Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

Removed(2) legal and administrative abuse;

AddedI. whereas Member States play a fundamental role in preventing, investigating and responding to acts of TNR; whereas fragmented national approaches, and a lack of coordination between Member States, undermine the EU’s ability to identify, prevent and combat TNR effectively and consistently, and are insufficient to address its cross-border nature; whereas such fragmentation may, in practice, exacerbate insecurity for affected individuals and communities, including by increasing exposure, visibility or vulnerability to coercion by states of origin; whereas stronger coordination at EU level should support and complement Member States’ competences in the field of national security;

Removed(3) non-physical coercive methods;

AddedJ. whereas data collected over the last decade indicate a sustained increase in the scale, geographic reach and sophistication of TNR; whereas the number and types of actors involved in TNR have also expanded due to the outsourcing of repression to proxies such as organised crime networks, former intelligence officers, and cyber actors, including within EU Member States, thereby increasing deniability, complicating attribution and undermining accountability;

AddedK. whereas TNR frequently exploits the ordinary operation of host-state administrative, financial, and migration systems, including compliance-driven financial controls, rigid documentation requirements and fragmented data-handling practices; whereas, as a result, EU institutions and Member States risk their structures being abused by perpetrators, even in the absence of intent or direct cooperation with perpetrator states; whereas addressing TNR therefore requires scrutiny of internal EU and national procedures to prevent their exploitation for repressive purposes;

AddedL. whereas individuals and communities targeted by TNR are also key first responders with unique knowledge of repressive tactics, proxy networks and evolving risk patterns; whereas therefore meaningful engagement with affected communities is essential for effective prevention, early warning, and the development of durable counter-strategies;

AddedM. whereas TNR has a severe and sustained impact on human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and political activists, as well as on their family members;

AddedN. whereas TNR is often mischaracterised as a series of isolated incidents rather than as a sustained strategy targeting entire communities; whereas the absence of physical violence or overt harassment should not be equated with safety or freedom, as silencing, fear, trauma and fragmentation are often the intended outcome of TNR; whereas these cumulative effects of TNR necessitate not only immediate protection but also access to effective remedies and compensation; whereas, even when victims prevail, compensation is often symbolic, delayed or unenforced;

AddedO. whereas TNR affects individuals differently depending on their gender, sexual orientation, racial, ethnic or religious background, and socio-economic position; whereas intersecting forms of discrimination and structural inequalities in both countries of origin and host states may increase the negative effects of TNR; whereas women face particular forms of TNR that can manifest in sexualised and sexist digital attacks targeting their identity, aiming to intimidate, discredit and deter them from activism, reflecting a broader pattern of gender-based online abuse and harassment, and whereas LGBTIQ+ individuals are also disproportionately targeted;

AddedTrends, forms and methods of transnational repression

AddedP. whereas TNR, albeit not new as such, is an evolving phenomenon and is taking place in a challenging context marked by the deterioration of human rights, restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic space, and the increasingly assertive behaviour of certain authoritarian regimes;

AddedQ. whereas physical forms of TNR include targeted killings, abductions, violence, enforced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property; whereas 1 375 direct physical incidents were recorded by Freedom House in 107 target countries between 2014 and 2025;

AddedR. whereas certain regimes are known to use threats or pay collaborators to record participants in public protest or spy on dissidents within the EU, thereby directly affecting the exercise of fundamental rights;

AddedS. whereas authoritarian regimes, in the digital era, are developing increasingly sophisticated capabilities to conduct digital TNR; whereas digital TNR includes online harassment, direct threats, doxxing, hacking, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, smear operations, and incitement of hatred against dissidents in their countries of residence, including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and the deployment of spyware and other surveillance technologies, to monitor, profile, intimidate or silence individuals abroad, intertwining with traditional methods of TNR; whereas such practices are often difficult to attribute and frequently remain below traditional criminal thresholds; whereas these practices are especially harmful as internet platforms and digital media can be crucially important, both personally and professionally, for individuals who have been forced to leave their countries as a result of political persecution; whereas the rise of AI has exponentially increased TNR’s reach and impact, including by enabling authorities to perform facial recognition, behaviour analysis and real-time data processing; whereas digital threats against civil society are considered human rights violations; whereas social media companies and online platforms play a significant role in shaping the online environment for human rights defenders and activists; whereas the absence of effective rapid-response mechanisms to address doxxing and targeted online harassment leaves defenders exposed to heightened risks of intimidation, surveillance and further TNR; whereas the Digital Services Act provides tools that can address aspects of TNR, particularly regarding coordinated harassment and disinformation;

