Changes from plenary report to adopted text

20. Recalls that, as clearly stated in the Strategic Compass, the EU’s objective is to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, alone when necessary or within a partnership, and that the Strategic Compass must not be a substitute for postponing vital investments in the EU’s security and defence capabilities; stresses that the Strategic Compass’ ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with corresponding political willingness and action on behalf of Member States and the EU institutions, as well as the necessary financial contributions where necessary; calls, therefore, on the Member States to engage in systematic, regular updates of the threat analysis;

21. Reaffirms that, in order to become a credible geopolitical player, the EU should reform its decision-making system; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has been used only in a very limited manner; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions on the CFSP and CSDP, at least in those areas that do not have military implications; reiterates its call for the establishment of regular EU defence minister Council meetings and calls for setting up joint civil-military headquarters at European level that combines civil and military instruments in order to make full use of the EU’s integrated approach in crisis management right from strategic planning to the actual conduct of the mission or operation;

22. Calls for the appointment of a Defence Union Commissioner (DUC), within the next Commission who is responsible for the finalisation of a true European Defence Union and all defence-related matters, including CSDP, following a clear division of tasks with the VP/HR; believes that, together with the to-be-established fully-fledged Security and Defence Committee in the Parliament, the DUC should jointly oversee a dedicated and substantial Defence Union budget;

The Strategic Compass: ‘ACT’

23. Reminds the respective EU bodies and Member States of their commitment to strengthening the MPCC and achieving full operational capability, including through the provision of adequate premises, sufficient staff and reorganisation of the EU Military Staff; demands that its full operational capability be reached by 2025, as stated in the Strategic Compass, and despite the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 which envisaged a 2020 deadline; further demands that the MPCC’s staffing level should be increased considerably up to 250 personnel; emphasises the urgent need to establish the MPCC as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations, including for the use of the future Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC); stresses that one of the current four national operational headquarters can also be designated for this task;

24. Reiterates the importance of the full implementation of the RDC with at least 5 000 troops and relevant capabilities according to its modular nature, available for crisis situations in non-permissive environments, such as rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or temporary reinforcement of missions; considers that without a firm political commitment and more resources, the ambition for the RDC to be operational by 2025 is at risk; calls on the Member States to take into account the practical modalities for implementing Article 44 TEU during the operationalisation of the RDC, as well as in other CSDP operational engagements, where relevant, in order to allow a group of willing and able Member States to plan and conduct a mission or operation within the EU framework and, thereby, ensure the swift activation of the RDC; reiterates that the RDC should be organised around different ‘notice to move’ deadlines for different parts of the RDC, with some having a ‘notice to move’ of 5 to 10 days; notes that an exact number for minimum troops can only be assessed after conceptual planners have all analysed potential scenarios; considers that the EU RDC has great potential to substantially improve and build on the lessons learnt from the previous EU battlegroups, address and overcome their various shortcomings, strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and positively contribute to the EU’s integrated approach to security and peace;

25. Welcomes the first ever live exercise, as part of MILEX (Crisis Management Military Exercise) 2023, for the RDC, that took place in October 2023 in Spain and looks forward to further live exercises in the future aimed at improving its capabilities, increasing interoperability between Member States and effectively testing the utilisation of the RDC in various scenarios; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to ensure that such training and certification exercises can benefit from the common costs mechanism to ensure adequate participation in the future;

30. Calls on the VP/HR and Member States to deliver more robust, flexible, efficient and modular CSDP missions and operations that can adapt to the changing security context, taking into account the integrated approach principle, and that builds on the synergies and complementarities of the civilian and military dimensions of CSDP; highlights the importance of civilian CSDP missions for coordinating with other international partners engaged in similar activities in the host country; emphasises the importance of setting out clear and achievable goals for each mission and operation, supplemented by the necessary financial, logistical and human resources according to the progress achieved towards each goal; stresses that each mission and operation has to be effectively tailored to the needs and requirements of each host country, ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the mission to achieve its stated goals and to maintain a strong partnership with the local population and national authorities; underlines the significance of the ‘train and equip’ and ‘train the trainer’ approaches to missions and operations to ensure their long-term success and impact on the host country;

