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A-9-2024-0016 → TA-9-2024-0100

From
A-9-2024-0016 Plenary report of 30 Jan 2024
To
TA-9-2024-0100 Adopted text of 28 Feb 2024
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Paragraphs
+688 added · −306 removed · 2 changed
More facts (2)
Title (from)
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on standard essential patents and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1001
Title (to)
Standard essential patents

These two texts have too little in common to be compared paragraph by paragraph (under 15 % of their paragraphs match): they are different documents rather than versions of one — for example a group’s motion and the joint text that was adopted.

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Part 2 of 18: Paragraphs 61–120

RemovedRecital 16 a (new): (16a) SEP holders and SEP implementers should be able to request that the competence centre provides a non-binding expert opinion by an independent third party on an aggregate royalty. When such a request is made, the competence centre should appoint a panel of conciliators and administer a process in which all interested stakeholders are invited to participate. After receiving information from all of the participants, the panel should provide an expert opinion on the aggregate royalty. The expert opinion on the aggregate royalty should contain a non-confidential analysis of the expected impact of the aggregate royalty on the SEP holders and the stakeholders in the value chain. In this respect, it would be important to consider factors such as efficiency of SEP licensing, including insights from any customary rules or practices for licensing of intellectual property in the value chain and cross-licensing, and impact on incentives to innovate of SEP holders and different stakeholders in the value chain.

Added(7) Licensing on FRAND terms and conditions, which are key in the development of the digital society, includes licensing royalty-free. Given that most issues arise with royalty-bearing licensing policies, this Regulation does not apply to royalty-free licensing of SEPs, except where such SEPs are part of a portfolio of patents licenses for royalties. [Am. 10]

RemovedRecital 17: (17) In line with the general principles and objectives of transparency, participation and access to European standardisation, the electronic register should make information regarding the number of SEPs applicable to a standard, the ownership of relevant SEPs, and the parts of the standard covered by the SEPs publicly available. The register and the database will contain information on relevant standards, products, processes, services and systems, which implement the standard, SEPs in force in the EU, standard SEP licensing FRAND terms and conditions or any licensing programmes, collective licensing programmes and essentiality. For SEP holders the register will create transparency with regard to the relevant SEPs, their share of all SEPs declared to the standard and the features of the standard covered by the patents. SEP holders will be in a better position to understand how their portfolios compare with other SEP holders’ portfolios. This is important not only for negotiations with implementers but also for the purpose of cross-licensing with other SEP holders. For implementers, the register will provide a trusted source of information on the SEPs, including with regard to the SEP holders from whom the implementer may need to obtain a licence. Making such information available in the register will also help shorten the length of technical discussions during the first stage of the SEP licensing negotiations.

Added(7a) Open standards are key in the development of our digital society, including the development of open source software. Open standards remove barriers to interoperability, promote choice between vendors and technology solutions and ensure market competition and innovation. This Regulation applies to open standards, whilst not discouraging SEP holders to innovate and participate in the open collaborative standards development. [Am. 11]

RemovedRecital 19: (19) In order to ensure transparency of about SEPs, it is appropriate to require from SEP holders to register their patents which are essential to the standard for which the registration is open. SEP holders should register their SEPs within 6 months following the opening of the registration by the competence centre or the grant of the relevant SEPs, whichever is first. SEP holders may collect royalties even if their SEP is not registered, but they should only be able to claim damages for uses and infringements that happened before the registration in case of timely registration, provided that the amount thereof has been established in accordance with the FRAND determination rules set out in this Regulation.

Added(8) In view of the global character of SEP licensing, references to aggregate royalty and FRAND determination may refer to global aggregate royalties and global FRAND determinations, or as otherwise agreed by the notifying stakeholders or the parties to the proceedings.

RemovedRecital 20: (20) In case of failure by SEP holders to register within the indicated time limit, the competence centre should notify the SEP holder that, in case of further delays in registering its patents, following a grace period of 1 month, the SEP holder should not be able to bring a claim in relation to its patent until the registration is completed.