AddedT. whereas digital service providers, social media and other online platforms, private spyware companies and other technology companies have, at times, become enablers of TNR; whereas mainstream platforms such as WeChat, Telegram, Facebook, X and others are used for tracking dissidents participating in protests or expressing their opinions in other ways; whereas companies placing surveillance technologies on the market have a responsibility to prevent their illegitimate use for political purposes;

AddedU. whereas malicious foreign actors abuse open vulnerabilities in devices in order to infiltrate personal or professional communications; whereas multiple cases in recent years have shown that the EU is not equipped to tackle infiltration of devices by spyware; whereas spyware has been used by foreign actors to monitor dissidents and public officials alike; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of TNR or surveillance-enabled coercion; whereas the use of spyware for TNR poses a serious threat to fundamental rights, democratic processes and electoral integrity;

AddedV. whereas coercion-by-proxy constitutes a widespread and particularly harmful form of TNR, involving threats, harassment, detention or punishment of family members or associates who remain in the country of origin, as well as the use of diaspora events or organisations to enable surveillance and intimidation of community members, thereby inflicting severe psychological harm and creating incentives for self-censorship; whereas coercion-by-proxy can also involve members of diaspora communities being compelled to carry out repressive activities on behalf of the state, rendering them simultaneously victims and instruments of TNR; whereas some members of diasporas can also be used as a tool to exert TNR without being compelled; whereas it is important to strengthen the identification of individuals among the diaspora that might be involved in carrying out acts of TNR;

AddedW. whereas, in order to make their requests appear more credible, state services responsible for TNR often falsify allegations, presenting victims of TNR as perpetrators of crimes; whereas perpetrators of TNR increasingly use trials in absentia, mass criminal proceedings, property confiscation, and intimidation of relatives as tools of repression against dissidents abroad, thereby preventing international travel and safe return, restricting property rights, and exerting indirect pressure through family members remaining in the country; whereas jurisdictional limitations and the extraterritorial nature of such practices make coercion-by-proxy especially difficult for host countries to prevent, document and prosecute, contributing significantly to victims’ reluctance to report incidents;

AddedX. whereas states engaging in TNR frequently misuse international and legal cooperation mechanisms, including extradition and information requests, data-sharing mechanisms, mutual legal assistance, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering / countering of the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and cybersecurity frameworks, as well as Interpol notices or diffusions used in connection with their implementation, to locate, detain or forcibly return individuals on political grounds, thereby giving repressive regimes legitimacy, despite explicit prohibitions on political misuse under international law; whereas, in particular, Interpol Purple and Silver Notices are conceived as operational tools without individual remedy or review avenues for those affected, which facilitates their abuse in the context of TNR; whereas the sharing of Interpol data, including for red notices and diffusions, can expose the persons targeted by autocratic actors to danger; whereas the number of Interpol red notices and diffusions has increased dramatically over the last decade and is the key tool used by perpetrators of TNR;

AddedY. whereas perpetrator states employ administrative and mobility-based forms of TNR through surveillance and coercion by diplomatic or consular missions, including by cancelling or refusing to renew passports, denying consular services, or revoking nationality, thereby coercing individuals to engage with consular authorities or preventing travel; whereas the denial of consular services affects not only human rights defenders and political activists but also their families;