31. Welcomes the adoption of the new Civilian CSDP Compact and the commitment to increasing the effectiveness, flexibility and responsiveness of civilian missions, including through speeding up decision-making, strengthening operational planning, as well as improving the selection and recruitment of personnel, emphasising greater gender equality and improving responsiveness tools; believes that civilian and military missions need to focus more on the key elements of human security; welcomes the commitment by the EEAS and the Member States, in close consultation with the Commission, to set up a regular and structured civilian capability development process in 2024;

32. Calls on the creation of detailed impact assessments for all missions and operations to be held at a frequent intervals, in combination with the Strategic Review exercise, in order to more effectively evaluate the short-, medium- and long-term effects on the host country, as well as to examine whether the missions and operations have achieved their desired impact; calls for these impact assessments to be shared with Parliament; stresses the particular need for all missions and operations to have sunset provisions to allow a sustainable termination if necessary;

33. Calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a cultural heritage protection component in their CSDP missions and operations in order to provide assistance and education to local partners in addressing security challenges related to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a preventive diplomacy component in their CSDP missions and operations in order to better analyse situations in the given areas, avert the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflicts, and mediate between parties that are on the brink of violence, helping to achieve reconciliation and build resilient and inclusive societies;

34. Recalls that mainstreaming and operationalising gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the women, peace and security agenda are long-standing priorities for the EU; insists, therefore, on the importance of delivering on all commitments made, including those in the EU’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) III (2020-2024) and in the Strategic Compass, including by promoting gender equality and by systematically mainstreaming a gender perspective, based on data-driven gender analysis, in all civilian and military CSDP planning and actions; welcomes, in this context, the appointment of Gender Advisors in all CSDP missions and operations and the establishment of a network of gender focal points; calls for the full implementation of the commitments made in the new Civilian CSDP Compact, which includes significantly increasing women’s participation in civilian CSDP among international staff, with the aim of reaching at least 40 % representation while striving for gender parity; underlines, nevertheless, that more needs to be done to ensure gender equality and the full and meaningful participation of women in CSDP, especially in military missions; calls on the Member States to take steps towards minimising career obstacles for women within their respective defence forces; urges the EEAS to provide regular reports on its progress in implementing gender-related actions to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE);

35. Emphasises the essential role of gender equality and women’s rights in the fundamental aspects of security and defence measures; strongly condemns the perpetration of war crimes against civilian populations, particularly the use of sexual violence as a tool of warfare; highlights the significance of cybersecurity measures in monitoring and preventing the trafficking of women affected by conflict;

36. Stresses that apart from the provision of security guarantees and assistance to Ukraine, measures must be in place to deal with mental health problems that arise and will continue to arise among military personnel and citizens as a consequence of the war;

37. Welcomes the joint communication of June 2023 on a new outlook on the climate and security nexus, which outlines concrete actions to address the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on security and European defence, including CSDP; stresses the need to move forward with its comprehensive implementation with a view to enhancing operational effectiveness, including the deployment of environmental advisors to all CSDP missions and operations by 2025 and support for the Member States in addressing any gaps, barriers and incentives to prepare their armed forces for climate change, as called for in the Strategic Compass;

38. Reiterates the important role of young people and youth organisations in maintaining and promoting peace and security and calls on the EEAS to commit to more systematically integrate young people into its youth, peace and security agenda;

46. Calls on the Commission to draw on the European Union Military Committee’s (EUMC) expertise in defining the defence industries’ priorities and formulating defence initiatives in order to ensure military coherence at industrial level;