Added(9) In the Union, standard setting and the application of competition law rules related to FRAND obligation to standard essential patents are guided by the Horizontal Guidelines and the Court of Justice judgment of 16 July 2015 in case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH. The Court of Justice recognised the right of a SEP holder to seek to enforce its patents in national courts subject to certain conditions that must be fulfilled to prevent an abuse of dominant position by the SEP holder when seeking an injunction. Since a patent confers on its holder the exclusive right to prevent any third party from using the invention without the holder’s consent only in the jurisdiction for which it is issued, the patent disputes are governed by national patent laws and civil proceedings and/or enforcement laws harmonised by Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

RemovedRecital 22: (22) SEP holders should ensure that their SEP registration(s) are updated. Updates should be registered within 6 months for relevant status changes, including ownership, invalidation findings or other applicable changes resulting from contractual commitments or public authorities’ decisions. In case of failure to update the registration, the competence centre should notify the SEP holder that in case of further delays in updating its registration, following a grace period of 1 month, its SEP may be suspended.

Added(10) As there are specific procedures for assessing the validity and the infringement of patents, this Regulation should not affect such procedures.

RemovedRecital 23: (23) A SEP holder may also request the modification of a SEP registration. An interested stakeholder may also request the modification of a SEP registration, if it can demonstrate that the registration is inaccurate based on a definitive decision by a public authority. A SEP can only be removed from the register at the request of the SEP holder, if the patent is expired, was invalidated or found non-essential by a final decision or ruling of a competent court of a Member State or found non-essential under this Regulation. To ensure transparency, a record of any modifications to the SEP registration should be made publicly available.

Added(10a) Patent pools, as industry-led joint patent licensing solutions, are beneficial to the market and companies involved with SEP licensing, including both SEP holders and SEP implementers. They are a predictable and fair option for licensing patented technologies essential for a standard, since they allow an agreement to be reached on a widely acceptable set of licensing terms and conditions between companies from across the world. Since patent pools deal with SEPs, they should also commit to FRAND terms and conditions and they should provide full transparency with regard to the patents that are covered by their portfolio, ideally license them to all interested licensees regardless of their position in the value chain and preferably include all the SEPs relevant to the standard. [Am. 12]

RemovedRecital 23 a (new): (23a) It is necessary to ensure that the registration and the obligations provided for in this Regulation are not circumvented by removing a SEP from the register. When an evaluator finds a claimed SEP non-essential, only the SEP holder can request its removal from the register and only after the annual sampling process has been completed and the proportion of true SEPs from the sample has been established and published.

Added(10b) While competition scrutiny of patent pools has already taken place, the uncertainty over the compatibility of licensee negotiation groups (LNGs) formed by SEP implementers still remains. LNGs can streamline the negotiation process, thereby reducing the administrative burden and ensuring that the licensing terms and conditions are more uniform and equitable for all participating SEP implementers. LNGs benefit SMEs in particular. The Commission should therefore examine the competitive impact of LNGs and analyse which conditions they should fulfil in order to comply with competition law while avoiding the risk of offering ‘hold-out’ options to participating SEP implementers. [Am. 13]

RemovedRecital 24: (24) To further ensure the quality of the register and avoid over-registration, essentiality checks should also be conducted randomly by independent and impartial evaluators selected according to objective criteria to be determined by the Commission. Only one SEP from the same patent family should be checked for essentiality.

Added(11) Any reference to a competent court of a Member State in this Regulation includes the Unified Patent Court where the conditions are met.

RemovedRecital 26: (26) SEP holders may voluntarily submit their SEPs for essentiality checks to the competence centre prior to registering their patents. After the registration, SEP holders or implementers may also designate annually up to 100 registered SEPs for essentiality checks. If the pre-selected SEPs are confirmed essential, the SEP holders may use this information in negotiations and as evidence in courts, without prejudicing the right of an implementer to challenge the essentiality of a registered SEP in court. The selected SEPs would have no bearing on the sampling process as the sample should be selected from all registered SEPs of each SEP holder. If a preselected SEP and a SEP selected for the sample set are the same, only one essentiality check should be done. Essentiality checks should not be repeated on SEPs from the same patent family.