AddedZ. whereas financial TNR involves the misuse of FATF AML/CFT standards to disseminate false allegations and trigger compliance-based account freezes and de-banking; whereas these practices deprive affected individuals and organisations of funding and financial services, and undermine their livelihoods, civic and political activities; whereas the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) constitutes a key EU safeguard point that must develop rapid-response mechanisms against abusive freezes and closures and establish strict limits on data-sharing with perpetrator states;

AddedAA. whereas administrative procedures may be exploited by perpetrator states and their enablers, particularly where access to documents issued by the country of origin is required or where interpreters are used as proxies to intimidate or coerce victims;

AddedPerpetrators, cooperation and proxy structures

AddedAB. whereas Parliament-commissioned research and independent datasets demonstrate that TNR is a global phenomenon, with more than 25 % of governments worldwide engaged in TNR, an estimated 3.5 million people at risk, and documented cases in more than 100 countries, according to Freedom House research; whereas TNR is committed mostly by authoritarian regimes; whereas prominent perpetrators of TNR in Europe and globally include Russia, China, Iran and Belarus;

AddedAC. whereas Parliament-commissioned research demonstrates that a majority of documented TNR incidents involve cooperation between origin and host states or the exploitation of weak rule-of-law environments, including through misuse of extradition frameworks, law enforcement cooperation and international organisations;

AddedAD. whereas TNR is often regionally clustered, indicating informal or formal cooperation frameworks and shared practices among perpetrator states and their enablers, including reciprocal enforcement of repression against exiled communities, European citizens and entities;

AddedAE. whereas, in order to make their requests appear more credible, state services responsible for TNR often falsify allegations, presenting victims of TNR as perpetrators of crimes;

AddedAF. whereas Russia is among the most aggressive perpetrators of TNR globally and is responsible for the highest number of documented incidents within the EU of any origin country, treating political emigration as a strategic threat, and using practices including assassination, attempted assassination, digital surveillance, harassment, kidnapping plots, cyberattacks, hostile intelligence operations, blackmail, smear campaigns, intimidation of diaspora communities, stigmatisation, in-absentia legal proceedings, coercion-by-proxy and threats against family members, the systematic weaponisation of international legal, financial, cybersecurity and lawenforcement cooperation mechanisms, as well as threats against EU lawmakers; whereas Russia accounts for a disproportionate share of public Interpol Red Notices globally, far exceeding comparable usage by other states; whereas Russia relies on bilateral prosecutorial cooperation agreements with third countries to facilitate extradition requests targeting its nationals abroad; whereas Russia’s intelligence services have conducted online recruitment campaigns, often through Telegram, for murder-for-hire and terrorist activities often directed against Russian diaspora and political opponents; whereas Russia uses proxies, including the Wagner Group, Chechen death squads, cultural institutions, and, in some cases, structures affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church to carry out TNR;

AddedAG. whereas Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory, notably through physical violence, the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, denial of travel documents, the use of spyware, coercive consular practices, forced returns, asset seizures and intimidation; whereas Belarus uses Interpol’s Red Notice system to target political opponents in exile, and targets the diaspora and dissidents, including those residing in the EU, through criminal cases, special in-absentia trials and coercion-by-proxy;

AddedAH. whereas China operates the most comprehensive and systematic TNR campaign in the world, supported by extensive extraterritorial infrastructure, comprising state-aligned entities, overseas police service stations, diaspora, academic and student organisations, media outlets and digital networks, used to identify, monitor, intimidate and coerce individuals within diaspora communities and their associates, through surveillance, harassment, legal and financial pressure, abuse of Interpol mechanisms, forced returns and family intimidation; whereas China uses coercive measures against European individuals and entities; whereas reports by human rights defenders indicate that China operates covert police stations and proxy actors on European soil without legal basis, enabling surveillance and coercive returns, including through threats against relatives and, in some cases, abductions; whereas Chinese authorities exert pressure on academics to halt research deemed sensitive, including on supply chains and forced labour practices, or on Tibet and Taiwan, and target artists by seeking the cancellation of events relating to Taiwan; whereas China is a leading exporter of surveillance systems, spyware and data-driven policing tools, which are used by other authoritarian regimes to monitor and intimidate their own diaspora communities abroad; whereas Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and have been used to carry out TNR, including by targeting European politicians with threats of prosecution and extradition, and issuing arrest warrants and bounties against activists and academics residing in the EU; whereas the EU’s extradition arrangements with China and Hong Kong raise serious concern;