47. Calls on the Member States to increase and ensure sustainable levels of defence spending to adjust to the current geopolitical situation and address the significant threats towards the Union’s security; calls on the EU NATO Member States to increase their military budgets, based on an assessment of their own requirements, and to spend at least 2 % of GDP, in a well-coordinated and comprehensive manner, which achieves economies of scale and interoperability, also when recalling the strong increase in defence spending by other rivals, such as Russia and China, and in order to remedy shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order and considering the impact of historic under-investment and spiralling inflation on defence budgets; underlines the EDTIB’s essential role in equipping Member States’ armed forces in order to enable them to protect European citizens and interests;

48. Underlines that European armed forces face severe recruitment and retention problems; considers it necessary to analyse these challenges and therefore invites the HR/VP to task the EUMC with gathering and analysing data across the EU Member States on these issues in order to identify possible counter-measures; points out that a true European Defence Union cannot be built without a common military culture and calls therefore on the VP/HR to task the European Security and Defence College with modernising and expanding the educational modules for military personnel from the Member States’ armed forces;

49. Highlights the importance of PESCO in improving the EU’s defence capabilities and welcomes the progress achieved so far through the PESCO initiative projects, such as in cyber defence, unmanned systems, medical services, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear surveillance, as well as the further progress achieved across projects in all military domains, as recorded by the PESCO Secretariat’s annual projects progress report; regrets, however, the fact that the Member States are still not making full use of the PESCO framework and that progress on implementation still falls far short of expectations; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to conduct a continuous, thorough review of the projects and their prospects, which should also include the possibility of merging, regrouping and even closing projects that lack sufficient progress and redirecting efforts towards a small number of priority projects intended to lead to concrete actions, as stated in the Strategic Compass; strongly regrets that Parliament is not in a situation to exercise proper scrutiny of PESCO projects; calls on the Member States to regularly, at least twice per year, provide Parliament with an assessment of progress made within PESCO;

53. Highlights that China has established a ‘no-limits friendship’ with Russia, that includes significant transfer of technology and military capabilities, and poses an increasing number of security challenges to the EU, especially in the fields of cyber and FIMI; stresses the need for the EU to strengthen the security and integrity of its critical infrastructures, de-risking and promoting EU’s technological edge in critical sectors, including measures to restrict or exclude high-risk suppliers, especially actors linked to the Chinese Government;

54. Recalls that dependencies on high-risk suppliers of critical products with digital elements pose a strategic risk that should be addressed at Union level; stresses the need to further strengthen the FDI-screening procedures with due-diligence standards to identify leverage by governments of states which would contravene the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States as established in the framework of the CFSP pursuant to Title V TEU over investors in EU critical infrastructure, such as European ports and in undersea cables in the Baltic, Mediterranean, as well as in the Arctic seas; underlines that this approach should apply equally to candidate and potential candidate countries; believes additional legislation is needed to effectively protect the security of the European information and communications technology supply chain from risky vendors and cyber-enabled intellectual property theft; calls for the creation of a European framework aiming to closely regulate and set minimum standards and conditions relating to the export of intellectual property and technologies which are critical to the security and defence of the Union, including among others, dual-use goods;

55. Expresses concern over China’s aggressive military posturing in the South China Sea, including island-building, harassment and dangerous manoeuvres conducted by its navy, coast guard and maritime militia, as well as its continued military pressure, assault exercises, airspace violations and other grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan; calls for greater Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) and capacity building with the EU’s partners in the region; calls on China to cease all of these activities, which endanger the stability of the entire region and, in the broader context, directly affect European security; encourages the Member States to increase the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and deepen security dialogues with Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression against the democratic island; emphasises collaboration with Taiwan and the leveraging of its expertise and technological edge against Chinese cyber threats, given the regional and EU security concerns; welcomes the recent agreement between the leaders of China and the US to resume high-level military-to-military communications;