Added(12) As the agency of the European Union in charge of intellectual property rights and in order to facilitate the implementation of this Regulation, the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) should perform the relevant tasks by means of a competence centre. The EUIPO has extensive experience with managing databases, electronic registers and alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, which are key aspects of the functions assigned under this Regulation. It is necessary to equipcrucial to ensure that the competence centre withhas the necessary means, including human and financial resources to fulfileffectively perform its tasks. [Am. 14]

RemovedRecital 27: (27) Assessments of essentiality of SEPs conducted by an independent entity prior to the entry into force of the Regulation, for example through patent pools, as well as essentiality determinations by judicial authorities should be indicated in the register. Those SEPs should not be re-checked for essentiality after the relevant evidence supporting the information in the register is provided to the competence centre unless the evaluator has objective reasons to believe, based on sufficient evidence, that the prior essentiality check was inaccurate. SEP holders or patent pools should also be able to conduct the assessment of essentiality of SEPs after the entry into force of this Regulation.

Added(12a) SEP licensing may cause friction in the value chains that have so far not been exposed to SEPs. Therefore, it is important that the competence centre raises awareness concerning SEP licensing in the value chain through any of the tools at its disposal, including through a meaningful engagement of stakeholders. Other factors would include the ability of upstream manufacturers to pass the cost of a SEP licence and any potential impact of existing indemnification clauses downstream within a value chain. The framework provided for in this Regulation should promote the European Union´s technological leadership in innovation. [Am. 15]

RemovedRecital 29: (29) The competence centre would publish the results of the essentiality checks, whether positive or negative, in the register and the database. The results of the essentiality checks would not be legally binding. Thus, it should be possible to address any subsequent disputes with regard to essentiality to the competent court. The results from the essentiality checks, whether requested by a SEP holder or based on a sample, may, however, be used for the purpose of demonstrating essentiality of those SEPs or other relevant criteria in negotiations, in patent pools and in court.

Added(13) The competence centre should on the one hand set up and administer an electronic register and an electronic database containing detailed information on SEPs in force in one or more Member States, including essentiality check results, opinions, reports, available case-law from jurisdictions across the globe, rules relating to SEPs in third countries, and results of studies specific to SEPs. In order to raise awareness and facilitate SEP licensing for SMEs. The electronic register should serve as a foundational repository designed to be the primary reference point for users, providing basic information about SEPs free of charge. On the other hand, the competence centre should offer assistance to SMEs. The settingalso set up and administering a system for essentiality checks and processes for aggregate royalty determination and FRAND determination by the competence centre should include actions improving the system and the processes on a continuous basisadminister an electronic database providing easily accessible information in a more extensive and comprehensive dataset to which access could be subject to the payment of a reasonable and proportionate fee. Public authorities, including through the use of new technologies. In line with this objective, the competence centrecourts, should have access to the information in the database free of charge. Academic institutions should establish training procedures for evaluators of essentiality and conciliators for providing opinions on aggregate royalty as well as on FRAND determination andalso be able to request access to the information free of charge under certain conditions. The electronic register and the electronic database should encourage consistency in their practicesoffer a high level of legal certainty. [Am. 16]

RemovedRecital 30: deleted

Added(13a) In order to raise awareness and facilitate SEP licensing for SMEs, the competence centre should offer assistance to SMEs and start-ups. The setting up and administering of a system for essentiality checks and processes for aggregate royalty determination and FRAND determination by the competence centre should include actions improving the system and the processes on a continuous basis, including through the use of new technologies. In line with this objective, the competence centre should establish training procedures for evaluators of essentiality and conciliators for providing opinions on aggregate royalty as well as on FRAND determination and should encourage consistency in their practices. [Am. 17]

RemovedRecital 31: (31) The purpose of the FRAND commitment is to facilitate adoption and use of the standard by making SEPs available to implementers on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and to provide the SEP holder a fair and reasonable return for its innovation. Thus, the ultimate goal of enforcement actions by SEP holders or actions brought by implementers based on a SEP holder’s refusal to license should be to conclude a FRAND licence agreement. The main objective of the Regulation in this regard is to facilitate the negotiations and out of court dispute resolution that can benefit both parties. Ensuring access to swift, fair and cost-efficient ways of resolving disputes on FRAND terms and conditions should benefit SEP holders and implementers alike. As such, a properly functioning out-of-court dispute resolution mechanism to determine FRAND terms (FRAND determination) may offer significant benefits for all parties. A party may request a FRAND determination in order to demonstrate that its offer is FRAND or to provide a security, when they engage in good faith.