AddedAI. whereas Iran has a long-standing record of pursuing perceived opponents abroad and conducting TNR within the EU, with operations directed at the highest levels of state authority and executed by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Quds Force, using tactics such as assassinations, abductions, enforced disappearances, credible threats of violence, digital TNR and the outsourcing of repression to organised crime groups and other proxies, including by intimidation of journalists and dissidents, cyber surveillance, coercion of relatives in Iran and documented assassination and kidnapping plots against opposition figures on European soil; whereas these actions threaten public security and violate fundamental rights;

AddedAJ. whereas the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act) provides an important instrument to target individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including those involved in acts of TNR; whereas its effective and consistent use can contribute to deterrence, accountability and the protection of fundamental rights;

AddedAK. whereas the EU currently lacks a common definition, comprehensive data collection mechanisms and a coordinated, whole-of-EU institutional approach to countering TNR; whereas these are also lacking outside the EU, which creates challenges for prevention, identification and effective policy responses;

AddedAL. whereas many forms of TNR are rarely captured in official statistics due to their covert nature; whereas TNR is significantly under-reported, including within the EU, as persons targeted by TNR often fear retaliation against family members or distrust authorities due to prior experiences in authoritarian contexts; whereas additional barriers to reporting include a lack of awareness and training among law enforcement and administrative authorities, the absence of accessible and trauma-informed reporting mechanisms, language barriers and the cumulative psychological toll of sustained intimidation, surveillance and harassment; whereas many TNR victims also refrain from reporting instances of abuse due to the inefficiency of local law enforcement or fear of making the situation worse; whereas this structural under-reporting results in a persistent protection gap for victims and communities targeted by TNR, undermines evidence-based policymaking and accountability, and thus contributes to the continued use of TNR by perpetrator states with limited risk of exposure or consequences;

AddedAM. whereas many EU host countries fail to address and capture TNR below the criminal threshold;

AddedAN. whereas the current proposal for the European Democracy Shield includes no mention of TNR;

AddedEstablishing a common EU understanding of transnational repression

Added1. Considers TNR to constitute a serious and growing threat to democracy, a human rights violation, and a form of foreign interference, undermining democratic governance, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the sovereignty and security of host states and their ability to ensure the protection of persons residing on their territory; underlines that these trends are likely to intensify due to the erosion of international norms and rapid technological change, which is also reducing the cost of carrying out such actions;

Added2. Condemns acts of TNR and foreign interference, including those carried out in EU Member States, in the strongest possible terms; calls on the Commission and the Member States to acknowledge that TNR constitutes an unacceptable and unlawful practice, primarily exercised by authoritarian regimes, and to commit to a zero-tolerance approach, which requires decisive, coordinated and comprehensive action towards any form of TNR occurring on EU territory;

Added3. Considers that the lack of a clear definition of TNR contributes to under-reporting, limits effective policy responses and hinders the use of accountability tools, including sanctions mechanisms; therefore calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to adopt a common EU definition of TNR based on the definition set out in this report and previous Parliament reports and integrate this definition systematically in all EU policies and instruments, including in external action, justice and home affairs, digital policy, financial regulation and sanctions frameworks, in order to prevent the EU’s legal and administrative frameworks from being misused for repressive purposes; urges Member States to codify TNR in their national legislation;

Added4. Defines TNR as deliberate acts or threats carried out by states, including repressive or authoritarian regimes, state-affiliated entities or entities subject to the influence of, or pressure from, a state, or its proxies, to defend and advance their interests by reaching across borders to intimidate, threaten, silence, coerce, control or harm in any other way individuals or groups living abroad, or their support networks and family members;

