Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Introduction

1. Welcomes the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield and the continued efforts to build on the work already undertaken under the European democracy action plan and the Defence of Democracy package; is of the view that the core mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy amid an ever-evolving threat landscape and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; takes the view that the measures set out in the communication do not fully reflect the level of ambition, foresight and capacity required and should be further developed and progressively strengthened over time, with a view to ensuring the effective establishment of robust and binding actions to protect democracy, in line with the scale of the challenges identified, while respecting the EU’s Treaty-based division of powers; stresses that soft policy measures are often insufficient where democratic values are deliberately undermined and that the fight against foreign interference, hybrid threats and disinformation requires ambition and strong action; takes the position that the credibility of the European Democracy Shield also depends on the will and determination to enforce existing EU legislation of relevance to the defence of democracy; recalls, furthermore, that the fragmentation of the EU remains a vulnerability in the defence of democracy;

2. Notes with concern the increasingly complex and evolving threat landscape undermining democratic processes and institutions in the EU and its Member States, characterised by FIMI, hybrid attacks and disinformation campaigns conducted by malicious third-country actors and their proxies in the EU; stresses that hybrid warfare goes beyond cyber or information attacks alone, and encompasses the economic, technological and societal dimensions of strategic confrontation; underlines that this reality is shared by many of the EU’s like-minded partners in its neighbourhood and worldwide;

3. Emphasises that social cohesion and trust in public institutions constitute cornerstones of democratic resilience; stresses that weaknesses in the rule of law, notably in areas such as judicial independence, media pluralism and the effectiveness of anti-corruption frameworks, risk undermining public confidence and being instrumentalised by both internal and external actors with a view to weakening democratic consensus and exacerbating societal polarisation; highlights the need for a comprehensive approach aimed at addressing concerns relating to the rule of law and reinforcing social cohesion, democratic legitimacy and societal trust across the EU and its Member States; further recalls that strengthening the rule of law in candidate countries is key to supporting their alignment with EU values and enhancing overall European democratic resilience;

4. Considers Russia to be the primary external threat to Europe’s security and democratic integrity and reiterates its view that Russia is a state sponsor of terrorism; underlines the need for a comprehensive and forward-looking strategy to safeguard European democracy;

5. Insists that the key policy priorities outlined in the European Democracy Shield initiative – including combating FIMI and hybrid threats, strengthening electoral resilience, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting civil society and promoting independent media and investigative journalism – must be sufficiently funded in the upcoming MFF; underscores that investment in democratic resilience is crucial for EU security, sovereignty and prosperity; expresses its support for the Commission’s commitment to mainstreaming democratic resilience across EU funding programmes; underlines, in that context, the need for various aspects of hybrid defence to be integrated into EU defence initiatives; stresses, however, that clear goals with measurable actions and outcomes are needed to use EU and national resources effectively and avoid waste or fragmented funding;

European Centre for Democratic Resilience

7. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience (the Centre) as a necessary and logical step towards enhanced coordination of efforts to withstand evolving common threats, in particular FIMI and disinformation; notes its approach of a gradual phasing-in of functions and operations, including a gradual increase in Member State participation; welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it is already working on setting up the Centre under the leadership of the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, with the express aim of ensuring that it is fully operational in the course of 2026; notes, however, the lack of clarity regarding the timeline and concrete milestones for the progressive roll-out of the Centre, as the reference to a ‘gradual’ implementation based on the voluntary participation of Member States does not provide sufficient predictability, accountability or operational certainty; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to regularly updating and involving Parliament in the process of implementing the European Democracy Shield and the Centre;

8. Regrets, however, that the Centre, as set out in the proposal, lacks a clear mandate and empowerment through a legal act, as well as dedicated budgetary resources and personnel, a specific governance structure and a timeline; notes that the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield does not explicitly link the Centre to any of the actions outlined therein, which remain in different administrative frameworks within the Commission and the EEAS; stresses that the Centre should add value beyond existing structures and not become another hub, network, platform or framework among others, thus further reducing the EU’s capacity to make efficient use of the full spectrum of tools available at present by duplicating work, increasing institutional ambiguity, exacerbating fragmentation and stretching budgets; firmly believes that the Centre should serve as an aggregator and consolidator of existing EU-level action by assisting, extending, complementing and, whenever feasible, coordinating national actions;

9. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication provides an extensive mapping of existing counter-FIMI and disinformation and resilience frameworks, structures, tools, initiatives and programmes, and a list of the actions that the Commission and the EEAS have committed to undertake; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to propose a clear timeline for their gradual phasing-in and integration within the Centre, with the end of 2026 to be set as the deadline for this integration; calls for the integration to include operational responsibility for an enhanced Rapid Alert System with a capacity to address information manipulation in real time, the deployment and operation of a unified FIMI intelligence database, thus further developing the EUvsDisinfo resource, including by mapping platforms used to spread FIMI and disinformation, ECNE, and the Commission’s Task Force on Disinformation and Strategic Communication, among others; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre has the capacity to assess coordinated attacks on information integrity; emphasises that the Centre must be equipped to trace, monitor and respond to foreign interference and hybrid threats, while ensuring all affiliated organisations remain independent, particularly of big tech;

10. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the need to engage with the Member States and Parliament on the Centre’s mandate, structure and working methods, and calls on the Commission to propose as a next step a legal act for the establishment of the Centre as a structurally autonomous EU entity with a clear institutional statute and positioning, governance structure and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; emphasises that institutional clarity is essential to enable the Centre to act decisively while remaining accountable; considers that the establishment of the Centre as a permanent structure by a legal act would represent a qualitative shift from fragmented coordination towards a more integrated, operational and strategic EU-level capacity; stresses that, to ensure coherent and timely action across the EU in view of rapidly changing realities, there should be an ambitious timeline for the establishment of the Centre by a legal act;

11. Calls for the governance of the Centre to include representatives of each Member State; notes that the voluntary nature of Member State participation, as proposed in the Commission’s communication, risks perpetuating an inefficient and fragmented architecture with different levels of protection and responses to common threats faced across the EU; notes that a lack of governance with representation from all Member States risks an architecture that operates on the basis of a lowest common denominator;

12. Stresses that enhanced EU-level action to protect democracy must be accompanied by strong democratic oversight; calls on the Commission to report regularly to Parliament on the activities of the Centre, including its budgetary, operational and strategic dimensions; stresses that the Centre’s governance should include representatives of the European Parliament, strengthening its democratic legitimacy;

13. Calls on the Commission to endow the Centre with a clear mandate, decision-making mechanisms and competence to act, thus allowing it to function as an independent centre of excellence for detecting, analysing and combating FIMI and disinformation operations, as a capability-building platform contributing to the establishment of common definitions, standards, training and technical tools across the EU, and as an operational backbone translating threat analysis and early warning into concrete, timely and evidence-based operational output and providing real-time coordination of technical support in countering active information manipulation campaigns, in close cooperation with national authorities and the relevant EU bodies; stresses the need for the Centre to have the capacity to act swiftly in crisis situations, particularly in the run-up to and during elections, in order to translate situational awareness into effective action; notes that the interference tactics of malign actors will evolve over time alongside technological progress and the Centre’s mandate should provide flexibility to enable it to address new challenges; stresses that the Centre must have a stable, multidisciplinary staff that includes FIMI analysts, open-source intelligence (OSINT) experts, and cybersecurity and financial tracking specialists, and must be authorised to coordinate cross-border task forces with the competent authorities of the Member States;

14. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s analytical and monitoring capacity is formally structured as a source of independent expert input into the systemic risk assessment processes established under the DSA, including with Digital Services Coordinators in each Member State, and under the EMFA, the TTPA and the Artificial Intelligence Act, by cooperating on the collection, preservation and analysis of evidence related to FIMI and disinformation, feeding directly into enforcement actions and by providing timely threat-intelligence reports, FIMI-pattern analyses and democracy-risk indicators, among others; stresses that the Centre’s role in these processes must remain advisory and analytical, so as to preserve the independence of regulatory decision-making; stresses that, where FIMI and disinformation activities undermine EU law, the Centre’s coordination role should ensure a direct link to bodies that have the power to initiate investigations and judicial proceedings; calls for relevant findings on systemic shortcomings or recurring vulnerabilities to be duly considered and reflected in the Commission’s annual rule of law report in dedicated subsections addressing disinformation and media integrity under the media pluralism and freedom pillar, and addressing electoral integrity and safeguards against undue influence under the checks and balances pillar; notes that the Centre could also contribute to the training of Digital Services Coordinators and the staff of national media regulators on the topic of FIMI and disinformation;

15. Welcomes the concept of a stakeholder platform; notes, however, that its purpose, structure and added value remain insufficiently defined, including in relation to existing networks and initiatives; acknowledges the added value of input from civil society in the development of the Centre’s mandate; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s coordination encompasses existing efforts by civil society and academia through the proposed platform; insists that the Centre must also provide opportunities for connections and learning between governments and diverse stakeholders across borders;

16. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the Centre’s mandate includes responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of democratic processes at EU level; reaffirms that the Member States’ operational structures constitute a first line of defence; stresses, however, that their primary responsibility does not exhaust the EU’s legitimate interests with regard to countering FIMI and disinformation and strengthening electoral integrity; notes that coordinated information manipulation campaigns often target the EU’s information space as a whole, thereby justifying a dedicated EU-level operational capacity to protect democratic processes beyond purely national contexts; calls on the Commission to clarify that the Centre must serve dual and mutually reinforcing objectives, namely to coordinate the activities of the Member States in this area and enhance their operational capacity, and to protect the democratic interests of the EU; stresses that working methods and data use must be fully interoperable between existing EU and national structures; underlines, in this respect, the need for common open-source methodologies, and effective collaboration across networks of actors including OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and policymakers;

17. Calls on those Member States that lack dedicated operational structures to establish or substantially strengthen dedicated national FIMI and disinformation detection and response institutions, with the Centre’s support; calls on the Commission to establish a roadmap and evaluation process for Member State capacity development; underlines that such a process would provide a basis for gradually raising the level of ambition of the Centre;

18. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of empowering the Centre to administer dedicated EU funding under the present and upcoming MFFs and relevant EU programmes whenever they relate to countering FIMI, strengthening democratic resilience and promoting information integrity; calls on the Commission to avoid programming that disperses and fragments efforts, or that creates unsustainable, temporary, small-scale initiatives, but to focus on coordinated, strategic, scalable efforts that are sustainable for all actors involved;

19. Calls on the Commission to provide sufficient and predictable funding for the Centre and its activities, including sufficient staff and financial resources under the next MFF and a dedicated EU budget line for the Centre’s operations, with a clear separation between operational funding and general coordination costs; furthermore, calls on the Commission to secure sufficient human resources and bridge funding from existing budgets to enable preparatory work before the 2028-2034 MFF;

20. Calls on the Commission to assess the feasibility of establishing a financing mechanism to complement the dedicated budget line for the Centre’s operations; takes the position that such a mechanism should include within its contributors large information society service providers whose activities represent a systemic risk to democratic integrity; stresses that any such mechanism must be accompanied by the strongest possible guarantees of independence and the total absence of conflicts of interest;

Digital resilience

21. Calls for the full implementation and effective enforcement of the entire digital-related EU acquis, including key legislation such as the DSA, the DMA, the TTPA, the AI Act and the EMFA, across all Member States and in full respect of fundamental rights; stresses that rigorous, consistent, systematic and timely enforcement is an essential pillar of European digital sovereignty and deterrence, and must be a precondition for operating in the single market; urges the Commission to report regularly on the enforcement and application of EU law, notably the DSA, avoid excessive delays in investigations, and impose strong sanctions for persistent breaches by VLOPs and VLOSEs; takes the position that the continued implementation of digital legislation should have a strengthened focus on countering FIMI and online disinformation, ensuring information integrity and protecting democratic discourse during and outside election periods;

22. Expresses serious concern that the engagement-based recommendation systems of certain VLOPs often cause systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes, as they amplify divisive, polarising or misleading content, often fuelling disinformation from foreign and domestic actors, while disproportionately favouring sensationalist material over fact-based content; recalls that Articles 34 and 35 DSA oblige VLOPs to assess and mitigate such risks; maintains that effective risk mitigation measures should also ensure that synthetic or manipulated content, such as deepfakes, can be clearly distinguished from authentic material, and that editorially independent and pluralistic media and verified sources have due prominence; calls on the Commission to investigate compliance with DSA obligations in this regard and take appropriate measures, including imposing interim measures; suggests that such interim measures include the limitation of engagement-based recommender systems that pose systemic risk, where necessary; further calls on the Commission to promote greater transparency and accountability in the design of algorithmic recommendation and advertising systems, especially together with other algorithmic systems, in order to enhance user choice and ensure non-manipulative default settings, all while promoting freedom of expression and information; reminds VLOPs, in this context, of their obligation to mitigate systemic risks, which may include testing and adapting their algorithmic systems, including their recommender systems, and of their obligation to provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling, in line with Articles 35(1)(d) and 38 DSA; further calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators and with the involvement of independent third parties through public consultations, to ensure that there are up-to-date guidelines for systemic risk mitigation, and to ensure consistent enforcement and a high level of protection against large-scale manipulation;