Added(14) The competence centre should be the subject ofto Union rules on access to documents and data protection. Its tasks should be designed to increase transparency by making existing information relevant to SEPs available to all stakeholders in a centralised and systematic way. Therefore, a balance would have toshould be made between the free public access to basic information and the need to finance the functioning of the competence centre. In order to cover the maintenance costs a registration fee should be requested to access detailed information contained in the database, such as results of any essentiality checks and non-confidential FRAND determination reports. [Am. 18]

RemovedRecital 32: (32) The FRAND determination should simplify and speed up negotiations concerning FRAND terms and conditions and reduce transaction costs for all stakeholders. The EUIPO should administer the procedure. The competence centre should create a roster of conciliators that satisfy established competence and independence criteria, as well as a repository of non-confidential reports (the confidential version of the reports will be accessible only by the parties and the conciliators). The conciliators should be neutral and impartial persons with extensive experience in dispute resolution and substantial understanding of the economics of licensing on FRAND terms and conditions. There should be rules and procedures defining conflicts of interests and mechanisms for addressing any such conflicts that might arise.

Added(15) Knowledge of the potential total royalty for all SEPs covering a standard (aggregate royalty) applicable to the implementations of that standard is important for the assessment of the royalty amount for a product, which plays a significant role for the manufacturer’s cost determinations. It also helps SEP holderholders to plan expected return on investment and SEP implementers to estimate the cost of standard integration in their products. The publication of the expected aggregate royalty and the standard licensing terms and conditions for a particular standard would facilitate SEP licensing and reduce the cost of SEP licensing. Thus, it is necessary to makeSEP implementers and SEP holders would benefit from making public the information on total royalty rates (aggregate royalty) and the standard FRAND terms and conditions of licensing. [Am. 19]

RemovedRecital 33: (33) In case one or more parties initiate a FRAND determination, it should be a mandatory step before a SEP holder would be able to initiate patent infringement proceedings or an implementer could request a determination or assessment of FRAND terms and conditions concerning a SEP before a competent court of a Member State. However, the obligation to initiate FRAND determination before the relevant court proceedings should not be required for SEPs covering those implementations of standards for which the Commission establishes that there are no significant difficulties or inefficiencies in licensing on FRAND terms.

Added(16) SEP holders should have the opportunity to first inform the competence centre of the publication of the standard in respect of which they claim essentiality or the aggregate royalty which they have agreed upon among themselves. Except for those use casesimplementations of standards for which the Commission establishes that there are well established and broadly well-functioning licensing practices of SEPs, the competence centre may assist the parties in the relevant aggregate royalty determination. In this context, if there is no agreement on an aggregate royalty among SEP holders, certain SEP holders may request the competence centre to appoint a conciliator to assist the SEP holders willing to participate in the process in determining an aggregate royalty for the SEPs covering the relevant standard. In this case, the role of the conciliator would be to facilitate the decision-making by the participating SEP holders without making any recommendation for an aggregate royalty. Finally, it is important to ensure that there is a third independent party, an expert, that could recommend an aggregate royalty. Therefore, SEP holders and/or implementers should be able to request the competence centre for an expert opinion on an aggregate royalty. When such a request is made, the competence centre should appoint a panel of conciliators and administer a process in which all interested stakeholders are invited to participate. After receiving information from all of the participants, the panel should provide a non-binding expert opinion for an aggregate royalty. The expert opinion on the aggregate royalty should contain a non-confidential analysis of the expected impact of the aggregate royalty on the SEP holders and the stakeholders in the value chain. Important in this respect would be to consider factors such as, efficiency of SEP licensing, including insights from any customary rules or practices for licensing of intellectual property in the value chain and cross-licensing, and impact on incentives to innovate of SEP holders and different stakeholders in the value chain. [Am. 20]

RemovedRecital 34: (34) Where a party does not reply to the FRAND determination request, the other party should be able to request either the termination or the unilateral continuation of the FRAND determination. Such a party should not be exposed to litigation during the time of the FRAND determination. At the same time, the FRAND determination should be an effective procedure for the parties to meet on neutral ground, such as before a panel of conciliators and reach agreement before litigation or to obtain a determination to be used in further proceedings. Therefore, the party or parties that duly engage in the procedure should be able to benefit from its completion.