56. Notes that a large portion of African infrastructure, including its communication infrastructure, has been financed and constructed by Chinese state-owned enterprises; expresses concern that this Chinese model is clearly attractive to many countries that cannot satisfy EU requirements for accessing equivalent levels of finance, thereby expanding Chinese influence to the detriment of EU partnerships; strongly believes, in this context, that the EU should further enhance its cooperation with African partners and increase both the visibility and the tangible benefits of its support for the local population; calls for a long-term and forward-looking EU security strategy towards China, the Mediterranean and Africa;

57. Calls for supplementary progress on further improving the EU Hybrid Toolbox, specifically addressing activities involving cyber-attacks and FIMI, and the revision of the implementing guidelines of the EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox; welcomes the commitment set out in the Strategic Compass and the new Civilian Compact to provide the necessary capabilities to enable CSDP missions and operations to respond to hybrid attacks, including FIMI and cyberattacks, by 2024, as well as to develop a coherent and clear communication strategy; reiterates the urgent necessity for ensuring the expertise and capacity for secure information and communications technologies for all CSDP missions and operations to communicate securely in theatre and with all EU institutions; welcomes, in this regard, the EEAS and Member States’ commitment to implement, by 2025, a Rapid Deployable Communication and Information System to securely connect force and mission headquarters in the theatre of operations with Brussels; recognises the important role that emerging disruptive technologies, such as quantum computing and AI, will play in this regard; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to increase their cooperation and coordination with other missions and operations of like-minded partners and organisations, including the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in countering FIMI operations in the field;

58. Calls on the Member States and the EEAS to upgrade their strategy and to take concrete actions to systematically include financial and human resources, tools and training aimed at countering FIMI-related threats in all EU delegations and CSDP missions and operations as part of their broader mandate in host countries and their resilience against hybrid threats and FIMI; calls for enhancing visibility and strategic communication on the benefits, presence and role of the CSDP missions;

59. Calls on the Member States, the EEAS and the Commission to consider creating a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting FIMI threats against the EU as a whole, in order to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence-sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI; considers that this structure would serve as a reference point and specialised knowledge hub to facilitate and foster operational exchange between Member States’ authorities, EU institutions and EU agencies, as well as to enable the exchange of best practices with like-minded partners across the globe; stresses that the structure should clarify and enhance the role of the EEAS StratCom division and its taskforces as the strategic body of the EU’s diplomatic service and prevent the overlap of activities;

60. Stresses that to combat the increasing threats and the rise of anti-European narratives by non-EU countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, the EU has to step up its efforts in providing support, training and capacity-building for like-minded partners, including by countering FIMI campaigns; calls to increase resilience against disinformation and disruptive campaigns designed to undermine democratic processes and create divisions, and encourage candidate countries to take decisive steps to tackle manipulative disinformation, malign propaganda and other hybrid threats; calls for strategic and proactive measures to counter hybrid threats and to prevent third party interference in the political, electoral and other democratic processes of the accession countries, in particular malicious acts aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining European integration;

61. Condemns and is concerned by the hybrid warfare activities of PMCs and state-sponsored proxies such as the Wagner Group and other armed groups, militias and proxies in exerting influence in several countries across the world; calls on the EEAS to create an initiative with like-minded partners to counter malign non-state and state-sponsored actor groups, such as Wagner; emphasises that the existing EU toolboxes should include responses, such as sanctions, to non-EU states financing or cooperating with private military companies in vulnerable regions;

62. Condemns the policies of aggression, including the pre-planned military attack of Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that this attack follows months of organised starvation and isolation of the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh through the blockade of the Lachin corridor; underlines that the so-called Russian peacekeepers on site did not take any action to prevent or end the blockade or to stop the Azeri military assault against Nagorno-Karabakh; condemns the military support provided by non-EU countries to Azerbaijan; is seriously concerned about the consequences on the civilian population which amount to de-facto ethnic cleansing; reiterates its view that the attack carried out by Azerbaijan cannot remain without consequences, and calls for the EU to take sanctions against the Azerbaijani authorities responsible for multiple ceasefire violations and to suspend the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy; calls for the EU to suspend negotiations over a new partnership agreement with Azerbaijan in the light of recent events and the country’s dramatic human rights situation;

