Changes from plenary report to adopted text

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

38. Emphasises that multilateral forums, in particular the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which bear witness to increasing competition between great powers; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and points, in this context, to disputes within the WTO and the WHO; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, balancing the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while prioritising cooperation with selected like-minded partners at the same time; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based system and the management of global commons, including the UN and its agencies, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the WHO, the WTO and NATO;

39. Notes the necessity of ensuring unity, coherence and complementarity of efforts between the EU and NATO in upholding international peace and security; underlines that NATO remains the cornerstone of European security and calls for cooperation between NATO and the EU to be enhanced further while strengthening the European pillar within NATO, inter alia by consistently meeting NATO’s defence spending benchmark of 2 % of gross domestic product; calls for greater cooperation with NATO on fighting disinformation and hybrid threats originating from third countries;

40. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the United Nations system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto, boosting regional representation, making executive bodies accountable to the assemblies that elect them, and redefining the composition of the Security Council’s membership to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; calls on the Commission to focus on ensuring the EU’s strategic indispensability in an increasingly multipolar world; calls for the EU institutions to ensure that the EU speaks with one voice in the UN, particularly in the Security Council; calls for continued dialogue with the UK to be ensured in order to maintain cooperation within the Security Council; calls on all UN member states to take action to revoke Russia’s veto powers in the Security Council;

41. Calls on the VP/HR to promote a convincing, durable and targeted democratic narrative that demonstrates that democracy delivers for individuals and societies across the globe and is capable of withstanding autocratic pressure and influence; deplores the fact that the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Iran and other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes use information manipulation and malign interference as integral instruments to exert pressure on multilateral institutions and democratic values and norms, to erode checks on the abuse of power, to increase the incidence and severity of human rights violations, to constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements and to spread anti-Western disinformation; encourages, in this context, investment in strategic communications and the fight against foreign interference and the spread of disinformation, and welcomes the EEAS’s engagement with the UN on a global code of conduct for information integrity;

42. Highlights the increasing phenomenon of transnational threats against human rights defenders and political activists by the national authorities of their countries or by proxies; encourages the Commission and the Member States to provide foreign human rights defenders and activists residing in the EU with appropriate financial and other means to enable them to continue their work remotely and without fear of retaliation; praises the relentless work of civil society organisations and human rights defenders worldwide and calls for the EU to step up its support of civil society and human rights defenders; expresses its serious concern about the increasing attacks on various minorities worldwide, including the LGBTIQ community and religious minorities, such as Christians; emphasises the need to address intersectionality in all EU actions, including in the implementation of the CFSP, in order to promote fully fledged gender equality;

Change 14

Added43. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the killing on 16 February 2024 of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate, who was incarcerated in a penal colony and subjected to ill treatment, including torture, arbitrary punishment and psychological pressure; calls for improved conditions for political prisoners in Russia, in line with its international commitments; denounces the Russian regime’s escalating human rights violations and condemns the ongoing suppression of government critics, human rights defenders and independent journalists; urges the EU and its Member States to provide assistance to Russian human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists and independent journalists both within and outside Russia; urges the Council to adopt restrictive measures against those responsible for the killing of Alexei Nalvany and for the arbitrary prosecutions and torture of anti-war protesters;

44. Recognises that several actors in the Global South are becoming more assertive; emphasises, in this context, that the term ‘Global South’ projects a degree of unity onto what is in reality a very diverse group of actors characterised by diverging aspirations and alignments; recognises the international leverage of these actors;

45. Recalls that the EU is the world’s leading donor of official development assistance; underlines that the EU must remain a reliable ally in development cooperation worldwide; expresses its concern that the EU is facing increasing scepticism and disengagement; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a key and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges; encourages, in this context, stronger political presence in countries where the EU’s footprint has predominantly consisted of development cooperation; highlights, in particular, the importance of the EU’s presence in Africa and calls on the Commission and the Member States to consolidate the political dialogue at national and regional levels, as well as providing a diversified range of technical support, including funding at government and local community levels, to achieve greater efficiency and visibility; stresses the importance of establishing political agreements with third countries, based on common European values and fundamental rights;

