Towards an EU strategy to protect and strengthen the international justice system and its institutions, mechanisms and partners

(2026/2004(INI))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 2, 3(5), 21, 23, 36 and 37 thereof,

–having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 208, 212, 220 and 221 thereof,

–having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

–having regard to the International Bill of Human Rights,

–having regard to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946,

–having regard to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

–having regard to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

–having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

–having regard to all international ad hoc tribunals and hybrid/internationalised courts established by the UN,

–having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

–having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–having regard to the Trust Fund for Victims created in 2004 by the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC, in accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute,

–having regard to the Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance of 10 April 20061,

–having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 20252,

–having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 20253,

–having regard to the criminal proceedings initiated on 20 March 2023 by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation against ICC officials, including Karim Khan, Rosario Salvatore Aitala, Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez and Tomoko Akane, on the basis of alleged ‘illegal prosecution’,

–having regard to the judgments delivered in absentia in December 2025 in Moscow against the Prosecutor and eight judges of the ICC, in connection with proceedings concerning Vladimir Putin, including measures targeting Karim Khan, Piotr Józef Hofmański, Tomoko Akane, Rosario Salvatore Aitala, Reine Alapini-Gansou, Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez, Haikel Ben Mahfoud, Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza and Bertram Schmitt,

–having regard to the decision of 21 May 2023 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation to place ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan on the federal wanted list,

–having regard to the US National Emergencies Act (NEA) of 1976 and the US International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977,

–having regard to Executive Order 14203 of 6 February 2025 of the President of the United States (‘Imposing Sanctions on the ICC’), adopted pursuant to the IEEPA and the NEA, which prohibits any material assistance, sponsor or provision of financial, material or technical support for, or goods or services to a designated person,

–having regard to the implementation measures adopted in 2025 under Executive Order 14203 by the US authorities, including successive designation rounds of ICC officials, notably Solomy Balungi Bossa, Luz del Carmen Ibañez Carranza, Reine Adelaide Sophie Alapini Gansou, Gocha Lordkipanidze, Erdenebalsuren Damdin, Karim Khan, Nazhat Shameem Khan, Mame Mandiaye Niang, Beti Hohler, Nicolas Guillou and Kimberly Prost, as designated on 6 February, 5 June, 20 August and 18 December 2025, including asset freezes, travel bans and restrictions on access to financial and digital services,

–having regard to coercive measures adopted by the US Government on 9 July and 4 September 2025 affecting United Nations mandate holders, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, as well as organisations cooperating with the ICC, including Al-Haq, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,

–having regard to the preliminary injunction of US District Court Judge Richard Leon for the District of Columbia on halting sanctions against Francesca Albanese on 13 May 2026,

–having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom4, as amended,

–having regard to the establishment of the Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) in 2022 and the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) in July 2023 within Eurojust,

–having regard to Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and repealing Common Position 2003/444/CFSP5,

–having regard to the action plan adopted by the European Council on 12 July 2011 to follow up on Council Decision 2011/168/CFSP of 21 March 2011 on the International Criminal Court and repealing Common Position 2003/444/CFSP6,

–having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 November 2015 on EU’s support to transitional justice,

–having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in June 2004 and updated in 2008, and to its resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders7,

–having regard to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, including the Statue of the Special Tribunal of 25 June 2025 between Ukraine and the Council of Europe (CoE),

–having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025,

–having regard to the Council conclusions of 30 January 2026 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2026,

–having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy 2020-2024, extended until 2027,

–having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘EU Strategy for Civil Society’ (COM(2025)0790),

–having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),

–having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 June 2025 entitled ‘An International Digital Strategy for the European Union’ (JOIN(2025)0140),

–having regard to the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol), in particular Article 2, which requires the organisation to act in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–having regard to the EU Visa Code and handbook,

–having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

–having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0000/2026),

A.whereas the EU’s commitment to support international justice is embedded in its external action policies, which aim to uphold human rights and the rule of law; whereas key actions include financing and defending the ICC through existing legal instruments, financing actions related to accountability through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, strengthening transitional justice, providing aid for investigations and reparations for victims, supporting Eurojust as well as UN-backed investigative mechanisms, partnering with civil society organisations and strengthening judicial cooperation with non-EU countries; whereas the Blocking Statute Regulation8 is a legal tool that can be used to protect stakeholders from the extraterritorial impact of foreign sanctions;

