On a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

B100423/2025

European Parliament resolution on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

(2025/2901(RSP))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

–having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

–having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

–having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö, special adviser to the President of the European Commission, of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

–having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.whereas three years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the UN Charter and its own international commitments; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B.whereas since then, Russian forces have continued to carry out and escalate indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments, combined with ground fighting, have continued throughout 2025;

C.whereas Russia has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas such airspace violations have rapidly increased over the last year and represent a reckless escalation that threatens regional security;

D.whereas during the night of 9-10 September 2025, amid a large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine, a swarm of Russian drones violated Polish airspace; whereas several Russian drones were shot down and others avoided interception; whereas in response, Poland invoked NATO consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

E.whereas on 13 September 2025, a Russian drone violated Romanian airspace, was intercepted by fighter jets and flew inside Romanian airspace for approximately 50 minutes before leaving, heading towards Ukraine; whereas this incident was not isolated, as multiple prior and subsequent violations of Romanian airspace have been documented, including repeated discoveries of Russian drone debris in Tulcea County and the Danube Delta between 2023 and 2025, and confirmed incursions on 17 January 2025 and 29–30 September 2025, when fragments from Russian attack drones targeting Ukrainian Danube ports were found on Romanian territory;

F.whereas on 20 September 2025, three Russian fighter jets entered up to 10 kilometres into Estonian airspace for 12 minutes until they were intercepted and escorted out by NATO fighter jets; whereas Estonia invoked NATO consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in response;

G.whereas in recent weeks, drone sightings in Denmark have caused the temporary closure of several airports; whereas drones have also been sighted at Danish military facilities; whereas it remains unclear who is responsible for these incidents; whereas these drones were operated in violation of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft;

H.whereas in recent days, drone sightings in Germany have caused disruption at Munich airport; whereas drones have been spotted across Germany at airports and military installations; whereas in many cases it remains unclear who is responsible for these incidents;

I.whereas during the night of 25-26 September 2025, drones were sighted near the Swedish Karlskrona naval base, the largest naval base of the Swedish navy; whereas Sweden and its largest island Gotland are of strategic importance for protecting the Baltic states in the event of a conflict with Russia;

J.whereas Russia continues to pose a direct and long-term military and hybrid threat to the EU and its neighbourhood; whereas EU countries in the Baltic Sea region and along the eastern border face persistent provocations and must maintain a high level of readiness and resilience;

K.whereas in response to ongoing airspace violations, NATO announced on 12 September 2025 the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a multi-domain military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s posture along its eastern flank;

L.whereas the Commission President proposed the construction of a ‘drone wall’ in September 2025, as part of a broader Eastern Flank Watch initiative; whereas the Commission has not yet produced a detailed proposal for this ‘drone wall’, leaving questions about cost and practicalities open;

M.whereas reinforcing the EU’s eastern border is essential for safeguarding its citizens, economy and infrastructure; whereas deterrence and preparedness must combine civilian, digital and military measures to prevent incursions and protect sovereignty;

1.Expresses its undivided solidarity with the countries affected by Russian airspace violations and stresses the importance for EU Member States of standing united in the face of Russia’s provocations;

2.Highlights that Russia’s clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare to sow fear and distrust, and are intended to test and destabilise the societies of EU Member States and NATO allies; stresses, therefore, the importance of societal resilience and preparedness as highlighted in the recommendations of the Niinistö report;

3.Stresses that while there have been incidents targeting civilian infrastructure in other parts of the EU, these should not divert attention from the security of the EU’s eastern border, which faces growing risks from the use of military drones; emphasises that the EU must act quickly to strengthen and fund protection measures in these regions, combining civil and military tools to ensure effective defence;

4.Notes the Commission President’s proposal for a ‘drone wall’, as well as Eastern Flank Watch; highlights that this proposal remains very vague, leaving questions about cost and practicalities open; stresses the need for a concrete proposal for drone defence alongside a detailed implementation roadmap with clear financing, governance and technological standards as a complementary element to the Union’s defence readiness, which also includes elements such as cyber defence, air defence and ammunition production as outlined in the white paper entitled ‘White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030’;

5.Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and supports the creation of a coordinated, multi-layered drone defence network across the eastern flank with a focus on advanced technologies and anti-drone systems for detection, tracking and neutralisation; stresses in this context the need for a holistic approach that also focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones; notes that armed forces are often not the actors best placed to deal with drone sightings swiftly and stresses the importance of civil-military cooperation in this regard;

6.Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

7.Welcomes the support Ukraine has offered to Poland, Romania and other European countries in countering Russian airspace violations; notes that Ukraine has extensive experience with Russian drones that EU Member States and NATO allies can learn from, despite the fact that drone defence in a wartime context fundamentally differs from drone defence in a peacetime context; places particular emphasis, in this regard, on Ukraine’s experience with the digitalisation of its armed forces, and the enhancement of its drone technology and production; calls on the Member States to facilitate the integration of Ukraine’s defence technological and industrial base into the European defence technological and industrial base as a mutually beneficial step;

8.Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility which would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model; calls on EU Member States to use loans under the Security Action for Europe initiative in this regard;

9.Urges the United States and EU Member States to lift restrictions on western-delivered weapons used by Ukraine in order to enable Ukraine to hit military targets inside Russia;

10.Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure; expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

11.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, the President and Parliament of Ukraine, and the President and Parliament of the Russian Federation.