Change 15

Added46. Calls on the Council to launch the project to establish a European civil peace corps, bringing together the expertise of institutional and non-institutional actors in conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation with a view to making EU civilian crisis management more credible, consistent, effective, flexible and visible;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

47. Recalls that the EU should be a more assertive global actor for peace and human security; notes that effective development cooperation and an ambitious trade policy are also crucial in addressing the root causes of migration and other challenges facing the Union;

48. Calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide by means of infrastructure and telecommunications investment that creates national value in partner countries and enables their socio-economic development, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, while pursuing the EU’s prosperity and security interests; recalls that the Global Gateway is to be understood as a strategic concept integrating foreign, economic and development policy; stresses, in this context, that coordination with international financial institutions, well-defined private-sector involvement and tailored strategic communications are essential in order for the instrument to reach the desired scale; welcomes, in this context, the first high-level Global Gateway Forum hosted by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in October 2023; insists that Parliament should be more closely involved in the decision-making process in order to guarantee transparent governance and make sure that the Global Gateway is properly coordinated with the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment;

49. Notes that EU investment and assistance should focus on common objectives at the most appropriate level of action, with clear visibility in receiving countries, and on tailor-made investments that respond to our partners’ needs, as defined through a more proactive and constructive engagement with them;

50. Calls for multilateral solutions to new challenges and realities, such as cybersecurity, biotechnology and artificial intelligence; insists on the centrality of multilateralism for the effective maintenance of order in outer space and on the need to deepen current initiatives, and launch new ones, to preserve the peaceful uses of outer space;

Asserting interests through the development of robust strategic alliances and like-minded partnerships

Change 16

Changed49.51. Emphasises the need to build strategic solidarity between like-minded partners as the best response to a more dangerous and unpredictable security environment; emphasises the need to strengthen existing partnerships with countries that share our values, particularly on issues such as strategic dependencies, economic coercion, political interference and disinformation, and highlights the significance of building new alliances, inter alia in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with third countries, whereby the EU will develop stronger partnerships with those that uphold the principles of the CFSP and CSDP and the fundamental values of the Union; believes, conversely, that the ‘less for less’ principle should apply in relation to third countries which display a manifest disregard for human rights and international law, as well as to those which enable other third countries to commit these violations; recalls that the level and intensity of EU engagement should be adapted accordingly, in particular in terms of development cooperation, trade benefits and access to EU programmes;

▸4 unchanged paragraphs

52. Stresses the importance of strong and strategic transatlantic cooperation, including that between NATO and the EU, based on shared values, interests and objectives and on the principle of a partnership of equals; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the US and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; urges the Commission and the VP/HR to engage closely with both partners by intensifying and consolidating the cooperation mechanisms already established, including the EU-US Trade and Technology Council; stresses, in particular, the need to progress on key foreign policy files, including on our respective relations with China, on Europe’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, on Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and on the Indo-Pacific; points, with regard to the latter, to the dedicated US-EU dialogue on security and defence and the Indo-Pacific with a view to developing closer and more ambitious cooperation, and highlights the first ever EU-US joint naval exercise in the north-western Indian Ocean in March 2023; calls for stronger transatlantic cooperation on trade and on combating challenges caused by rapid technological changes and growing cyber threats;

53. Recalls that the US is the EU’s most important ally; reiterates its request that EU-US summits be held on a regular basis in order to lend sustained impetus to the indispensable nature of transatlantic cooperation; reiterates its support for the establishment of a transatlantic political council that would serve as a forum for regular and effective institutional dialogue between the US and the EU on foreign and security policy; calls on the House of Representatives to establish a standing Congressional delegation for the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD), in line with the 1999 joint statement on the establishment of the TLD between the US Congress and the European Parliament, as this would enhance our capacity for policy dialogue and cooperation;

54. Calls for the EU and the US to make decisive progress in the negotiations on strengthening international supply chains for critical minerals with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to address the discriminatory impact of the US Inflation Reduction Act;

55. Welcomes the conclusion of the Windsor Framework and recalls the importance of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement for a strong and constructive partnership with the UK; highlights the crucial and multi-layered significance of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the Windsor Framework for long-lasting relations with the UK;

