Changes from plenary report to adopted text

111. Notes, with concern, the growing evidence of foreign interference and espionage targeting political institutions and processes at both EU and Member State level; welcomes the investigations in several Member States leading to convictions and ongoing cases involving bribery, espionage and foreign influence activities; underlines the serious risks posed by insufficient safeguards in the recruitment of staff and associates with close links to authoritarian regimes; stresses that protecting the integrity and functioning of the EU institutions requires robust measures against espionage and infiltration; further highlights the need to investigate the serious and evolving allegations that Hungarian officials, acting under the previous Fidesz-led Hungarian Government, conducted espionage activities targeting the EU institutions, including reports that sensitive information from EU meetings was shared with Russian counterparts, raising concerns about breaches of confidentiality, intelligence leakage and the integrity of EU decision-making processes;

112. Welcomes the recently adopted regulation on the revised rules for the statute and funding of European political parties and foundations; notes the provisions concerning the financing and participation of parties from non-EU countries, in particular regarding the fact that non-EU parties should not have any veto powers or control over European parties; calls on the co-legislators to ensure the full and effective implementation of the regulation;

113. Reiterates its call on the Commission to strengthen the annual rule of law report and reinforce democracies against foreign interference, including by addressing free and fair elections, robust legal guarantees, checks and balances, and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a more complete picture of rule of law standards across the EU;

114. Notes that rapid developments in cryptocurrency, including platforms or service providers operating outside the EU, create a potential vulnerability in terms of a lack of transparency and an inability to scrutinise the financing of political parties and movements in Europe; highlights the fact that, given their pseudonymous nature and global reach, and the availability of anonymising techniques and services, crypto-assets can present challenges in identifying the origin of political donations and mitigating potential foreign influence in democratic processes; stresses that political donations involving crypto-assets should be subject to the ‘know your donor’ principle, with the same transparency and accountability standards as traditional financial contributions; acknowledges the Commission’s commitment to bring together national experts under the umbrella of ECNE, in close cooperation with other EU networks and stakeholders, to exchange best practice, prepare possible guidelines and promote joint actions; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to continue monitoring the implementation of the anti-money laundering package and the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), to ensure effective and consistent enforcement and address any potential gaps in the legislation that may need to be filled; notes in this regard that the market integration and supervisory package includes a proposed revision of the MiCA;

115. Calls on the Member States to exchange best practice in the oversight of political party funding; expresses concern that certain financial intelligence units do not possess the requisite mandate to submit information regarding interference in elections to the competent national and European authorities; calls on the Commission to assess the added value of expanding the role, mandate and resources of the APPF to further enhance the coordination of national and EU authorities responsible for the oversight of political party financing; underlines, in this context, the need to strengthen cooperation between the APPF and ECNE;

The role of sanctions in the protection of democracy

116. Considers sanctions against individuals and state and non-state entities engaged in actions aimed at undermining the democratic integrity of the EU or its Member States to be an essential component of the European Democracy Shield’s toolbox; further stresses that effective sanctions must be adopted based on objective and consistent criteria and must include a comprehensive set of measures, including asset freezing and confiscation, clear attribution and public exposure, cost increases and revenue cuts, bans on imports and exports, travel bans, the denial of access to EU markets and financial systems, and other effective, robust and impactful restrictive measures; reiterates its call on the Council to gradually transition to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the common foreign and security policy such as sanctions;

117. Calls for the effectiveness and impact of EU sanctions adopted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to be improved, so as to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression and threatening the security of other neighbouring countries; calls on the Commission and the Member States to regularly and closely assess imposed sanctions in terms of optimal efficiency and possible further expansion, including sanctions targeting individuals and entities that engage in the active circumvention of the EU sanctions against Russia; considers that, particularly in the area of Russian hybrid threats and destabilising activities, the EU should further expand its sanctions regime by targeting the financial and technical enablers that sustain disinformation, cyberattacks and election interference, such as crypto exchanges, advertising networks and hosting providers, while also disrupting Russia’s proxy networks in non-EU countries, notably in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, by imposing sanctions on media outlets, logistics hubs and Wagner-linked groups that spread anti-EU narratives; considers that, to further raise the cost of hybrid aggression, the EU should expand sanctions targeting non-EU (and in particular Chinese) individuals and entities that are responsible for the active circumvention of sanctions and the facilitation of Russian operations, and that it should ban Russian cyber mercenaries from using EU-based services, such as hosting, domain and cloud services, and publicly expose and impose sanctions on EU politicians or lobbyists who are covertly funded by Moscow;

118. Considers that identifying and naming source countries, in addition to attributing responsibility to individuals or companies, could be an important step towards acknowledging the problem of clear systematic, multilayered and often state-sponsored interference that countries such as Russia or Iran are engaging in throughout Europe; welcomes the Commission’s decision to list Russia as a high-risk third country under the EU’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, in order to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system; calls on the Commission to assess whether further listing Belarus would be appropriate, given its risk profile and links to the Russian political and economic structures; recalls that the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation will provide extended possibilities for identifying and listing high-risk third countries; calls on the Commission, with the assistance of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority, to fully use its powers with regard to ensuring the implementation of targeted financial sanctions;

