Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Removed(9c) Hydrogen corridors as identified in the REPowerEU Plan should be supported by the corresponding dedicated hydrogen infrastructure, including hydrogen networks, hydrogen storage and hydrogen import terminals in order to meet the REPowerEU Plan targets for hydrogen production and imports by 2030. Therefore, the network development plans should identify investment gaps, in particular with regard to ensuring sufficient cross-border capacities which are needed for the establishment of an integrated European hydrogen market enabling hydrogen to move freely across the borders, taking into account the hydrogen storage development and the integration of hydrogen imports.

Removed(9d) The definition of hydrogen ready infrastructure and end-use applications should ensure a common approach in Union funding programmes and the revised Climate and Energy state aid guidelines.

Removed(10) The freedoms which the Treaty guarantees the citizens of the Union — inter alia, the free movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services — are achievable only in a fully open market, which enables all consumers freely to choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers.

Removed(11) Consumer interests should be at the heart of this Directive and quality of service should be a central responsibility of natural gas undertakings. Existing rights of consumers and rights for access to essential services, including energy, and tackling energy poverty, as stated in the communication of the Commission of 26 April 2017 establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights ▌need to be strengthened and guaranteed, and should include greater transparency on prices. In that respect, cross-subsidisation of hydrogen network through natural gas or electricity network tariffs should be avoided, as it puts the burden of the energy transition of the industry sector on natural gas or electricity users, including household users. Consumer protection should ensure that all consumers in the wider remit of the Union benefit from a competitive gas market. Consumer rights should be enforced by Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the regulatory authorities.

Removed(12) The European Pillar of Social Rights places energy among the essential services everyone shall have access to and calls for support measures for those in need (principle 20). UN Sustainable Development Goal number 7 (SDG7) also calls for ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. This Directive builds on comprehensive and common concepts of vulnerable customers and energy poverty.

Removed(13) Public service requirements and the common minimum standards that follow from them need to be further strengthened to make sure that all consumers, especially vulnerable ones, can benefit from competition and fair prices. The public service requirements should be defined at national level, taking into account national circumstances; Union law should, however, be respected by the Member States.

Removed(14) Member States should ensure that household customers and, where Member States consider it to be appropriate, small enterprises, enjoy the right to be supplied with gas of a specified quality at clearly comparable, transparent and competitive prices. Member States should maintain a wide discretion to impose public service obligations on gas undertakings in pursuing objectives of general economic interest without hampering the transition to an integrated, highly energy efficient and on renewables-based energy system in accordance with the relevant Union targets, law and strategies. However, public service obligations in the form of price setting for the supply of natural gas constitute a fundamentally distortive measure that often leads to the accumulation of tariff deficits, the limitation of consumer choice, poorer incentives for energy saving and energy efficiency investments, lower standards of service, lower levels of consumer engagement and satisfaction, and the restriction of competition, as well as to there being fewer innovative products and services on the market. Consequently, Member States should apply other policy tools, in particular targeted social policy measures, to safeguard the affordability of natural gas supply to their citizens. Public interventions in price setting for the supply of natural gas should be carried out only as public service obligations, and ▌be limited in time, while being subject to specific conditions. A fully liberalised, well-functioning retail natural gas market would stimulate price and non-price competition among existing suppliers and provide incentives to new market entrants, thereby improving consumer choice and satisfaction.

Removed(14a) Member States should ensure the continuous and uninterrupted availability of energy and the technical safety of energy supply by increasing efficiency and interoperability of transmission and distribution networks, promoting system flexibility, avoiding congestions, ensuring resilient supply chains, cybersecurity and the protection and climate adaptation of all, and in particular, critical infrastructure while reducing strategic energy dependencies.

Removed(15) Public interventions in the form of price setting for the supply of natural gas should be used without overriding the principle of open markets in clearly defined circumstances and beneficiaries and should be limited in duration. In exceptional circumstances, for example where supply is severely constrained, causing significantly higher gas prices than normal or in the event of a market failure where interventions by regulatory authorities and competition authorities have proven to be ineffective, Member States may broaden the scope of public intervention in price setting for the supply of gas to categories other than vulnerable customers and customers affected by energy poverty such as microenterprises, other household customers and protected customers, as defined in Article 2, point (5), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, in order to avoid significant impact on the economy and society. In order to mitigate the distortive effects of public interventions in price setting for the supply of natural gas and to reduce the public budget allocated over time for those interventions, Member States applying such interventions should put in place additional measures, including measures to prevent distortions of price setting in the wholesale market and allocate at least an equivalent financial amount to supporting beneficiaries in investing in energy efficiency and renewable energy projects, which would help to shield them sustainably and without recurring price interventions from natural gas prices fluctuations. Member States should ensure that all beneficiaries of regulated prices are able to benefit fully from the offers available on the competitive market when they choose to do so. To that end, they should be directly and regularly informed of the offers and savings available on the competitive market, and should be provided with assistance to respond to and benefit from market-based offers.