Change 17

Changed54.56. Regrets the fact that the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement does not include provisions on cooperation on foreign policy and defence; calls, in this context, for greater involvement of the UK in European security and defence projects and for more structured and regular engagement with the UK on foreign affairs, building on the constructive experience of EU-UK cooperation in countering Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the adoption and monitoring of sanctions; welcomes the joint missions to third countries by representatives of the EU and the UK with a view to preventing the circumvention of sanctions; highlights shared interests and collective responsibilities and calls for more permanent forms of coordination with regard to foreign and security policy in various regions; welcomes the UK’s participation in the European Political Community;Community and its hosting of its fourth summit; is convinced that the European Political Community can facilitate trust between the UK and the EU, promote closer dialogue on shared challenges, particularly relating to security, and serve as an incubator for concrete cooperation projects;

Change 18

Changed55.57. Welcomes both the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and Belarusian democratic forces, and the ongoing support provided to Russian human rights defenders and to independent media inside and outside Russia; is shocked by the death of 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny, who was arrested and sentenced on dubious and politically motivated grounds and who sacrificed his life to defend democracy and oppose oppression and corruption in Russia; calls on the Russian regime to shed light on the circumstances of Alexei Navalny’s death without delay; reiterates its support for the Belarusian democratic opposition, all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader and the regime’s complicity in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in spite of ongoing crackdowns, and who have expressed their desire to achieve the democratic development of Belarus and its membership of the EU, inter alia at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

58. Condemns the Lukashenka regime’s active role in supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; emphasises the urgent need for the mirroring of sanctions between Belarus and Russia, with Lukashenka’s regime being fully complicit in the war crimes committed, such as the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children;

Change 19

Removed57. Welcomes the 2023 enlargement package and the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans presented by the Commission and calls on the Council to demonstrate genuine political commitment to the EU membership perspective of the countries in Western Balkans; notes that this should include advancing accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; supports efforts to achieve, as a matter of priority, the relevant constitutional changes in North Macedonia and calls on all political forces to play a constructive role in this regard; asks, in particular, the governments of the Member States that set this additional requirement for North Macedonia to do their utmost to support these efforts; regrets the unjustified delays in the accession processes of North Macedonia and Albania and recalls that candidate countries should be assessed on the basis of their own merit in complying with the objective criteria for accession, including their implementation of EU-related reforms and their policy alignment with the CFSP, such as the positions and restrictive measures adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the fact that the majority of countries in the Western Balkans are aligned with the CFSP, while calling on Belgrade to urgently do the same, particularly considering that Serbia is one of the very few European countries not yet in line with the sanctions adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that accession can only proceed once the country in question aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on EU-related reforms; remains very concerned about the destabilising influence on the whole region of the Serbian authorities;

Added59. Is shocked and appalled by the murder of 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate and Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny, who sacrificed his life to defend democracy and oppose oppression and corruption in Russia;

Removed58. Regrets the fact that high political tensions and polarisation in Montenegro delayed progress on EU-related reforms and plunged the country into a deep political and institutional crisis, stalling Montenegro’s EU accession process; welcomes the formation of a new government and stresses the importance of it being able and committed to take forward EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path;

Added60. Welcomes the 2023 enlargement package and the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes a facility of EUR 6 billion in grants and loans to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU between 2024 and 2027; confirms that it is examining the proposal for the reform and growth facility for the Western Balkans and will cooperate with the Council to ensure rapid ratification; calls on the Council to demonstrate genuine political commitment to the EU membership perspective of the countries in Western Balkans; notes that this should include advancing accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; supports efforts to achieve, as a matter of priority, the relevant constitutional changes in North Macedonia and calls on all political forces to play a constructive role in this regard; asks, in particular, the governments of the Member States that set this additional requirement for North Macedonia to do their utmost to support these efforts; regrets the unjustified delays in the accession processes of North Macedonia and Albania and recalls that candidate countries should be assessed on the basis of their own merit in complying with the objective criteria for accession, including their implementation of EU-related reforms and their policy alignment with the CFSP, such as the positions and restrictive measures adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the fact that the majority of countries in the Western Balkans are aligned with the CFSP, while calling on Belgrade to urgently do the same, particularly considering that Serbia is one of the very few European countries not yet in line with the sanctions adopted in response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that accession can only proceed once the country in question aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on EU-related reforms; remains very concerned about the destabilising influence on the whole region of the Serbian authorities;