70. Welcomes the extension of the mandate and underlines the importance of the work of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in training and supporting the armed forces of BiH (AFBiH); welcomes, further, the cooperation and training contract for 2023 concluded between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on BiH to work towards forming multi-ethnic units of the AFBiH; recalls the EU engagement in supporting BiH’s defence capacity-building, in particular via the EUR 20 million that has been allocated through the EPF so far; supports the extension of the mandate of EUFOR Althea by the UN Security Council as an established and proven mission; strongly condemns any divisive and/or secessionist rhetoric which further contributes to increasing the vulnerability of the country and emphasises that candidate country status is an opportunity and an obligation for BiH elected representatives to fulfil citizens’ expectations and concretely improve the daily life of ordinary people; calls for the further strengthening of EUFOR Althea, particularly through the deployment of further troops and assets, as well as through the creation of a credible presence in the Brčko District;

71. Welcomes the high levels of alignment with the CFSP achieved by most of the countries of the Western Balkans, with the relevant exception of Serbia; calls for the meaningful participation of the Western Balkans in the EU initiatives for cooperative development and procurement of defence capabilities; calls for the conclusion of administrative arrangements between the EDA and the Western Balkan countries that have not yet reached this milestone; welcomes the continued presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and calls on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) to strengthen its cooperation with KFOR to prevent organised criminal gangs, paramilitary groups and other disruptive forces from destabilising Kosovo;

72. Recognises Israel’s right to self-defence, as enshrined in and constrained by international law, and emphasises that the actions of Israel must therefore strictly comply with international humanitarian law; reiterates the EU’s strong support for the International Criminal Court’s work; underlines the importance of differentiating between the Palestinian people and their legitimate aspirations on the one hand, and the Hamas terrorist organisation and its acts of terror on the other hand; calls for opening channels for providing humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip and for these to be kept permanently open; reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 lines with two sovereign, democratic states living side by side in peace and guaranteed security, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, and in full respect of international law; calls for a thorough investigation into the role of Iran, Qatar and Russia in financing and supporting terrorism in the region; strongly disagrees and expresses its disappointment about recent statements made by the President of Türkiye in which he wrongfully claimed that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation;

73. Supports the ongoing work by the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the occupied Palestinian territory (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah in assisting with the Palestinian Authorities’ security and justice sector reform and integrated border management; expresses its appreciation for the missions’ officials and staff who continue working under extremely difficult conditions; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to review the two missions’ mandates and strengthen their future role, in view of the current situation and their unique position where they maintain dialogue with both the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in an effort to enhance the EU’s peace efforts;

74. Welcomes the joint communication on the EU cyber defence policy and calls on the Member States to stay committed to and implement the ambitious but realistic set of actions proposed by the Commission, including the proposal for a cyber solidarity act to enhance their ability to detect and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents in the EU, but also to enhance information-sharing and to support the production of high-quality intelligence along with dedicated platforms, resources and funding; notes that the mutual cooperation between the EU Member States, as well as with our allies and partners around the world, is essential for our cybersecurity; urges caution when sharing data, which should only be available to partners with the same values, while management and infrastructure should be entrusted to trusted companies and service providers; notes, in this regard, that the use of Huawei technology in the development of 5G seriously undermines the EU’s cyber resilience;

75. Calls for strengthening the resilience and capabilities of the EU institutions in combating cyberattacks, which is an important security issue, particularly ahead of the EU elections;

76. Demands that the Union take effective measures to protect European critical infrastructure, valuable supply chains and democratic institutions from hybrid threats; calls for the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems for critical infrastructure such as pipelines and fibre optics cables to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks;