On Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

B100076/2025

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

(2024/2988(RSP))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine,

–having regard to the UN Charter,

–having regard to the Hague Conventions,

–having regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols thereto,

–having regard to the Rome Statute of 1998,

–having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),

–having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a continuous and unprecedented assault as part of its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B.whereas Russia’s forces continue to conduct systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting continued throughout 2024; whereas waves of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure, disrupting power and water supplies, have seriously limited access to essential services for civilians, healthcare facilities and schools, all with long-term implications;

C.whereas alongside the physical war on the ground where Ukrainian soldiers risk their lives every day for their country’s freedom and independence, Russia is also waging a global war of disinformation in an attempt to justify its heinous crimes against Ukraine and influence discourse about the war in its favour, including by using false historical narratives to delegitimise Ukraine and falsely labelling Ukrainians as Nazis or Nazi sympathisers;

D.whereas Vladimir Putin’s regime has developed a campaign based on a parallel universe of European history and uses social media to spread its disinformation; whereas Russia’s campaign of historical falsification demonstrates a pattern, particularly regarding the pre-World War II era; whereas one of the most prominent examples of this historical falsification is Russia’s interpretation of the 1939 German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, commonly referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, justifying its claims to spheres of influence in Europe and promoting the concept of ‘Russkiy mir’, or ‘Russian world’; whereas among the EU Member States, Russia particularly threatens Poland and the Baltic States and their sovereignty on a regular basis through this type of historical revisionism;

E.whereas a large part of disinformation comes from more covert online sources, such as networks of bots spreading disinformation and false narratives or paid influencers reproducing disinformation; whereas in June 2024 alone, there were 1 400 fake pro-Russian accounts on X, reaching 4.5 million users;

F.whereas Russia’s disinformation campaign reaches beyond Ukraine and seeks to destabilise democracies in the EU and divide Europe, be it through social media or corrupt political actors;

G.whereas a Moscow-orchestrated campaign used TikTok to influence Romania’s 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections by promoting a far-right candidate through multiple methods, including coordinated accounts, algorithms to boost his presence on the platform and paid promotion; whereas on 5 December 2024, the Commission issued a ‘retention order’ to TikTok under its Digital Services Act (DSA) to preserve evidence ‘related to actual or foreseeable systemic risks its service could pose on electoral processes and civic discourse in the EU’;

H.whereas the personalised recommender algorithms of social media platforms actively promote and spread content that induces anger, such as disinformation, clickbait and hate content, including Russian disinformation;

I.whereas Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has announced a change to Meta’s content review policies on Facebook and Instagram, removing fact-checkers and replacing them with user-generated ‘community notes’, which will clear the way for increased and more successful Russian disinformation; whereas Elon Musk previously made similar changes to his social media platform, X;

J.whereas in December 2024, the Council adopted the EU’s 15th sanctions package of economic and individual restrictive measures against Russia, including specific measures targeting 16 individuals and three entities responsible for Russia’s destabilising actions abroad that are part of its broader international disinformation campaign;

1.Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

2.Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law; stresses that the ultimate goal remains the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of the Ukrainian people within a peaceful and stable Europe;

3.Condemns Russia’s efforts to produce and promote false historical narratives serving its strategic geopolitical and neo-colonial goals of undermining support for Ukraine, justifying its war of aggression, threatening the statehood of EU Member States and causing division in Europe; expresses concern about the hesitant response to these narratives at both European and Member State level;

4.Recognises that the suppression of historical archives, attacks on independent research institutions and official endorsements of extremist scholars have contributed to the imperial, colonialist and fascist state narratives in Russia, which also seek to dismantle the EU as a voluntary, open-ended and civic political project; calls for the EU and its Member States not just to counter these false narratives, but to dedicate project funding for researchers, non-governmental organisations and relevant institutions in the context of Europe’s historical, multifaceted, self-reflective memory;

5.Welcomes the Commission’s 15th sanctions package of economic and individual restrictive measures against Russia and, in particular, the restrictive measures in the context of fighting Russia’s disinformation campaign; calls for the EU and its Member States to swiftly and thoroughly implement these sanctions, and for like-minded partners to adopt similar sanctions; calls, further, on the Commission to expand and update similar sanctions in future sanctions packages;

6.Expresses deep concern about the recent announcements from social media companies’ leadership concerning relaxing their rules on fact-checking and moderation and how this will further enable Russia’s disinformation campaign around the world; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the DSA in response to these announcements by Meta and earlier by X, including as an important part of the fight against Russian disinformation;

7.Calls for stricter transparency for political advertising through the enforcement of the DSA and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, as well as for action against profit-driven algorithms based on personalisation, clicks and interaction, which amplify hatred and lies over truth; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take measures against recommender systems based on personalisation, clicks and interaction, as they are known in practice to promote disinformation and polarising, shocking content, they are too easy to manipulate, for example through bot networks, and they make European democracies and people directly vulnerable to foreign interference and manipulation, as shown in the recent case of Russian interference via TikTok in Romania’s elections;

8.Calls on the Commission to explore alternatives such as recommendations based on accounts followed in chronological order, alternative recommender systems that give more control to users and the interoperability of recommender systems; calls on the Commission to proactively research foreign interference and manipulation and promptly sanction sources that are known to be backed by the Russian state;

9.Calls for the EU and the Member States to step up their support for the independent Russian media in exile in order to enable diverse voices in the Russian-language media;

10.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Russian authorities.