Removed59. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved; urges the country’s political leaders to implement the substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms, in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples, as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgments of domestic and international courts, including all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against destabilising actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably Milorad Dodik; welcomes the agreement reached to extend the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Operation Althea until 2 November 2024 and recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Added61. Takes note of the preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission (I-EOM) of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights on Serbia’s early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023; welcomes the high voter turnout, but is concerned by the irregularities and procedural deficiencies reported; stresses that the proper functioning of Serbia’s democratic institutions is at the core of the country’s EU accession process and calls on the competent authorities to investigate properly and follow up on the I-EOM’s recommendations; encourages Serbia’s political leadership to ensure constructive, inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum and to deliver on the necessary reforms for Serbia to progress on the path to EU accession;

Added62. Is strongly concerned about a public statement from President Vučić in February 2024 explicitly endorsing possible military measures from the PRC against Taiwan in contradiction to the EU's policy supporting the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and warning against unilateral measures, in particular by force or coercion.

Added63. Regrets the fact that high political tensions and polarisation in Montenegro delayed progress on EU-related reforms and plunged the country into a deep political and institutional crisis, stalling Montenegro’s EU accession process; welcomes the formation of a new government and stresses the importance of the government being able and committed to take forward EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path;

Added64. Deplores the fact that the Serbian parliamentary and local elections held on 17 December 2023 deviated from international standards and Serbia’s commitments to free and fair elections, owing to the incumbents’ persistent and systematic abuse of institutions and media in order to gain an unfair and undue advantage; considers that these elections cannot be deemed to have been held in just conditions; is alarmed by reports of the widespread and systematic scale of fraud that compromised the integrity of the elections in Serbia; notes that the I-EOM stated that the election was conducted smoothly, but that the day was marked by numerous procedural deficiencies, including the inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches of voting secrecy and numerous instances of group voting, and was dominated by the decisive involvement of President Vučić together with the ruling party’s systemic advantages; expresses its serious concern over these irregularities and the overall election environment, which fell below the standards expected of an EU candidate country; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of Serbia’s democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology; calls for an independent international investigation by respected international legal experts and institutions into the irregularities of the parliamentary, provincial and municipal elections, with special attention to the elections to the Belgrade City Assembly, as certain allegations, including those regarding organised voter migration at local level, go beyond the scope covered by the OSCE/ODIHR reports;

Added65. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved; eagerly awaits the Commission’s report on progress, which is expected in March 2024 at the latest; urges the country’s political leaders to implement the substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms, in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples, as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgments of domestic and international courts, including all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; denounces the recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist laws and policies of the leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, including the celebration of the unconstitutional ‘RS Day’ on 9 January 2024; calls on Member States and representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote and support the implementation of these rulings; reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against destabilising actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of RS and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; welcomes the agreement reached to extend the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Operation Althea until 2 November 2024 and recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; urges the EU’s military mission to actively prevent unlawful parades and other provocations as well as threats against everyone working to help the victims of genocide and investing in inter-ethnic reconciliation and a peaceful future for the country;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

66. Welcomes the fact that the unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has prompted the EU to reprioritise its enlargement policy; reaffirms that the pace of the enlargement process depends both on the individual countries’ capacity to meet the criteria for accession and on the commitment of the political leaders in the Western Balkan countries and the EU Member States; is concerned about the rise of ethnonationalism in the Western Balkans; calls on the EEAS to monitor the situation closely in order to prevent tensions; underlines the importance of the democracy support activities facilitated by Parliament, such as the Jean Monnet Dialogue and the Parliamentary Dialogue Process;

67. Welcomes recent signals regarding the accelerated timeline for candidate countries; calls for it to be ensured that ongoing and future accession negotiations will not be delayed because of particular national interests or the need to reform the Treaties; reiterates the need to continue to work on the accession of new Member States and the deepening of the EU in parallel; underlines the importance of financial instruments, such as the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III, in order to strengthen the partnership between the EU and candidate countries; calls for the development of a coherent strategy for the gradual integration of all candidate countries, including into sectoral policies and as observers in the various institutions of the Union; remains deeply concerned about reports that the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement is deliberately seeking to circumvent and undermine the centrality of democratic and rule of law reforms in EU accession countries; urges the Commission to initiate an independent and impartial investigation into whether the conduct displayed and the policies furthered by the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement constitute a breach of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission and of the Commissioner’s obligations under the Treaties;