Removed(16) Public interventions in price setting for the supply of natural gas should not lead to direct cross-subsidisation between different categories of customers. According to that principle, price systems must not explicitly make certain categories of customer bear the cost of price interventions that affect other categories of customer.

Removed(17) Clear and comprehensible information should be made available to consumers concerning their rights in relation to the energy sector. The Commission has established, after consulting relevant stakeholders including Member States, regulatory authorities, consumer organisations and natural gas undertakings, an accessible, user-friendly energy consumer checklist providing consumers with practical information about their rights. That energy consumer checklist should be maintained to date, provided to all consumers and should be made publicly available.

Removed(18) Member States should take into account the fact that the successful ecological transition requires enhanced investment in education, training and skills for workers in the energy sector, including gas industry, and related value chains, as well as in relation to infrastructure development and renewable energy roll out, such as heat pump deployment and other renewable alternatives. Such mention would be in line with the proposals for a revision of Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (2021/0203(COD) and Directive (EU) 2018/2001 (2018/0201(COD) as well as the REPowerEU Plan. Social partners must play a key role in that process.

Removed(19) Market rules should protect and empower customers to make the most energy efficient choices, in order for new renewable gas and low carbon gas to be fully embedded in the energy transition and steered to those end-use sectors where no other more energy or cost efficient alternatives are available. For example, there is only a limited financial or environmental benefit in supplying hydrogen to individual heating appliances and such uses should therefore not be encouraged as a general principle.

Removed(20) Natural gas still plays a key role in energy supply, as household energy consumption from natural gas is still higher than from electricity. Although electrification is a key element of the green transition, in the future there will still be household natural gas consumption including increasing volumes of renewable gas, in particular biomethane.

Removed(21) As the natural gas sector, including the natural gas retail market was not part of the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package, the related provisions on infrastructure planning and investments, consumer engagement and protection have not been adapted to the needs of the energy transition, which corresponds instead to the situation of over a decade ago when the Third Energy Package was adopted.

Removed(22) The natural gas market currently witnesses exceptional circumstances leading to high prices which are expected to remain rather high also in the years to come, poor customer satisfaction and engagement as well as slow uptake of new renewable gas and low-carbon gas and other renewable alternatives, which all reflect limited competition in many Member States as well as an unfavourable regulatory environment for electrification and other renewable alternatives. ▌Natural gas prices for household customers rose in the last decade resulting in household consumers paying two or three times more for their natural gas consumption than industrial customers.

Removed(22a) The energy prices crisis has shown the inability of the liquid market to give the right price signal and to adequately reflect the demand-supply dynamics in the price formation mechanism. It has also shown the inadequacy of the liquid market to cope with emergency situations, such as supply disruptions and market manipulation practices. In order to prevent high price volatility and to discourage anti-competitive conducts, trading platforms should make use of similar instruments already used in the financial markets for the same purposes. As suggested by European Securities and Markets Authority, those instruments should consist of, inter alia, trading halt mechanisms or price collars. ACER as well as regulatory authorities should continue to investigate any cases of market manipulations and distortions.

Removed(23) As in the electricity sector, market flexibilities and an adequate Union consumer rights’ legal framework in the natural gas sector are essential and the natural gas sector should be reinforced to ensure that consumers can participate in the energy transition and benefit from affordable prices, good standards of service, and effective choice of offers mirroring sustainable technological developments. Unlike in the electricity sector, natural gas consumer should be protected from rising tariffs when natural gas assets have to be depreciated, from cross subsidisation between gas and hydrogen users and rising gas tariffs with a shrinking customer base. The role of gaseous fuels for heating or cooling in buildings will decline in the future due to renewable alternatives, in particular electrification, district heating or thermal renewable energy.