119. Underlines that the effectiveness and credibility of EU sanctions depend on strict and consistent enforcement; calls, therefore, on the Member States to establish a mechanism for the effective monitoring of enforcement activities, including through collaboration with civil society and academia, to improve coordination and to work together on closing loopholes and harmonising procedures; welcomes the fact that the announced revision of the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) offers an opportunity to strengthen its role to include the investigation and prosecution of sanctions violations; stresses that the reform should be matched by adequate funding to enable the EPPO to effectively carry out its enhanced responsibilities;

120. Recalls that the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, which has been in place since 2023, provides for a wide range of EU measures to counteract third countries’ attempts at economic coercion against the EU or a Member State; stresses that the Anti-Coercion Instrument should be part of a proactive escalation strategy to respond to threats targeting European territorial integrity and digital, regulatory, financial or economic sovereignty; recalls that access to the internal market for operators from non-EU countries is subject to compliance with EU law;

121. Condemns the politically motivated use by foreign governments, not least Russia, of blacklists, visa bans and other restrictive or retaliatory measures targeting EU citizens, representatives of state authorities and commercial organisations, journalists, civil society actors, humanitarian organisations and political officials, including democratically elected MEPs; is concerned that such practices, which aim at exerting undue political pressure on the EU’s regulatory autonomy and fundamental rights framework, undermine diplomatic norms and the principle of mutual respect between jurisdictions; calls for a more coordinated and resolute EU response to these arbitrary measures alongside continued diplomatic efforts, ensuring the protection and security of those blacklisted and providing them with solidarity and the necessary assistance; expresses its full support for all individuals affected; stresses the need to establish a system for continuously assessing and informing targeted individuals, in particular in relation to the Russian blacklist, including MEPs and their staff, and EU officials, to ensure transparency and protection;

The EU’s preparedness

122. Welcomes the EU Preparedness Union strategy and underlines that the objectives set out in the strategy are closely interconnected with those of the European Democracy Shield; further emphasises that democratic resilience requires societies to be able to function under exceptional or disruptive conditions, and that reforms aimed at strengthening preparedness should therefore form an integral part of the European Democracy Shield; welcomes Member State initiatives, such as those in Sweden and Finland, to strengthen societal preparedness, cooperation and clear communication about citizens’ responsibilities; underlines that an effective preparedness policy must be based on inclusion across all ages, communities and social and economic groups; highlights, in this context, the role of companies, associations and skilled individuals in supporting essential services and care; stresses that effective civil resilience requires citizens to be engaged and educated on how and when to contribute;

123. Calls for the establishment of an annual, publicly accessible EU activity report on the overall state of preparedness across the EU with a comprehensive structured overview for each Member State; emphasises that such a report could set out, among other things, institutional readiness, state of civil-military cooperation, strategic capabilities, preventive measures, response mechanisms, vulnerabilities and key trends, while respecting national security considerations; underlines that such a report could contribute to the exchange of best practice and serve as a guidance and advisory instrument for the implementation of Member States’ preparedness strategies; notes that consideration should be given to whether the European Centre for Democratic Resilience could play a coordinating role in the preparation of such a report;

124. Calls for the swift development and deployment of an EU-wide, interoperable crisis-alert application, providing real-time, reliable, multilingual information to residents during emergencies; recommends that this app be integrated into national and EU early warning systems, be accessible to all persons, with a special focus on availability for vulnerable groups, and be regularly updated with technological advances and in line with best practice in crisis management;

125. Welcomes the initiatives in several Member States to distribute a household preparedness booklet, offering clear, practical guidance tailored to Europe’s diverse social and geographical realities to help citizens prepare for emergencies; calls on the Commission to produce an EU-level booklet reflecting the cross-border and multinational context, including recommended emergency supplies, instructions for practical self-sufficiency for a minimum of 72 hours, basic first aid advice and specific guidance for vulnerable groups, including elderly people, people with disabilities and families with children;

126. Calls for the organisation of regular large-scale, EU-coordinated preparedness exercises involving EU institutions, EU agencies, Member States, regional and local authorities, the private sector and civil society; considers that preparation for scenarios ranging from floods, forest fires, earthquakes and medical emergencies to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents may also contribute to strengthening Europe’s capacity to prevent, withstand and respond to threats, such as those demonstrated in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks against Europe as a whole; recommends that these exercises simulate complex and realistic scenarios, including cyberattacks, disruption to critical infrastructure, coordinated disinformation campaigns and hybrid crises, in order to assess response capacities, improve interoperability across governance levels, share best practice and promote a culture of preparedness at all levels; underlines, in this context, that EU initiatives on military mobility are also highly relevant with regard to civilian preparedness and the ability to transport relief supplies in emergencies; further calls for the establishment of a European Preparedness Day; considers that the date for this event should be 24 February, the date of Russia’s unprovoked full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as a symbol of the EU’s solidarity with Ukraine and a stark reminder of the need to strengthen civilian and defence preparedness against growing threats from authoritarian regimes;

127. Calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of expanding Erasmus+ or similar programmes to include cross-border initiatives on preparedness training for workers in critical sectors, such as firefighters, healthcare workers, civil protection volunteers, public servants and representatives of civil society organisations, and for the public at large; recommends that these programmes promote cross-border and cross-sectoral knowledge exchange, joint exercises and training on hybrid threats and emergencies, and strengthen local preparedness capacities across all Member States, with a special focus on vulnerable regions;

128. Calls for the accelerated implementation of secure communication systems such as IRIS² and the European Critical Communications System, while building on already existing systems at Member State level; stresses that these initiatives ensure telecommunications resilience, the continuity of essential services during crises, reduced external dependencies in strategic sectors, and reinforced cybersecurity for this infrastructure through harmonised spectrum authorisation, cybersecurity certification and ICT supply chain security measures in line with the Commission’s proposals for a Digital Networks Act and a revised CSA;

129. Calls for enhanced coordination between EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, the Member States and like-minded international partners through shared situational awareness platforms, common methodologies and rapid, secure information-sharing mechanisms; stresses that these tools enable a coherent, agile and coordinated response to hybrid threats, improve risk anticipation and strengthen the EU’s collective preparedness and resilience; emphasises, in this context, that preparedness and resilience are collective responsibilities requiring societal participation;

130. Highlights the need to mainstream preparedness within the 2028-2034 MFF, in order to build credible resilience and achieve a sufficient level of civilian and defence preparedness; urges the Commission to develop targeted financial instruments combining relevant defence and civil security instruments, such as the Defending Europe Facility and the Securing Europe Facility, in order to provide sufficient and stable funding for resilience-building projects, technological innovation and dual-use capabilities, civil preparedness initiatives, critical infrastructure protection, and efforts to strengthen the EU’s industrial and technological sovereignty; notes that dedicated funding streams should also prioritise local preparedness efforts, particularly in territories that are most exposed to vulnerabilities and hybrid threats, in particular information warfare;

131. Recommends that the EU’s decision-making institutions review and optimise the strategies and contingency plans they would deploy in the event of an open military conflict against one or more Member States and similar crisis scenarios, including in cases of activation of Article 42.7 TEU; stresses, furthermore, the need to ensure the highest levels of safety and security in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including in the area of cybersecurity and the security and integrity of information, and to create the necessary conditions in this regard, including ensuring accredited secure communication channels and adequate meeting rooms for in camera meetings; underlines the need to strictly enforce rules on breaches of information security and confidentiality, including through effective investigation and prosecution of such breaches, in particular in the context of a heightened risk of espionage and sabotage; calls, in this regard, for regular auditing of vulnerabilities and dependencies, particularly in the digital space, in all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; stresses that, even outside of open military conflict, hybrid threats continue to pose ever higher risks to the daily functioning of the EU;

132. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to strengthen physical and information security within the EU institutions, as outlined in the Corporate Management Board note of October 2025, including plans for secure meeting rooms, enhanced security clearance procedures for staff who handle classified information, and the establishment of the Security College to ensure regular updates on threat developments; notes that these measures respond to heightened risks from espionage, foreign interference and hybrid threats targeting EU decision-making processes; stresses, however, that physical security upgrades must be complemented by robust cybersecurity protocols and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the full spectrum of infiltration risks; calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation on information security in the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union; recalls that the Cybersecurity Regulation for the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies recommends a cybersecurity budget of 10 % of the overall information and communications technology budget for EU entities; welcomes the activities of the Cybersecurity Service for the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (CERT-EU) and insists on the need to ensure that it has a sufficient budget and proper staffing;

133. Recommends further measures to strengthen Parliament’s security, resilience to foreign interference and ability to operate effectively in crises, including reinforced support for MEPs and staff through IT and security checks, targeted training, pre-mission briefings and interdisciplinary resilience-building activities integrating physical security, information security and cybersecurity; stresses the need to further enhance its cybersecurity framework in line with the Cybersecurity Regulation, improve operational maturity and strengthen threat detection capabilities in an evolving technological and threat landscape, while also providing more targeted training for staff to counter information manipulation and applying stricter security clearances for sensitive meetings and missions; notes that the use of private mobile devices and laptops for parliamentary work constitutes a potential vulnerability and underlines that MEPs and staff should be equipped with secure institutional devices; welcomes existing voluntary spyware screening and calls for its systematic extension to all devices used for parliamentary business; further calls on the Commission and the EEAS to systematically involve Parliament in preparedness activities and exercises, such as the EU Integrated Resolve;

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134. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.