68. Notes the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in today’s geopolitical context, as well as for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; reiterates the need for greater European presence and visibility in the region in order to divert foreign malign influences and their hybrid activities;

69. Condemns the terrorist attack carried out on 24 September 2023 against Kosovo Police officers in Banjska in the north of the Republic of Kosovo, and other provocations; re-emphasises its position as adopted in its resolution of 19 October 2023; urges all sides, in this context, to work to de-escalate the situation and avoid any rhetoric or action that could lead to further tensions; is closely following the ongoing investigations and reiterates that the perpetrators responsible must be held accountable and face justice; calls on the Commission and the Council to take measures against the Serbian Government if investigations reveal that the Serbian State was directly involved in the aforementioned attack or the violent attacks that took place in the north of Kosovo in May 2023, or if the Serbian authorities are unwilling to cooperate fully;

70. Supports the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and the development of the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina; calls on Kosovo and Serbia to engage in the Dialogue in good faith and in the spirit of compromise to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of their relations, based on mutual recognition, in accordance with international law and without further delay; recalls that failure to advance on the normalisation of relations would negatively impact the EU integration of both countries; regrets the restrictive measures imposed by the Council against Kosovo and calls for their immediate lifting; calls for the EU to adopt a balanced approach to the mediation between the parties in order to overcome the current stalemate; recalls that the failure of the Dialogue would also have consequences for the EU’s role as a credible foreign policy player;

Change 20

Removed65. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation to the Council to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Council to adopt the negotiation framework once Ukraine and Moldova have advanced on pending laws on anti-corruption and the verification of assets and undertaken further steps on de-oligarchisation; takes positive note of the recommendation to also open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved; welcomes Kosovo’s application for EU membership and asks the Commission to respond to it; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens, which will enter into force no later than January 2024;

Added71. Regrets the numerous irregularities that were reported by observers during the Serbian early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023, including, but not limited to, misuse of public resources, pressure on public-sector employees, intimidation and pressure on voters, vote buying and media capture; calls for a prompt independent investigation into these irregularities; against this background, calls on the Serbian authorities to follow up on the recommendations from the international election observation mission; is concerned about the deep polarisation within Serbian society and the recent violent episodes, including the reported beating of an opposition politician by the Serbian secret services;

Removed66. Takes positive note of the Commission’s recommendation to the Council to grant Georgia the status of candidate country on the understanding that further steps are taken on fighting disinformation, aligning with the CFSP, improving the implementation of parliamentary oversight and addressing political polarisation, de-oligarchisation and anti-corruption; underlines the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and accordingly stresses the importance of EU support for the country, with a focus on civil society actors working towards Georgia’s integration into the EU; points to the potential stabilising role that Georgia can play in the South Caucasus;

Added72. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and with the Republic of Moldova; calls on the Council to adopt the respective negotiation frameworks once the relevant steps set out in the respective Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 are taken; takes positive note of the recommendation to also open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved; welcomes Kosovo’s application for EU membership and asks the Commission to respond to it; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens;

Added73. Takes positive note of the European Council’s decision to grant the status of candidate country to Georgia, on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023, including those on fighting disinformation, aligning with the CFSP, improving the implementation of parliamentary oversight and addressing political polarisation, de-oligarchisation and anti-corruption are taken; reiterates its calls to release former president Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds and encourages President Salome Zourabichvili to use her constitutional right to pardon him, which would contribute to reducing the political polarisation in the country; underlines the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and accordingly stresses the importance of EU support for the country, with a focus on civil society actors working towards Georgia’s integration into the EU; points to the potential stabilising role that Georgia can play in the South Caucasus;

74. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to take decisive steps to ensure that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, in particular to withdraw all its military and security forces from Georgia’s occupied territories, to allow the deployment of international security mechanisms on the ground and to grant the EU Monitoring Mission unimpeded access to the Russia-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; encourages the EU institutions and the Member States to further strengthen the EU Monitoring Mission’s capacities and further extend its mandate; further calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to use the term ‘occupation’ with regard to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia that are illegally occupied by and under effective control of Russia, as established by the respective judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the investigation of the International Criminal Court;