Added(16a) SEP holders and SEP implementers should be able to request that the competence centre provides a non-binding expert opinion by an independent third party on an aggregate royalty. When such a request is made, the competence centre should appoint a panel of conciliators and administer a process in which all interested stakeholders are invited to participate. After receiving information from all of the participants, the panel should provide an expert opinion on the aggregate royalty. The expert opinion on the aggregate royalty should contain a non-confidential analysis of the expected impact of the aggregate royalty on the SEP holders and the stakeholders in the value chain. In this respect, it would be important to consider factors such as efficiency of SEP licensing, including insights from any customary rules or practices for licensing of intellectual property in the value chain and cross-licensing, and impact on incentives to innovate of SEP holders and different stakeholders in the value chain. [Am. 21]

RemovedRecital 35: (35) The obligation to initiate FRAND determination should not be detrimental to the effective protection of the parties’ rights. The parties should be able to request a provisional injunction of a financial nature before the competent court. In a situation where a FRAND commitment has been given by the relevant SEP holder, provisional injunctions of an adequate and proportionate financial nature should provide the necessary judicial protection to the SEP holder who has agreed to license its SEP on FRAND terms, while the implementer should be able to contest the level of FRAND royalties or raise a defence of lack of essentiality or of invalidity of the SEP. In those national systems that require the initiation of the proceedings on the merits of the case as a condition to request the interim measures of a financial nature, it should be possible to initiate such proceedings, but the parties should request that the case be suspended during the FRAND determination. When determining what level of the provisional injunction of financial nature is to be deemed adequate in a given case, account should be taken, inter alia, of the economic capacity of the applicant and the potential effects for the effectiveness of the measures applied for, in particular for SMEs, also in order to prevent the abusive use of such measures. It should also be clarified that once the FRAND determination is terminated, the whole range of measures, including provisional, precautionary and corrective measur…

Added(17) In line with the general principles and objectives of transparency, participation and access to European standardisation, the centralisedelectronic register should make information regarding the number of SEPs applicable to a standard, the ownership of relevant SEPs, and the parts of the standard covered by the SEPs publicly available. The register and the database will contain information on relevant standards, products, processes, services and systems, which implement the standard, SEPs in force in the EU, standard SEP licensing FRAND terms and conditions or any licensing programmes, collective licensing programmes and essentiality. For SEP holders the register will create transparency with regard to the relevant SEPs, their share of all SEPs declared to the standard and the features of the standard covered by the patents. SEP holders will be in a better position to understand how their portfolios compare with other SEP holders’ portfolios. This is important not only for negotiations with implementers but also for the purpose of cross-licensing with other SEP holders. For implementers, the register will provide a trusted source of information on the SEPs, including with regard to the SEP holders from whom the implementer may need to obtain a licence. Making such information available in the register will also help shorten the length of technical discussions during the first stage of the SEP licensing negotiations. [Am. 22]

RemovedRecital 36: (36) When the parties enter into the FRAND determination, they should select a panel of conciliators for the FRAND determination from the roster. In case of disagreement, the competence centre would select the members of the panel of conciliators. The FRAND determination should be concluded within 9 months. This time would be necessary for a procedure that ensures that the rights of the parties are respected and at the same time is sufficiently swift to avoid delays in concluding licences. Parties may settle at any time during the process, which results in the termination of the FRAND determination.

Added(18) Once a standard has been notified or an aggregate royalty is specified, whichever is made first, the competence centre will open the registration of SEPs by holders of SEPs in force in one or more Member States.

RemovedRecital 37: (37) Upon appointment, the conciliation centre should refer the FRAND determination to the panel of conciliators, who should examine whether the request contains the necessary information, and communicate the schedule of procedure to the parties or the party requesting the continuations of the FRAND determination.