B.whereas Articles 3 and 21 TEU require consistency between the EU’s internal and external action; whereas failure to support international justice mechanisms and to comply with international obligations would undermine the credibility of the EU’s external action;

C.whereas supporting the ICC and building networks to promote the universality and integrity of the Rome Statute is a specific action of the EU human rights and democracy action plan 2020-2027;

D.whereas as a court of last resort, the ICC is fully integrated into the judicial system of all State Parties to the Rome Statute;

E.whereas coercive measures imposed by countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute are targeting individuals, including EU citizens, and entities working on international accountability mechanisms, such as ICC judges and prosecutors, UN mandate holders and civil society organisations; whereas such measures threaten accountability processes and jurisdictional independence and have an extraterritorial impact in the EU;

F.whereas such coercive measures are illegal, and constitute a serious threat to EU and Member State sovereignty;

G.whereas a number of civil society organisations documenting international crimes face coercive measures because of their cooperation with the ICC or with non-governmental organisations cooperating with the ICC or with UN mandate holders;

H.whereas such coercive measures impair their ability to collect, preserve and transmit evidence, thereby jeopardising accountability processes and victims’ rights;

I.whereas banks, insurers and payment providers face risk of fines and exclusion from markets if they maintain or establish relations with the ICC or entities and individuals designated under such coercive measures; whereas this has led to widespread overcompliance by private operators in order to mitigate their exposure to risk; whereas overcompliance and extraterritorial effects manifest in the disruption of essential services to individuals and organisations;

J.whereas the extraterritorial impacts of such measures are amplified by the structural dependence of global, financial, digital and technological systems on non-EU infrastructure;

K.whereas the need to mitigate these impacts is urgent, as they weaken investigations, witness protection, and evidence gathering and preservation, create chilling effects, including self-censorship, and result in reduced cooperation with accountability mechanisms;

L.whereas the broad complex of existing EU support instruments for international justice should be assessed to identify efficiency gaps, such as the absence of a dedicated comprehensive EU strategy;

M.whereas in its resolution of 21 January 2026 on human rights and democracy in the world and the EU’s policy on the matter (annual report 2025), Parliament reaffirmed its full support for the ICC as an essential pillar of the international justice system, stressed that its independence and impartiality must be safeguarded against political pressure and coercive measures, called for full cooperation with the ICC, and underlined the crucial role of civil society organisations;

N.whereas international accountability efforts, including the establishment of the ICPA and CICED within Eurojust, demonstrate the effectiveness of coordinated responses to strengthen international justice mechanisms;

O.whereas Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, as amended, was adopted to protect natural and legal persons within the EU against the extraterritorial application of legislation of non-EU countries;

P.whereas Parliament has repeatedly called on the Commission to activate the EU Blocking Statute to protect the ICC;

Q.whereas the Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 has not been updated to reflect the most recent developments;

R.whereas activating the Blocking Statute would manifest the EU’s capacity to preserve the integrity of its legal order against extraterritorial effects of measures taken by non-EU countries and to uphold EU sovereignty; whereas activating the Statute would also represent a powerful symbol of the EU support given to international justice, its operators and partners as well as give substantial support to EU economic actors by providing clear guidelines; whereas a persistent lack of activation could amount to a potential breach of the EU’s obligation as per its cooperation agreement with the ICC;

Developing an EU strategy to strengthen the international system of justice and to protect European sovereignty

1.Recalls that respect for the protection and enforcement of international criminal justice through both defensive and positive actions are clear objectives of EU foreign policy;

2.Notes that the EU has developed important legal, diplomatic, operational and financial instruments to support the international justice architecture, UN-backed investigative mechanisms, CoE- and UN-backed Special Tribunals, judicial cooperation initiatives and the ICC;

3.Firmly condemns all unilateral foreign coercive measures, applied or threatened, targeting international multilateral judicial institutions and UN mandate holders, as well as human rights organisations cooperating with them;