Change 21

Changed68.75. Believes that Ukraine’s and the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the support package and the launch of the civilian EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova; commends the progress already achieved on reforms and urges the Commission to present an ambitious roadmap for accession negotiations to start as soon as possible, as well as for Ukraine’s and Moldova’s gradual integration into EU policies and programmes; underlines the complexity and merit-based nature of the enlargement process, which requires steps to be taken steadily and in a timely manner; further insists that a continuous effort must be made to adjust existing accession tools and build the legal basis for the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III; looks forward to the European Council’s addressing internal reforms concerning enlargement at its upcoming meetings with a view to adopting, by the summer of 2024, the conclusions on a roadmap for future work;

76. Reiterates the need to re-think the Eastern Partnership multilateral policy to restore regional engagement and the regional democratic reform agenda, including through the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly;

Change 22

Changed70.77. Condemns,Regrets the fact that Azerbaijan chose a military solution over diplomacy with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, while recognising that Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani territory; condemns, in the strongest terms, the pre-planned and unjustified attack by Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and the people who have remained in the region; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh and to offer solid guarantees regarding the protection of their rights; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; deplores the fact that Baku’s offensive represented a gross violation of international law and human rights and a clear infringement of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and of the commitments that Azerbaijan made in the negotiations mediated by the EU; believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts; supports the ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been seriously hampered by the recent military operation against Nagorno-KarabakhNagorno-Karabakh, andwhich led to the deexodus factoof ethnicArmenian cleansing;population; highlights that a dignified and durable regional peace that maintains sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for both countries is a prerequisite for stability in the neighbourhood; is concerned by attempts by some leaders and regional powers to exploit the current situation in a way that could threaten the fragile prospects for peace; warns that any efforts to achieve goals by using force and violating the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries should be met with a decisive response by the EU and the international community;

78. Calls on the EU civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size, extend its duration and also place monitors along the border with Türkiye; calls on Azerbaijan to allow EUMA’s presence on its side of the border and in Nagorno-Karabakh;

Change 23

Changed72.79. Calls on the VP/HR and the EEAS to further support Armenia via the European Peace Facility, in particular with a view to strengthening its defence capabilities against hybrid threats in order to enlarge its security space beyond the Collective Security Treaty Organization; welcomes the establishment of the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue and its firstsecond meeting on 2615 JanuaryNovember 2023;

Change 24

Changed73.80. Stresses that Parliament’s multiple warnings about the situation have not led to any change in the EU’s policy regarding Azerbaijan; insists that any deepening of EU relations with Azerbaijan must remain conditional on the country making substantial progress on respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental freedoms, including the protection of ethnic minorities; expresses, in this regard, its serious concern about the recent worsening crackdown on independent journalists and human rights defenders in Azerbaijan; further calls on the EU to immediately impose sanctions on Azerbaijan and to suspend the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy; further, questions the suitability of Azerbaijan hosting COP29 in 2024 while the country plans to increase its fossil fuel production by a third over the next decade;

Change 25

Changed74.81. Reiterates its support for the democratically elected government of Armenia and its full respect of the country’s sovereignty, democracy and territorial integrity; praises Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s declaration that Armenia will not be dragged into a new war with Azerbaijan and his recent calls for the resumption of peace talks at the highest level with Azerbaijan; condemns Russian’s interference in Armenia, which are aimed at spreading unrest; calls for the EU to strengthen its engagement in the South Caucasus; welcomes Armenia’s decision toratification ratifyof the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

Change 26

Changed75.82. Remains concerned by the fact that Türkiye’s Government has not reversed the negative trend of deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary, that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP and that Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; strongly disagrees with and expresses its disappointment about the statements made by the President of Türkiye claiming that Hamas is not a terrorist organisation;

83. Stresses that in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed; calls for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership, considering the key role played by Türkiye in the region and its significance as a NATO ally; recommends starting a reflection process to find a parallel and realistic framework for EU-Türkiye relations that encompasses the interests of all parties involved, which would anchor Türkiye to the EU instead of pushing it towards Russia or Iran;

