Changes from report parliamentary committee draft to plenary report

AddedC. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the increased assertiveness of other regional and global actors, such as China, Iran and certain Gulf countries, are destabilising the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, including through strategic investments and disinformation campaigns; whereas the EU needs to ensure greater support, especially for candidate countries, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in terms of the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; whereas the future of the Western Balkans and the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood lies in the EU;

AddedD. whereas Russia’s persistent attempts to destabilise the EU and to undermine the European security architecture requires the EU to substantially enhance the cohesion and effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy and its strategic sovereignty, set its own strategic objectives, defend its interests, values and citizens both within and outside its borders, in the Western Balkans and its immediate Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, to deliver peace, human security, sustainable development and democracy, and support its partners;

AddedE. whereas the strategic environment of the European continent as a whole is highly volatile, with open or latent conflicts in most neighbouring regions, from the Caucasus to the Sahel and from the Middle East to certain areas of North Africa; whereas, in addition to the annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions in Ukraine, Russia continues to occupy the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia and the Transnistria region in the Republic of Moldova, which demonstrates a need for an ongoing CSDP presence in the region;

AddedF. whereas the EU’s cooperation with certain African countries is being contested; whereas the EU and its Member States need to evaluate the effectiveness of EU CSDP missions and operations;

AddedG. whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes for Ukraine to have a decisive military victory to end Russia’s illegal war of aggression, restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and deter any future aggression; whereas Ukraine, in defending itself, is also protecting and fighting for European values and core security interests; whereas EU-NATO cooperation has been fundamental in coordinating weapons deliveries to Ukraine;

AddedH. whereas there is a new urgency for the EU to boost its capabilities, including by building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine and by increasing the funding of the European Defence Fund (EDF), Military Mobility and, in particular, the European Peace Facility (EPF), through which the EU has provided Ukraine with over EUR 5 billion worth of military equipment, as well as through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects and CSDP military and civilian missions; whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in security and defence, but also in cyber security;

AddedI. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, replenish depleted stocks and reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector; whereas further initiatives are needed to establish genuine European defence integration, including a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP);

AddedJ. whereas maximising the EU’s and the Member States’ defence capabilities requires smarter spending and greater joint procurement; whereas building capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrines and concepts; whereas the EU needs to prepare its future framework for defence cooperation on military capabilities, ranging from their conception, through to their development and operational employment, with a view to increasing our defence readiness in a joint effort;

AddedK. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has reaffirmed the role of NATO as the cornerstone of the collective defence of its members and the indispensability of a strong transatlantic bond; whereas the war has also underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO member states; whereas the decision of NATO leaders to commit a minimum of 2 % of GDP to defence spending has only been implemented by a few NATO member states; whereas the 2 % spending goal should represent a minimum for EU NATO countries and not a ceiling for defence spending;

AddedL. whereas the terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel have highlighted the volatile and dynamic security situation in the Middle East and the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility and assist governments and civil society organisations of the region with reaching durable and sustainable peace, in particular by continuing to support a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine;

AddedM. whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary strategic guidance and realistic and operational tools to move towards a coherent and credible defence policy, based on significantly increased military cooperation between Member States, and to make it an effective and capable security provider and an assertive global actor, also in view of the new security context, with the ability to rapidly respond to crises outside the EU; whereas EU leaders have committed to developing modalities for more flexible decision-making, particularly through Article 44 TEU, which allows ‘coalitions of the willing’ to conduct missions and operations on behalf of the EU; whereas to navigate the current international environment, the EU needs to adopt a holistic approach to face all the threats it is confronted with;

AddedN. whereas the Strategic Compass makes a positive contribution to global and transatlantic security, and it needs to be coherent and compatible with NATO’s Strategic Concept; whereas EU-NATO cooperation has recently improved significantly; whereas Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 42(7) TEU entail a mutual defence clause for members; whereas Article 222 TFEU further specifies a ‘solidarity clause’ among EU Member States;

AddedO. whereas, as outlined in the Strategic Compass, the EU must move further in its ambition to achieve an open strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty, while also reinforcing its partnerships with like-minded partners in order to safeguard its values and interests, as well as those of its allies and neighbours;

AddedP. whereas the CSDP has nine military missions and 13 civilian missions with over 4 000 personnel; whereas CSDP missions and operations often lack rapid decision-making and suffer from excessive micro-management from the Council, as well as limited financial, logistical and human resources; whereas Member States are deploying fewer personnel to the missions and operations; whereas these obstacles limit the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas one of the objectives of the Strategic Compass is to reinforce EU civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making processes and ensuring greater financial solidarity;

AddedQ. whereas CSDP missions and operations aim to strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood, such as in the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans and in the Horn of Africa, by providing services such as military, police, coast guard, border management training and capacity building; whereas if CSDP missions are to achieve mission objectives, they must begin giving advice and training in coping with emerging and disruptive technologies that are rapidly entering the ‘frozen conflict’ environment;

AddedR. whereas the EU’s integrated approach to external conflicts and crises provides for the coherent use of the EU’s different capacities, within which its security and defence policy should complement and be complemented by other civilian tools in order to contribute to human security and sustainable peace in Europe and the wider world;

AddedS. whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence, as also demonstrated by Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas women are heavily underrepresented in civilian CSDP missions, military missions and military operations; whereas the participation of women in peacekeeping and military operations should be encouraged and bolstered;

AddedT. whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM) has demonstrated the positive impact that CSDP missions and operations have with the necessary resources and contributions from Member States; whereas EUMAM has already reached the target of 30 000 Ukrainian soldiers trained; whereas, based on current results and trends, EUMAM stands ready to train more Ukrainian military personnel to reach the target of 40 000 soldiers; whereas the mission is also prepared to integrate air and maritime training as appropriate and to react to any other urgent Ukrainian training requests;

AddedU. whereas CSDP missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns, putting at risk their effectiveness in stabilising the country in which they are deployed; whereas the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) must consider how to protect a deployed force against hybrid threats;

AddedV. whereas Russia makes use of private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group, as part of a hybrid warfare toolbox to maintain plausible deniability, while successfully exerting influence in various regions and gaining access to natural resources and critical infrastructures; whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the Central African Republic; whereas it has reinforced anti-European sentiments, especially in countries with a strong EU presence or that host CSDP missions; whereas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger the situation is marked by the non-cooperative stance of the putschists towards other partners, including EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, regional organizations, as well as MINUSMA;

AddedW. whereas following the July coup in Niger, the putschists have taken a decision to prepare a case to prosecute the legitimate Nigerian President, Mohamed Bazoum, for ‘high treason’; whereas the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has followed a ‘two-track’ policy – mediation while applying sanctions (trade, banking and individual); whereas the EU has expressed strong support for ECOWAS, a readiness to prepare an autonomous sanctions regime and a willingness to look at any request that might come from ECOWAS for further support; whereas following the coup, both CSDP missions (EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger and the EU Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) in Niger) have suspended their operational activities and have kept only necessary core staff in the country; whereas the ongoing four assistance measures from the EPF (EUR 74 million in total) have been suspended; whereas the EUTM and EUCAP missions in the Sahel and in the Central African Republic have not yielded the expected results;

AddedX. whereas the instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood and the Sahel region is closely interlinked with and remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and the EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation (IRINI) are contributing to efforts made for sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo and fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking;

AddedY. whereas malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, in particular sponsored by Russia, and in some cases other actors such as China and Iran, are a significant challenge to the EU’s foreign policy;

AddedZ. whereas the rise in the use of hybrid attacks and threats, as demonstrated by Russia’s activities in the EU, in Ukraine, in Africa and elsewhere, necessitate the development of comprehensive instruments to detect, prevent and react to such incidents and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, through transforming traditional military capacities, improving the security of critical infrastructure, countering FIMI and further developing a common high level of cybersecurity; whereas China has also demonstrated an increased use of hybrid warfare tactics, including in the Indo-Pacific and South China Sea, aimed at undermining the stability and security of the EU;