Removed(24) The switch from fossil gas to renewable alternatives will concretise if energy from renewable sources becomes an attractive, non-discriminatory choice for consumers based on truly transparent information where the transition costs are fairly distributed among different groups of consumers and market players. However, unlike in the electricity sector, switching from gas to other renewable technologies is usually not as easy due to the lock-in effect related to the underpinning infrastructure. Mandatory fuel switches should be accompanied by measures that remove adverse effects on final customers, in particular vulnerable customers and people affected by or at risk of energy poverty, as well as measures that mitigate and resolve inequalities resulting from the energy transition.

Removed(25) To address the current gaps in the retail gas market, it is necessary to tackle the existing competition and technical barriers to the emergence of alternative, renewables-based energy supply, new services, better levels of service, and lower consumer prices, whilst ensuring the protection of ▌vulnerable consumers and customers affected by or at risk of energy poverty.

Removed(26) In order to ensure a high level of consumer protection and empowerment consistently across energy sectors, the legislative framework in the decarbonised gas market law should reflect the electricity market customer protection and where relevant its empowerment provisions and take into account the energy system efficiency, the Union's objectives on security of supply, energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Removed(27) To be coherent and effective, this mirroring approach should be encompass all consumer protection and empowerment provisions, whenever feasible and adaptable to the gas market. This should go from basic contractual rights to rules for billing information, switching energy provider, having at disposal reliable comparison tools, protecting vulnerable customers and customers affected by or at risk of energy poverty, ensuring adequate data protection for smart meters and data management, and efficient alternative dispute resolution rules. Smart meters should be deployed only after a positive cost-benefit assessment.

Removed(28) In pursuing the consistency of provisions across sectors, burdens for national administrations and businesses should be limited and proportionate by also building on the experience with the Clean Energy for All Europeans Package.

Removed(29) The modernisation and decarbonisation of the gas sector is expected to lead to substantial economic and environmental benefits in terms of both improved retail competition and its social and distributional benefits and customer empowerment, including strengthened contractual rights and better available information on consumption and energy sources leading to greener choices, which also include uptaking energy efficiency measures and reducing or switching from fossil gas to other more sustainable and energy efficient renewable energy sources. Acknowledging the need to produce biomethane, respecting the sustainability criteria laid down in Directive (EU) 2018/2001, environmental standards, such as prevention of methane leakage as well as the avoidance of food security issues, local biomethane production and supply could lead to economic benefits at the local level, in particular for the agricultural sector, and household and non-household customers located in the proximity of production areas. As an organisational concept aiming to drive social innovation, renewable energy communities as set out in Directive (EU) 2018/2001 should contribute to the uptake of renewable gas.

Removed(30) Switching is an important indicator of customer engagement as well as an important tool to boost competition on both the natural gas and hydrogen markets and should therefore be guaranteed as a basic right to costumers. However, switching rates remain inconsistent among Member States and consumers are discouraged from switching both energy source and supplier by exit and termination fees. Although removing such fees might limit customer choice by eliminating products based on rewarding customer loyalty, restricting their use further should improve consumer welfare, consumer engagement and competition in the market, including promoting the use of biomethane and other low-carbon gas and renewable gas.

Removed(31) Shorter switching times are likely to encourage customers to search for better energy deals and switch supplier. With the increased deployment of information technology, by the year 2026, the technical switching process of registering a new supplier in a metering point at the market operator should typically be possible to complete within 24 hours on any working day. Ensuring that it is possible by that date for the technical process of switching to take place within 24 hours would minimise switching times, helping to increase consumer engagement and retail competition.

Removed(32) Several factors impede customers from accessing, understanding and acting upon the various sources of market information available to them. It follows that the comparability of offers should be improved, through adequate customer information, including on the environmental impact of the energy offers, and comparison tools for all customers, and unjustified barriers to switching should be removed without unduly limiting customer choice.

Removed(33) Independent comparison tools, including websites, are an effective means for smaller customers to assess the merits of the different energy offers that are available on the market. They should aim to include the broadest possible range of available offers, and to cover the market as completely as is feasible so as to give the customer a representative overview in a clear and easy to understand manner. Where the environmental impact is promoted as an essential feature of the offer, comparison tools should also include a description of that environmental impact. It is crucial that smaller customers have access to at least one comparison tool and that the information given on such tools be trustworthy, impartial, transparent and easy to understand. To that end, Member States could provide for a comparison tool that is operated by a national authority or a private company. It is also vital to provide customers with a clear and understandable pre-contractual information, so that they are fully aware about the details and consequences of the contract.

Removed(34) In some instances, final customers, in particular those in the agricultural sector or at local or municipal level, are able to consume, to store and to sell self-generated renewable gas. To the extent that they are able to undertake those activities while respecting environmental standards, including the mitigation of methane emissions, those customers should be able to participate in all natural gas markets, including local supply, providing ancillary services to the system, for instance through energy storage, while maintaining their rights as final customers. Such collective arrangements between active customers can provide opportunities for service providers and local businesses, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to contribute to local system balancing and flexibility. Member States should be able to have different provisions in their national law with respect to taxes and levies for individual and jointly-acting active customers.

Removed▌

Removed(37) Bills and billing information are an important means to inform and empower final customers. Energy bills remain the most common consumer concern and source of consumer complaints, a factor that contributes to the persistently low levels of consumer satisfaction and engagement in the gas sector. Provisions for billing information in the gas sector also lag behind rights granted to consumers in the electricity sector. It is therefore necessary to align them and to set minimum requirements for bills and billing information in the gas sector, so that consumers have access to transparent, complete, easy to understand information. Bills should convey information to the final customers on their consumption and costs, greenhouse gas emission intensity, type of energy, its share and quantity, thus facilitating comparison between offers and switching supplier or energy sources, as well as information on their consumer rights (such as on alternative dispute resolution). In addition, bills should be a tool to actively engage consumers in the market, so that consumers can manage their consumption patterns and make greener choices. It is important to provide comprehensive and accurate information to consumers to ensure they are aware of their environmental impact and, thus, consumers can express their preference for the most sustainable energy carriers.

Removed(38) The regular provision of accurate billing information based on actual gas consumption ▌is important to help customers to control their gas consumption and costs. Nevertheless, customers, in particular household customers, should have access to flexible arrangements for the actual payment of their bills.

Removed(39) A key aspect in supplying customers is access to objective and transparent consumption data. Thus, consumers should have access to their consumption data and associated prices and services costs so that they can invite competitors to make an offer based on that information. Consumers should also have the right to be properly informed about their energy consumption. Prepayments should not place a disproportionate disadvantage on their users, while different payment systems should be non-discriminatory. Information on energy costs provided to consumers frequently enough should create incentives for energy savings because it will give customers direct feedback on the effects of investment in energy efficiency and change of behaviour.

Removed(40) ▌ Deciding at national level on the deployment of natural gas smart metering systems for customers should be dependent on a positive cost-benefit assessment, to avoid stranded investments for customers. That economic assessment should take into account the long-term benefits of the deployment of smart metering systems to customers, including customers’ benefits arising from the use of smart meters and signing up for smart meter-enabled offers, and the whole value chain. Should that assessment conclude that the introduction of such metering systems is economically reasonable and cost-effective only for industrial consumers with a certain amount of natural gas consumption, Member States should be able to take this into account when proceeding with deployment. ▌

Removed(41) In order to assist final customers’ active participation in the market, the smart metering systems that could be deployed, subject to a positive cost-benefit assessment, should have due regard to the use of relevant available standards, including those enabling interoperability on the level of the data model and the application layer, to best practices and the importance of the development of data exchange, to future and innovative energy services. Moreover, the smart metering systems that are deployed should not represent a barrier to switching supplier in the case of natural gas consumers, and should be equipped with fit-for-purpose functionalities that allow final customers to have timely access to their consumption data, to modulate their energy behaviour, be rewarded for it, and obtain savings in their bills. Consumer groups should be advised on how to improve their energy efficiency by using smart meters.

Removed(42) Member States that do not systematically deploy smart metering in the natural gas system should allow industrial consumers to benefit from the installation of a smart meter, upon request and under fair and reasonable conditions, and should provide them with all the relevant information.

Removed(43) Currently, different models for the management of data have been developed or are under development in Member States following deployment of smart metering systems. Independently of the data management model it is important that Member States put in place transparent rules that data can be accessed under non-discriminatory conditions and ensure the highest level of cybersecurity and data protection as well as the impartiality of the entities which process data.

Removed(44) Greater consumer protection is guaranteed by the availability of effective means of dispute settlement for all costumers. Member States should provide for speedy and effective complaint handling procedures. Guidance about where and how to complain should be provided in costumer contracts and billing information.

Removed(45) Member States should take appropriate measures, such as providing benefits by means of their social security systems, to ensure the necessary supply to vulnerable customers, or providing for support for energy efficiency improvements, including building renovations, and renewable energy deployment, to sustainably address energy poverty where identified pursuant to Article 3(3), point (d) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive (EU) .../...+, including in the broader context of poverty. Such measures could differ according to the particular circumstances in the Member States in question and should include social or energy policy measures relating to the payment of any gas bills, to investment in the energy efficiency of residential buildings, or to consumer protection such as disconnection safeguards. Disconnection of vulnerable customers or customers affected by or at risk of energy poverty should be prohibited in critical times and in any event during the winter.

Removed(46) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 ▌, the Commission provided indicative guidance on appropriate indicators for measuring energy poverty and defining a ‘significant number of households in energy poverty’. Directive (EU) .../...+ provides for a clear definition and a back-up set of criteria in the event that a Member State fails to define energy poverty in accordance with the relevant law.

Removed(47) The simplification and streamlining of administrative permit granting processes and clear time limits for decisions to be taken by the authorities competent for issuing an authorisation should ensure that the deployment of hydrogen production facilities and hydrogen system infrastructure can occur at an adequate pace without hampering public consultations. Member States should be requested to report on progress made. Grandfathering of authorisations (such as licences, permissions, concessions or approvals), granted under national law for the construction and operation of existing natural gas pipelines and other network assets, is needed once the transported gaseous energy carrier in a gas pipeline changes from natural gas to (pure) hydrogen. This should prevent undue delay in repurposing existing natural gas pipelines and other networks assets for hydrogen transport. It should be avoided that conditions for granting authorisations for hydrogen system infrastructure are materially different unless sufficiently justified. Technical safety considerations could justify a differentiated approach in grandfathering existing or issuing new authorisations. The provisions on authorisation procedures should apply without prejudice to international and Union law, including provisions to protect the environment, biodiversity and human health. Where duly justified on the grounds of extraordinary circumstances, it should be possible to extend the time limits for authorisation procedures by up to one year.

Removed(48) Providing guidance to applicants throughout their administrative permit application and granting processes by means of an administrative contact point is intended to reduce complexity for project developers and increase efficiency and transparency. The availability for applicants to submit relevant documents in digital form and the availability of a manual of procedures for applicants could contribute to efficiency. Member States should ensure that the authorities implementing authorisation procedures are actively involved in the tackling of remaining barriers, including non-financial ones such as insufficient knowledge, digital and human resources that hinder their processing of a growing number of authorisation procedures.

Removed(49) Without effective separation of networks from activities of production and supply (effective unbundling), there is a risk of discrimination not only in the operation of the network but also in the incentives for vertically integrated undertakings to invest adequately in their networks.

Removed(50) The rules on legal and functional unbundling as provided for in Directive 2003/55/EC have not, however, led to effective unbundling of the transmission system operators. At its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007, the European Council therefore invited the Commission to develop legislative proposals for the ‘effective separation of supply and production activities from network operations’.

Removed(51) Only the removal of the incentive for vertically integrated undertakings to discriminate against competitors as regards network access and investment can ensure effective unbundling. Ownership unbundling, which implies the appointment of the network owner as the system operator and its independence from any supply and production interests, is clearly an effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interests and to ensure security of supply. For that reason, the European Parliament, in its resolution of 10 July 2007 on prospects for the internal gas and electricity market referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective tool to promote investments in infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the network for new entrants and transparency in the market. Under ownership unbundling, Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the same person or persons are not entitled to exercise control over a production or supply undertaking and, at the same time, exercise control or any right over a transmission system operator or transmission system. Conversely, control over a transmission system or transmission system operator should preclude the possibility of exercising control or any right over a production or supply undertaking. Within those limits, a production or supply undertaking should be able to have a minority shareholding in a transmission system operator or transmission system.

Removed(52) Any system for unbundling should be effective in removing any conflict of interests between producers, suppliers and transmission system operators, in order to create incentives for the necessary investments and guarantee the access of new market entrants under a transparent and efficient regulatory regime and should not create an overly onerous regulatory regime for regulatory authorities.

Removed(53) The definition of the term ‘control’ is taken from Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation).

Removed(54) In view of the vertical links between the electricity and gas sectors, the unbundling provisions should apply across the two sectors.

Removed▌

Removed(56) Under ownership unbundling, to ensure full independence of network operation from supply and production interests and to prevent exchanges of any confidential information, the same person should not be a member of the managing boards of both a transmission system operator or a transmission system and an undertaking performing any of the functions of production or supply. For the same reason, the same person should not be entitled to appoint members of the managing boards of a transmission system operator or a transmission system and to exercise control or any right over a production or supply undertaking.