Added5. Notes with concern that targets of TNR include a broad range of individuals and groups, comprising, inter alia, dissidents, journalists, activists, academics and diaspora members and their families; acknowledges that TNR extends beyond diasporas and also targets organisations and persons defending or assisting victims, including those with no national connection to the perpetrator state; expresses serious concern about the shrinking of civic space and the silencing of exiled communities, whose voices are instrumental in documenting human rights situations and abuses;

Added6. Underlines that TNR encompasses a wide range of constantly expanding coercive practices, including but not limited to:

Added(1) physical TNR, such as targeted killings, abductions, violence, forced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property;

Added(2) legal and administrative abuse – including the misuse of consular services, extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures – in absentia prosecutions, abuse of international notice systems, asset freezing and restriction of access to banking and financial services, baseless criminal charges, selective prosecution, denial of permits, licenses, or approvals without valid reason, or arbitrary fines or penalties;

Added(3) non-physical coercive methods, such as digital surveillance, threats, intimidation, digital harassment, misuse of spyware technologies, hacking, blackmail, accusations of terrorism or undermining state security, harassment of relatives and coercion-by-proxy – including through diplomatic or consular missions, organised crime networks, private actors, or state-aligned and state-affiliated entities operating abroad;

Added7. Stresses that the Member States are currently affected by TNR to differing degrees and display varying levels of awareness, institutional preparedness and protection mechanisms; stresses, however, that as perpetrators operate across borders and exploit divergences between national systems, TNR cannot be addressed effectively through isolated national responses, and therefore requires the engagement and preparedness of all Member States, within a coordinated EU framework;

Strengthening EU coordination, data collection and institutional response

Change 3

Removed6. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to establish an EU data collection, monitoring and reporting mechanism for TNR;

Added8. Stresses that TNR is significantly under-reported, even though collecting reliable data is essential to understand its scale; notes that people targeted by TNR may be reluctant to report incidents because they fear retaliation against family members, distrust authorities due to experiences in authoritarian countries or face language barriers;

Removed7. Underlines the essential role civil society plays in documenting the most hidden forms of TNR;

Added9. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in cooperation with relevant EU bodies including Europol, to establish an EU data collection, monitoring and reporting mechanism on TNR, covering incidents within the EU and globally, allowing public authorities and stakeholders to provide input, and which the Commission and Member States can use to develop, refine and evaluate their policies to counter TNR; stresses the need for shared methodologies and ensuring cooperation in this area with like-minded partners; stresses that reporting channels should be multilingual and trauma-informed, while ensuring robust data protection and confidentiality;

Removed8. Stresses that underreporting is structural; therefore, calls for reporting channels that are accessible and trauma-informed, and guarantee victim confidentiality and safety;

Added10. Calls on the Member States to ensure that criminal and non-criminal acts that have a component of TNR are consistently recorded as such across the EU, and that the relevant authorities are equipped to identify the TNR dimension;

Removed9. Calls on the Member States to provide specialised training for relevant authorities and to establish dedicated reporting channels and rapid response mechanisms for victims and civil society organisations;

Added11. Highlights the need for strong encryption and strict safeguards to ensure that information shared through these channels cannot be intercepted, misused or accessed by unauthorised actors, and that victims are not exposed to further harm;

Removed10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to set up a network of national contact points on TNR to facilitate regular exchanges of experiences and good practices;

Added12. Stresses that reports received through these channels should be assessed quickly and, where appropriate, followed by concrete action by the competent authorities, including investigations and efforts to identify possible links to foreign intelligence actors;

Removed11. Calls on the Council to appoint a coordinator for countering TNR;

Added13. Recognises the essential role of civil society organisations in documenting the most hidden forms of TNR – including digital surveillance, financial repression, administrative harassment, and coercion-by-proxy; highlights that current data collection on TNR is still primarily based on non-governmental sources, many of which face severe funding constraints, increasing the urgency for Member State and EU-level monitoring mechanisms; reiterates the need to support civil society, journalists, whistleblowers and others who uncover mechanisms and cases of TNR, often exposing them to high personal risks;