AddedAa. whereas hybrid threats in the years to come will see increased use of the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyber warfare and emerging and disruptive technologies, from seabed to space, with the deployment of advanced space-based surveillance and strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, and nano-tech and bio-warfare;

AddedAb. whereas approximately 90 % of the Union’s external trade is transported by sea; whereas around two thirds of the world’s oil and gas supply is extracted at sea or transported by sea; whereas up to 90 % of international data and communications transfers are carried via undersea cables; whereas organised crime and drug traffickers carry out a significant part of their activities by sea, and even use submersible or semi-submersible vehicles or equipment that are difficult for law enforcement agencies to apprehend;

AddedAc. whereas security and defence cooperation with partners and allies are crucial to the EU’s ambition to become an international security provider; whereas cooperation with organisations such as the UN, NATO, the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as numerous allies and like-minded partners, is crucial to the successful implementation of the CSDP;

AddedAd. whereas the United States is the EU’s most important ally; whereas joint EU-US cooperation, partnership and friendship, mirrored, among other things, through our joint cooperation within NATO, are the backbone of our shared freedom, prosperity, democracy and security;

AddedAe. whereas Latin America is a strategic partner for the EU and whereas there is a lot of untapped potential for building a true strategic partnership, including in security cooperation;

AddedAf. whereas the Commission and Parliament are committed to reinforcing the EU as an external actor that is able to act more strategically and autonomously;

AddedAg. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation;

AddedAh. whereas China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas China has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation;

AddedAi. whereas the United States, Japan and South Korea held a historic first trilateral meeting on 18 August 2023; whereas mutual cooperation among like-minded countries, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region, is fundamental to ensuring the peaceful and prosperous development of the region; whereas the EU should also strive to enhance its security collaboration with these like-minded countries in the region;

AddedAj. whereas Kosovo and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue are facing threats of destabilisation; whereas the operation EUFOR Althea plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region;

AddedAk. whereas cultural heritage has a universal dimension as a testimony of history inseparable from peoples’ identity, which the international community has to protect and preserve for future generations;

Providing Ukraine with the defence capabilities it needs

Change 2

Removed1. Stands united with Ukraine and resolutely condemns Russia’s illegal war of aggression; deplores the global consequences of Russia’s illegal war of aggression which is hitting countries and vulnerable societies around the world through increased energy prices and food shortages and which also grossly violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermines European and global security and stability;

Added1. Expresses its concern about the rapidly deteriorating global security situation and believes that in these times of high uncertainty European and transatlantic unity, as well as close collaboration with like-minded partners across the globe, is more necessary than ever in order to address the challenges created by multiple global crises, act proactively and react decisively to threats to the international rules-based order and facilitate the effective implementation of the CSDP;

Removed2. Confirms the EU will continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes to end Russia’s war of aggression and restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, enabling it to effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect its civilians and fulfil their wish for EU membership;

Added2. Stands united with Ukraine and resolutely condemns Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression; deplores the global consequences of Russia’s illegal war of aggression which is hitting countries and vulnerable societies around the world through increased energy prices and food shortages and which also grossly violates and endangers international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermines European and global security and stability; recognises that Russia is continuing its war of aggression against Ukraine with the support of Belarus, Iran and North Korea, and maintains an active military presence where it deems it strategically important;

Removed3. Stresses the importance of the European Peace Facility (EPF) which has supported the Ukrainian armed forces by financing and delivering military equipment and training, while providing coordination for all stakeholders through the Clearing House Mechanism hosted by the EU Military Staff; calls for the financial sustainability and durability of the EPF to be ensured in order to provide Ukraine and other EU partners around the world with the support they request;

Added3. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the despicable terrorist attacks committed by the terrorist group Hamas against Israel, including the taking of hostages, and expresses its support for the State of Israel and its people; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages who have been taken by the terrorist group Hamas and for the bodies of deceased hostages to be returned; emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law; calls for continued, rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need through all necessary measures including humanitarian corridors and pauses for humanitarian needs; expresses its deepest sorrow and full solidarity with the innocent victims on both sides, their families and loved ones; calls for those responsible for terrorist acts and for violations of international law to be held to account;

Removed4. Welcomes the setting up of the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and its role in enhancing the military effectiveness of Ukraine’s armed forces so they can defend their territorial integrity within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders and allow the country to effectively exercise its sovereignty and protection of civilians;

Added4. Confirms that the EU will continue to support Ukraine by providing the necessary military means to end Russia’s war of aggression and restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, enabling it to effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect its citizens, document and investigate war crimes and bring those responsible to justice, and fulfil the wish of the people of Ukraine for Euro-Atlantic integration, in particular EU membership grounded in the strong identification with European values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and NATO membership; stresses that Ukraine’s military victory and its EU and NATO memberships are needed for overall security, stability and sustainable peace on the European continent;

Removed5. Commends the flexibility and adaptability of the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine in implementing its revised mandate in difficult conditions; calls on the EU to ensure it can operate with the adequate financial, logistical and human means to meet Ukraine’s needs;

Added5. Stresses the importance of the EPF, which has supported the Ukrainian armed forces by financing and delivering military equipment and training while providing coordination for all stakeholders through the Clearing House Mechanism hosted by the EU Military Staff (EUMS); encourages Member States to create a scenario-based and predictable inventory of military capabilities that can be provided under the EPF to ensure rapid sourcing of short- and long-term provision of capabilities; calls for the financial sustainability and durability of the EPF to be ensured in order to provide Ukraine and other EU partners around the world with the support they request; calls for a further increase in and speeding up of financial and military assistance to Ukraine and for the immediate deployment of modern equipment, weapons and next-generation air defence and surface-to-surface systems;

Removed6. Underlines the EU’s concrete support to Ukraine through the ‘three ammunition tracks’; urges faster delivery of ammunition from Member States’ existing stocks through the EPF; calls for the joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine to be sped up and stresses the need to ramp up the third track and ensure the effective implementation of the Act in Support of Ammunition Production; further stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration in EU defence policies and programmes during the EU membership process, building on the existing agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and as a beneficiary of the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA); calls on the European External Action Service to come forward with a plan for a sustainable and long-term package of security commitments for Ukraine;

Added6. Welcomes, in this regard, VP/HR Borrell’s proposal, building on Parliament’s previous call, for the creation of a EUR 20 billion assistance fund within the EPF, dedicated to supporting the Ukrainian armed forces with up to EUR 5 billion per year between 2023 and 2027, and calls on the Member States to rapidly approve it; strongly condemns efforts made by Hungary to block recent attempts to top up the EPF and the VP/HR’s proposal for the special assistance fund for Ukraine; emphasises that all military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF must fully comply with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, and must provide adequate transparency and accountability;7. Welcomes the setting up of the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) and its role in enhancing the military effectiveness of Ukraine’s armed forces so that they can defend their territorial integrity within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders and allow the country to effectively exercise its sovereignty and protection of civilians; stresses the need to provide the necessary personnel and infrastructure to the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to exercise planning and command of this important training mission;

Removed7. Underlines the outcome of the Vilnius Summit that clearly confirms Ukraine’s future is in the alliance; welcomes the Summit’s support package for Ukraine and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council that will prepare Ukraine for NATO membership;

Added8. Welcomes EUMAM Ukraine’s capacity to address Ukrainian training needs in a flexible way; expects it to bring added value by expanding training offers and to be synchronised with other training initiatives already underway; insists on adapting training modules to lessons learnt in order to adequately correspond to the Ukrainian forces’ needs; congratulates the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States for the projected successful training of up to 30 000 troops before the end of 2023; welcomes the VP/HR’s proposal of an increased target of 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers to be trained by the end of 2023; stresses the importance of continuously adjusting and reviewing training modules based on the lessons learnt from the battlefield, as well as of a sustained focus on addressing current and future challenges, including counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), UAV system training, air defence, mine detection, combined arms and specialised training, and developing the capacities of current and future officers of the Ukrainian armed forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; welcomes, further, the rapid conclusion of deliberations and strong participation by Member States in launching EUMAM Ukraine, which can be described as a template for future military training missions, and calls on them to demonstrate similar ambition and contributions to other current and future CSDP missions and operations;

Added9. Commends the flexibility and adaptability of the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) in implementing, in difficult conditions, its revised mandate, including its support for the investigation and prosecution of international crimes committed in the context of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine; calls for the EU to ensure it can operate with the adequate financial, logistical and human means to meet Ukraine’s needs and welcomes non-EU country participation in this regard;

Added10. Underlines the EU’s concrete support to Ukraine through the ‘three ammunition tracks’; urges faster delivery of ammunition from Member States’ existing stocks through the EPF; draws attention to track two of the ‘three ammunition tracks’, which aims to provide one million artillery rounds to Ukraine by March 2024, and expresses concern about recent statements which indicate that the deadline will not be met; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States for the joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine to be sped up and stresses the need to ramp up the manufacturing capacities of the European industry by ensuring rapid and effective implementation of the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP); encourages the Member States to provide specialised opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the European defence sector so that they have the capacity to participate in the bidding process; calls on the EU Member States to accelerate the development of military ammunition production capacities, with particular focus on joint projects with Ukraine; further stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration in EU defence and cybersecurity policies and programmes during the EU membership process, building on cooperation and exchanges with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), on the existing agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and on the possibility for Member States to procure on behalf of Ukraine as a recipient of additional quantities within the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA); calls on the EEAS and the Commission to come forward with a plan for a sustainable and long-term package of security commitments for Ukraine that is complementary to ensuring the increasing security requirements of the EU; welcomes the proposals for the ‘Ukraine Facility’ and urges all actors to work for its speedy conclusion and implementation;

Added11. Stresses the importance of the global condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermines global security and stability; calls on the Commission’s Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions to thoroughly investigate the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russian entities, especially concerning dual-use goods in connection with its war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the presence of non-EU country soldiers, including from Cuba, Serbia and Syria, fighting for Russia in its war of aggression in Ukraine, and demands their immediate withdrawal;

Added12. Underlines the outcome of NATO’s Vilnius Summit that clearly confirms Ukraine’s future is in the alliance; welcomes the Summit’s support package for Ukraine and the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council that will prepare Ukraine for NATO membership, after the war is over and to be finalised as soon as possible; supports continued transatlantic efforts and coordination on military assistance and weapons deliveries to Ukraine;

13. Underlines that the EU and NATO’s commitments to Ukraine are part of a wider internationally coordinated package of security guarantees for Ukraine, including the G7’s launch of a multilateral framework for the negotiation of bilateral security commitments and arrangements for Ukraine;

Change 3

RemovedStrengthening European defence in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

Added14. Emphasises the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance and calls for concrete steps in order to develop a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the coherence between this and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering that not all EU Member States are NATO members;

Removed9. Underlines the commitment of the EU’s heads of state and government, made in the Versailles Declaration, to provide all the necessary support needed by Ukraine and to take greater responsibility for European security by bolstering European defence capabilities; calls on the EU and its Member States to deliver on this commitment by accelerating the full implementation of the Strategic Compass in order to make the European Union a stronger and more capable security provider;

AddedStrengthening European defence in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

Added15. Underlines and expresses its unwavering support for the commitment of the EU’s heads of state and government, made in the Versailles Declaration, to provide all the necessary support needed by Ukraine and to take greater responsibility for European security by bolstering Member States’ and EU defence capabilities; encourages greater coordination with transatlantic allies and NATO in this respect; considers it necessary to update the Strategic Compass in order to incorporate the lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine that began days before its adoption, as well as in the light of recent events in the Middle East; calls on the EU and its Member States, following this review, which should become a regular exercise, to deliver on the Versailles Declaration commitment by accelerating the full implementation of the Strategic Compass via a massive boost of European military cooperation at industrial and armed forces level, in order to make the European Union a stronger and more capable security provider which is interoperable and complementary with NATO;