Change 27

Changed77.84. Welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the East Mediterranean and Aegean and calls on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive or aggressive, approach with its partners in these regions; callswelcomes, onin thethis Grandregard, NationalTürkiye’s Assemblyand ofHungary’s Türkiyelong-delayed decision to swiftlyfinally ratifyapprove Sweden’s applicationaccession to join NATO and urges the Turkish national authorities to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

85. Condemns the launch of illegal construction work by the Turkish Cypriot side within the buffer zone near the bi-communal village of Pyla/Pile in Cyprus, as well as the assaults against UN peacekeepers and damage to UN vehicles on 18 August 2023; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; recalls that threats to the safety of UN peacekeepers and damage to UN property constitute crimes under international law; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to cease and reverse all such unilateral activities and avoid any further actions and provocations that are not conducive to the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; welcomes the understanding reached by the sides to find a way forward on the Pyla/Pile road in Cyprus and to stabilise the situation and calls for engagement in peaceful negotiations and a real process of dialogue;

Change 28

Changed79.86. Deplores the fact that, more than 25 years after the start of the Barcelona Process, the creation of a shared area of prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; encourages the VP/HR and the Commission to strengthen the southern dimension of the EU’s neighbourhood, including through increased dialogue and strengthened conditionality tied to the disbursement of funds, and to secure adequate resources for the timely and effective implementation of the new agenda for the Mediterranean, stresses the important role played by the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood in the management of migration in a manner based on the principles of the human rights of migrants and refugees as enshrined in international, regional and national law, solidarity, balance and the sharing of responsibility between countries; stresses the importance of practical agreementscooperation with these countries in order to mitigate the root causes of migration, consequences of irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling of illicit weapons and cultural goods; points out that many countries in the Southern Neighbourhood are rich in energy resources and can contribute more to the diversification of energy supply in European countries;

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

87. Takes note of the political agreement on a comprehensive partnership package with Tunisia; recalls that this memorandum of understanding comes with conditions and urges the Commission to ensure compliance with these; regrets, however, the fact that the memorandum of understanding failed to include the human rights obligations expected by the EU in its agreements with third countries; believes, furthermore, that EU-Tunisia relations should be based on the framework of the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement and on respect for democracy, human rights and rule of law, with full parliamentary oversight regarding the implementation of the Association Agreement and the disbursement of EU funds to Tunisia; firmly believes that the transfer of EU funds should be conditional on Tunisia’s compliance with human rights standards and include conditionality and accountability provisions; calls on the Commission to present a mechanism to ensure compliance in this regard, exploring all relevant options;

88. Is highly concerned about the authoritarian drift by the Tunisian leadership, the detention of opposition and civil society figures and the persecution of refugees and asylum seekers, and urges the Tunisian authorities to respect international humanitarian rights law and migrants’ rights; condemns, furthermore, the decision of the Tunisian authorities to refuse entry to the delegation from Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and urges the Tunisian authorities to allow open political dialogue;

89. Highlights the necessity of engaging more strategically with the Gulf countries, particularly on the promotion of regional security cooperation, climate action, human rights and the fight against corruption; welcomes the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran; welcomes, furthermore, the proposed establishment of a structured security dialogue between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council; recalls, in this regard, the need for full transparency and accountability in the strategic partnership between the EU and the Gulf countries; calls for the EU and the Member States to continue to emphasise respect for human rights and gender equality and the gradual alignment of values, in particular when responding to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences;

90. Underlines that the CFSP aims to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that these goals are not shared by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; takes note of the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continues to engage with the EU in the framework of a regular dialogue on human rights; condemns, however, the country’s persistent violation of human rights, in particular the application of death sentences and executions and the restrictions on civil and political rights, as well as free speech, and calls for the death penalty to be abolished;

91. Denounces the brutal crackdown by Iranian police and security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on demonstrations following the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini and many others tortured and killed who opposed the regime; calls for additional restrictive measures against the IRGC, its subsidiary forces and all those responsible for the human rights violations against peaceful protests, including the highest-ranking officials; calls on the Council to designate the IRGC and its subsidiary forces, including Iran’s Morality Police, the paramilitary Basij militia and the Quds Force, as a terrorist entity;