Added(19) In order to ensure transparency of about SEPs, it is appropriate to require from SEP holders to register their patents which are essential to the standard for which the registration is open. SEP holders should register their SEPs within 6 months following the opening of the registration by the competence centre or the grant of the relevant SEPs, whichever is first. In case of timely registration, SEPsSEP holders should be able tomay collect royalties andeven if their SEP is not registered, but they should only be able to claim damages for uses and infringements that happened before the registration in case of timely registration, provided that the amount thereof has been established in accordance with the FRAND determination rules set out in this Regulation. [Am. 23]

RemovedRecital 38: (38) The panel of conciliators should examine the parties’ submissions and suggestions for the determination of FRAND terms and conditions, and consider the relevant negotiation steps, among other relevant circumstances. The panel of conciliators, upon its own initiative or the request of a party, should be able to require the parties to submit evidence it deems necessary for the fulfilment of its task. It should also be able to examine publicly available information and the competence centre’s register and reports of other FRAND determinations, as well as non-confidential documents and information produced by or submitted to the competence centre.

Added(20) In case of failure by SEP holders mayto register afterwithin the indicated time limit. However, in that case, SEP holders, the competence centre should notify the SEP holder that, in case of further delays in registering its patents, following a grace period of 1 month, the SEP holder should not be able to collect royalties andbring a claim damages for the period of delayin relation to its patent until the registration is completed. [Am. 24]

RemovedRecital 39: (39) If a party fails to engage in the FRAND determination after the panel of conciliators has been appointed, the other party may request the termination or may request that the conciliator issues a recommendation for a FRAND determination on the basis of the information it was able to assess.

Added(21) Clauses in licensing agreement that set a royalty for a large number of patents – present or future – should not be affected by the invalidity, non-essentiality, or unenforceability of a small number of those patents when they do not affect the overall amount and enforceability of the royalty or other clauses in such agreements.

RemovedRecital 40: (40) If a party initiates a procedure in a jurisdiction outside the Union resulting in legally binding and enforceable decisions regarding the same standard that is subject to FRAND determination and its implementation, or including SEPs from the same patent family as SEPs subject to FRAND determination and involving one or more of the parties to the FRAND determination as a party; before or during of the FRAND determination by a party, the panel of conciliators, or where it has not been appointed has not been established, the competence centre, should be able to terminate the procedure upon the request of the other party.

Added(22) SEP holders should ensure that their SEP registration(s) are updated. Updates should be registered within 6 months for relevant status changes, including ownership, invalidation findings or other applicable changes resulting from contractual commitments or public authorities’ decisions. In case of failure to update the registration may lead to the suspension of the, the competence centre should notify the SEP holder that in case of further delays in updating its registration, following a grace period of 1 month, its SEP may be suspended of the SEP from the register. [Am. 25]

RemovedRecital 41: (41) At the conclusion of the procedure, the panel of conciliators should make a proposal recommending FRAND terms and conditions. Either party should have the option to accept or reject the proposal. If the parties do not settle and/or do not accept its proposal, the panel of conciliators should draft a report of the FRAND determination. The report would have a confidential and a non-confidential version. The non-confidential version of the report should contain the proposal for FRAND terms and conditions and the methodology used and should be provided to the competence centre for publication in order to inform any subsequent FRAND determination between the parties and other stakeholders involved in similar negotiations. The report would thus have a dual purpose to encourage the parties to settle and to provide transparency as to the process and the recommended FRAND terms in cases of disagreement.

Added(23) A SEP holder may also request the modification of a SEP registration. An interested stakeholder may also request the modification of a SEP registration, if it can demonstrate that the registration is inaccurate based on a definitive decision by a public authority. A SEP can only be removed from the register at the request of the SEP holder, if the patent is expired, was invalidated or found non-essential by a final decision or ruling of a competent court of a Member State or found non-essential under this Regulation. To ensure transparency, a record of any modifications to the SEP registration should be made publicly available. [Am. 26]