4.Considers that such measures and their extraterritorial application are unlawful and constitute interference threatening European sovereignty and have exposed significant gaps and insufficiencies in the EU’s capacity to protect international justice stakeholders and defend EU autonomy;

5.Calls for the EU to undertake diplomatic and legal action aimed at revoking all unilateral foreign coercive measures;

6.Calls for a comprehensive assessment of the existing EU tools that support international justice in order to identify and address gaps, such as the absence of a dedicated comprehensive EU strategy, lack of protection mechanisms for sanctioned stakeholders, insufficient regulatory clarity and operational safeguards against overcompliance by private operators, and limited financial predictability for international accountability actors;

7.Calls on the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in partnership with Parliament, to propose a comprehensive EU Strategic Framework to respect, protect and strengthen the international justice system and its institutions, mechanisms and partners against unilateral foreign coercive measures and other forms of interference; demands that there be extensive consultation with civil society organisations when preparing such a strategy;

8.Calls on the Commission to adopt an action plan, integrated into the strategic framework, to address every issue arising from the extraterritorial application of unilateral foreign coercive measures, allow sanctioned entities and individuals to retain access to IT providers, bank accounts, insurance and health coverage, and mitigate the risks of fragmented national policies and external dependencies; stresses the need for strengthened interservice cooperation for a consistent EU response in this regard;

9.Urges the Commission to activate the EU Blocking Statute as an essential and immediate instrument to counteract the extraterritorial effects of foreign unilateral coercive measures;

Respecting, protecting and strengthening international justice institutions and mechanisms

10.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the lack of full domestic implementation of the Rome Statute;

11.Urges the Hungarian Government to reverse its withdrawal from the Rome Statute as a matter of priority;

12.Reaffirms the centrality of the Rome Statute in the ICC and calls on the European Council to work towards its explicit inclusion in the EU acquis;

13.Deplores the fact that coercive measures from non-EU countries and the credible threat of such measures against international justice actors divert institutional and human resources away from core work on investigations, prosecutions, witness and victim protection, and documentation, generate chilling effects, including self-censorship among institutions and civil society organisations, and endanger the chain of custody, integrity and admissibility of evidence collected for use in proceedings;

14.Commends international accountability practices, such as the Eurojust liaison prosecutors’ system and CICED; calls for such instruments to be applied more broadly worldwide;

15.Calls on the Commission to propose updating Europol’s mandate so that ICC arrest warrants are automatically transferred to and implemented by the executing State; calls for Europol’s immunity system to be aligned with Article 27 of the Rome Statute;

16.Reaffirms the essential role of the UN in achieving international accountability; calls for the EU and the Member States to strengthen their support to international criminal jurisdictions and investigative mechanisms established by the UN;

Respecting, protecting and supporting all stakeholders working on accountability and justice

17.Recognises the key role that civil society organisations play in documenting and gathering evidence of international crimes and providing legal expertise and support to victims, and in broader monitoring and advocacy efforts for international justice;

18.Deplores the fact that stakeholders targeted by foreign coercive measures for their work on accountability face severe restrictions in daily life, including lack of access to banking services and financial transactions, insurance coverage, digital accounts, and mobility;

19.Stresses that such organisations and individuals, including EU citizens, must be protected effectively against the extraterritorial impact of such coercive measures; calls on the Commission to reduce structural vulnerabilities by developing European independent financial and digital infrastructure, including a sovereign European payment system;

20.Calls for the EU to publicly support civil society organisations and institutions targeted by such coercive measures in order to allow them to continue their work; calls for the EU and the Member States to facilitate visa procedures for ICC witnesses and human rights defenders working on accountability, including through the fast-tracking of applications, and issuing of both Schengen visas and national visas, as provided for by the Visa Code and handbook;

21.Disapproves of the fact that amplification of the extraterritorial reach of unilateral coercive measures frequently occurs due to overcompliance by private actors either operating exclusively in the EU or within globally integrated financial and technological infrastructure;

22.Calls on the Commission to mitigate the legal uncertainty faced by private actors arising from foreign coercive measures by adopting EU guidelines to address overcompliance and by providing protection mechanisms;

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23.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.