Removed(57) The setting up of a system operator or a transmission operator that is independent from supply and production interests should enable a vertically integrated undertaking to maintain its ownership of network assets whilst ensuring an effective separation of interests, provided that such independent system operator or such independent transmission operator performs all the functions of a system operator and detailed regulation and extensive regulatory control mechanisms are put in place.

Removed(58) Where, on 3 September 2009, an undertaking owning a transmission system was part of a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling and setting up a system operator or transmission operator which is independent from supply and production interests.

Removed(59) To fully preserve the interests of the shareholders of vertically integrated undertakings, Member States should have the choice of implementing ownership unbundling either by direct divestiture or by splitting the shares of the integrated undertaking into shares of the network undertaking and shares of the remaining supply and production undertaking, provided that the requirements resulting from ownership unbundling are complied with.

Removed(60) The full effectiveness of the independent system operator or independent transmission operator solutions should be ensured by way of specific additional rules. The rules on the independent transmission operator provide an appropriate regulatory framework to guarantee fair competition, sufficient investment, access for new market entrants and the integration of gas markets. Effective unbundling through the independent transmission operator provisions should be based on a pillar of organisational measures and measures relating to the governance of transmission system operators and on a pillar of measures relating to investment, connecting new production capacities to the network and market integration through regional cooperation. The independence of the transmission operator should also, inter alia, be ensured through certain ‘cooling-off’ periods during which no management or other relevant activity giving access to the same information as could have been obtained in a managerial position is exercised in the vertically integrated undertaking.

Removed(61) In order to develop competition in the internal market in gas, large non-household customers, engaged in large-scale commercial activities, should be able to choose their suppliers and enter into contracts with several suppliers to secure their gas requirements. Such customers should be protected against exclusivity clauses, the effect of which is to exclude competing or complementary offers.

Removed(62) A Member State should have the right to opt for full ownership unbundling in its territory. Where a Member State has exercised that right, an undertaking should not have the right to set up an independent system operator or an independent transmission operator. Furthermore, an undertaking performing any of the functions of production or supply should not directly or indirectly exercise control or any right over a transmission system operator from a Member State that has opted for full ownership unbundling.

Removed(63) Different types of market organisation exist in the internal market in natural gas. The measures that Member States could take in order to ensure a level playing field should be based on overriding requirements of general interest. The Commission should be consulted on the compatibility of the measures with the TFEU and Union law.

Removed(64) The implementation of effective unbundling should respect the principle of non-discrimination between the public and private sectors. To that end, the same person should not be able to exercise control or any right, in violation of the rules of ownership unbundling or the independent system operator option, solely or jointly, over the composition, voting or decision of the bodies of both the transmission system operators or the transmission systems and the production or supply undertakings. With regard to ownership unbundling and the independent system operator solution, provided that the Member State in question is able to demonstrate that the requirement is complied with, two separate public bodies should be able to control production and supply activities on the one hand and transmission activities on the other.

Removed(65) Fully effective separation of network activities from supply and production activities should apply throughout the Union to both Union and non-Union undertakings. To ensure that network activities and supply and production activities throughout the Union remain independent from each other, regulatory authorities should be empowered to refuse certification to transmission system operators that do not comply with the unbundling rules. To ensure the consistent application of those rules across the Union, the regulatory authorities should take utmost account of the Commission’s opinion when the former take decisions on certification. To ensure, in addition, respect for the international obligations of the Union and solidarity and energy security within the Union, the Commission should have the right to give an opinion on certification in relation to a transmission system owner or a transmission system operator which is controlled by a person or persons from a third country or third countries.

Removed(66) Pipeline networks for hydrogen will constitute an important means of efficient and sustainable transport for hydrogen, both onshore and offshore, and complement the transport for hydrogen by other means such as liquid hydrogen, ammonia or other hydrogen carriers. As a result of the high capital expenditure required for their construction, hydrogen pipeline networks could constitute natural monopolies. Experience with the regulation of natural gas markets has shown the importance of ensuring open and non-discriminatory access to pipeline networks with a view to safeguarding competition on commodity markets. Therefore, well-established principles of network operation, such as third-party access, should be applicable to onshore and offshore hydrogen networks in the Union. The development of and the investment in such pipeline networks for hydrogen should be based on reasonable assumptions about the future demand and production of hydrogen and follow a transparent planning process, including stakeholder consultations.