RemovedRecital 42: (42) The Regulation respects the intellectual property rights of patent owners, in line with Article 17(2) of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, although it includes a restriction on the ability to enforce a SEP that has not been registered within a certain time-limit and introduces a requirement to conduct a FRAND determination before enforcing individual SEPs. The limitation on the exercise of intellectual property rights is allowed under the EU Charter, provided that the proportionality principle is respected. According to settled case-law, fundamental rights can be restricted provided that those restrictions correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Union and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes the very essence of the rights guaranteed39 . In that respect, this Regulation is in the public interest in that it provides a uniform, open and predictable information and outcome on SEPs for the benefit of SEP holder, implementers and end users, at Union level. It aims at dissemination of technology for the mutual advantage of the SEP holders and implementers. Furthermore, the rules concerning the FRAND determination are temporary thus limited and aimed at improving and streamlining the process but are not ultimately binding.40

Added(23a) It is necessary to ensure that the registration and the obligations provided for in this Regulation are not circumvented by removing a SEP from the register. When an evaluator finds a claimed SEP non-essential, only the SEP holder can request its removal from the register and only after the annual sampling process has been completed and the proportion of true SEPs from the sample has been established and published. [Am. 27]

RemovedRecital 43: (43) The FRAND determination is also consistent with the right to an effective remedy and to access to justice as laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as the implementer and the SEP holder fully retain that right. In case of failure to register within the prescribed time limit, the exclusion of the right to effective enforcement is limited and necessary and meets objectives of general interest. As confirmed by the CJEU41 , the provision of a mandatory dispute resolution as a precondition to access to competent courts of Member States is deemed to be compatible with the principle of effective judicial protection. The FRAND determination follows the conditions for mandatory dispute resolution outlined in the CJEU judgments, taking into account the particular characteristics of SEP licensing. The FRAND determination procedure also allows a deposit of a bond by the alleged infringer as a provisional injunction of a financial nature, which can be requested in order to avoid seriously restricting the alleged infringer’s activity and ensuring that the other party receives the corresponding sum in the event of a claim for damages. Moreover, the FRAND determination in no way impairs the SEP holder’s ability to receive compensation for an infringement that occurred during the FRAND determination in subsequent court proceedings.

Added(24) To further ensure the quality of the register and avoid over-registration, essentiality checks should also be conducted randomly by independent and impartial evaluators selected according to objective criteria to be determined by the Commission. Only one SEP from the same patent family should be checked for essentiality. [Am. 28]

RemovedRecital 44: (44) When determining the aggregate royalties and making FRAND determinations the conciliators should take into account in particular any Union acquis and judgments of the Court of Justice pertaining to SEPs as well as guidance issued under this Regulation, the Horizontal Guidelines42 and the Commission’s 2017 Communication ‘Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents’.43 Furthermore, the panel of conciliators should consider any expert opinion on the aggregate royalty or in the absence thereof, should request information from the parties before it makes its final proposals well as guidance issued under this Regulation, as well as guidance issued under this Regulation.

Added(25) These essentiality checks should be conducted on a sampling from SEP portfolios to ensure that the sample is capable of producing statistically valid results. The results of the sampled essentiality checks should determine the ratio of positively checked SEPs from all the SEPs registered by each SEP holder. The essentiality rate should be updated annually.

RemovedRecital 45: deleted

Added(26) SEP holders may voluntarily submit their SEPs for essentiality checks to the competence centre prior to registering their patents. After the registration, SEP holders or implementers may also designate annually up to 100 registered SEPs for essentiality checks. If the pre-selected SEPs are confirmed essential, the SEP holders may use this information in negotiations and as evidence in courts, without prejudicing the right of an implementer to challenge the essentiality of a registered SEP in court. The selected SEPs would have no bearing on the sampling process as the sample should be selected from all registered SEPs of each SEP holder. If a preselected SEP and a SEP selected for the sample set are the same, only one essentiality check should be done. Essentiality checks should not be repeated on SEPs from the same patent family. [Am. 29]

RemovedRecital 45 a (new): (45a) In order to avoid a possible negative impact on companies which are established in the Union as well as engage and compete successfully as regards the development of global technologies through standardisation, the Commission should evaluate the impact that the essentiality check system, the aggregate royalties determination system and the FRAND determination system have on the competitiveness of Union SEP holders on a global level. Based on the outcome of that evaluation, the Commission should, where necessary, present a legislative proposal in order to adapt the systems. The role of patent pools, including those created by SEP implementers, should be evaluated by the Commission in order to assess their impact once this Regulation has entered into force, notably in terms of their impact on the competitiveness on the market.

Added(27) Any assessmentAssessments of essentiality of SEPs conducted by an independent entity prior to the entry into force of the Regulation, for example through patent pools, as well as essentiality determinations by judicial authorities should be indicated in the register. Those SEPs should not be re-checked for essentiality after the relevant evidence supporting the information in the register is provided to the competence centre unless the evaluator has objective reasons to believe, based on sufficient evidence, that the prior essentiality check was inaccurate. SEP holders or patent pools should also be able to conduct the assessment of essentiality of SEPs after the entry into force of this Regulation. [Am. 30]

RemovedRecital 46: (46) SMEs may be involved in SEP licensing both as SEP holders and SEP implementers. While there are currently a few SME SEP holders, the efficiencies produced with this Regulation should also facilitate the licensing of their SEP. Additional conditions are necessary to relieve the cost burden on such SMEs such as reduced administration burdens and administrative fees and potentially reduced fees for essentiality checks and conciliation in addition to free support and trainings, so that they are better placed to engage in SEP related matters and also standard development. The SEPs of micro and small enterprises and start-ups should not be the subject of sampling for essentiality check, but they should be able to propose SEPs for essentiality checks if they wish to. SME and start-up implementers should likewise benefit from reduced access fees and free support and trainings. Finally, SEP holders should be encouraged to incentivise licensing by SMEs through low volume discounts or exemptions from FRAND royalties. In this context, it is important to ensure that SMEs and start-ups benefit from a one-stop shop set up by the competence centre which identifies relevant licensees and licensors for the SMEs and advises them, free of charge, on SEPs. To that end, the competence centre should set up a SEP Licensing Assistance Hub for SMEs and start-ups which could also provide, under certain conditions, assistance with regard to judicial support, such as a pro bono legal representative …

Added(28) The evaluators should work independently in accordance with the rules of procedure and Code of Conduct to be determined by the Commission. The SEP holder would be able request a peer evaluation before the issuance of a reasoned opinion. Unless a SEP is the subject of a peer review, there would be no further review of the essentiality check results. The results of the peer evaluation should serve to improve the essentiality check process, to identify and remedy shortcomings and improve consistency.

RemovedRecital 46 a (new): (46a) While advantages should be granted to SMEs, they should not be susceptible to misuses. In this regard, patent assertion entities, which may be characterised by an “obtain and assert” business model and which have the purpose of generating revenues through licensing fees, royalties and damage compensation, should not benefit from exemptions and the help from the competence centre provided for in this Regulation.

Added(29) The competence centre would publish the results of the essentiality checks, whether positive or negative, in the register and the database. The results of the essentiality checks would not be legally binding. Thus, it should be possible to address any subsequent disputes with regard to essentiality would have to be addressed in the relevantto the competent court. The results from the essentiality checks, whether requested by a SEP holder or based on a sample, may, however, be used for the purpose of demonstrating essentiality of those SEPs or other relevant criteria in negotiations, in patent pools and in court. [Am. 31]

Sources & citation

Where the facts on this page come from, and how to cite it.

Data source
Licensed CC BY 4.0.
Retrieved
28 September 2026

Cite as

European Parliament (2024). “Changes between A-9-2024-0016 and TA-9-2024-0100”. Text, 28 February 2024. from A-9-2024-0016, to TA-9-2024-0100. EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2024-0016/compare/TA-9-2024-0100?all=1&part=2 (retrieved 28 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2024-02-28,
  author = {{European Parliament}},
  title = {{Changes between A-9-2024-0016 and TA-9-2024-0100}},
  year = {2024},
  date = {2024-02-28},
  howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2024-0016/compare/TA-9-2024-0100?all=1&part=2}},
  url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-9-2024-0016/compare/TA-9-2024-0100?all=1&part=2},
  urldate = {2026-09-28},
  publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
  note = {Text. from A-9-2024-0016, to TA-9-2024-0100. Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}