23. Condemns the targeted sanctions and attempts at coercion by the US administration against EU actors involved in shaping and enforcing the DSA and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner; calls for the immediate lifting of these measures; urges the Commission and the Member States to resist such pressure, uphold EU legislation, and defend the right to self-governance and digital sovereignty; underlines that freedom of expression is a fundamental right in the EU and a core value shared with the United States and like-minded partners across the democratic world; stresses that political and trade considerations, as well as pressure from third countries or large technology companies, should not unduly influence the enforcement of EU digital legislation; stresses that decisions concerning the application of EU digital rules must be guided solely by EU law and the protection of democratic interests, and that the EU, as an open and rules-based single market, retains the sovereign right to regulate its economic activity in line with democratic values and international commitments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the protective and redress mechanisms of EU digital legislation are shielded from any interference that could compromise their independence or effectiveness, and to establish robust safeguards against such risks;

24. Calls on the Commission to increase efforts to promote and align the DSA and other key EU digital legislative acts in candidate and potential candidate countries and ensure that these countries have the support, tools and guidance needed for the implementation of such laws, enabling gradual integration into relevant EU enforcement and cooperation mechanisms, where appropriate; stresses that efforts to demonetise disinformation should explicitly include candidate and potential candidate countries, in order to prevent regulatory loopholes and cross-border spillover effects; stresses the need to take particular note of trends observed in candidate and potential candidate countries when conducting election-related work under the Code of Conduct on Disinformation;

25. Notes the official integration of the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation into the framework of the DSA as a Code of Conduct on Disinformation, becoming a relevant benchmark for determining DSA compliance regarding disinformation risks, to complement other effective mitigation measures by VLOPs and VLOSEs to address systemic risks to democratic processes; notes that the implications of potential non-compliance with the code vis-à-vis DSA compliance and enforcement could be further clarified; underlines that the code should remain a dynamic instrument that follows the latest trends and that the Commission should continue to oversee the effective implementation by the signatories; considers that the implementation of the DSA should address the coordinated inauthentic use of online platforms, e.g. through bots, fake accounts, polarising algorithms, and artificial engagement and amplification creating the illusion of public support; considers these phenomena to be among the most serious risks to free, authentic and open discourse online, particularly in election periods; stresses that foreign authoritarian actors, in particular Russia, have developed disinformation playbooks whose effects have become increasingly visible during recent elections across Europe; calls urgently on all VLOPs and VLOSEs operating in the EU to fully adhere to the code, and urges the platform X to rejoin it;

26. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to draw up a DSA incidents and crisis protocol, including clear processes for coordination between relevant authorities, to further address major incidents and interference in the information environment; considers that this protocol should encourage the participation of online platforms and online search engines and should address, among other things, electoral interference through coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the online space, particularly through bot-driven amplification and engagement that effectively distort genuine public discourse; stresses the need for platforms to respond quickly and effectively through preventive and corrective measures against such interference, and for the authorities to react swiftly in cases of non-compliance, rather than relying on ex post measures and late enforcement; welcomes, in this context, Google’s proactive removal in 2025 of nearly 11 000 YouTube channels and accounts linked to state-backed propaganda from China, Russia, and other malicious actors, and urges all platforms to systematically address such threats;

28. Underlines the need for increased transparency regarding actors behind online content and accounts, particularly for advertising purposes; stresses that measures to combat coordinated inauthentic behaviour without abolishing anonymity online are essential to prevent FIMI, bot farms and covert political campaigning; invites the Commission to explore possible measures that would support online platforms in adopting proportionate steps to verify that a human is behind an account, thereby countering the activities of bot accounts; calls on platforms to prioritise the development of effective mechanisms to identify, scrutinise and, where necessary, suspend inauthentic accounts, especially those involved in coordinated influence operations; stresses that measures targeting inauthentic accounts must not undermine the ability to remain anonymous online, which is essential for protecting journalists, activists, marginalised communities and individuals in vulnerable situations (such as whistle-blowers, dissidents and political opponents of autocratic regimes), and should continue to allow space for satirical and humorous accounts;

29. Calls on the Commission and relevant regulatory authorities to systematically investigate covert disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting generative AI systems, included coordinated propaganda and narrative-laundering networks, such as the activities of the Moscow-based ‘Pravda’ network and the explicit manipulation of Grok (xAI) and to expose these campaigns publicly in a way that does not promote their spread; highlights the importance of clarifying the exact obligations of providers and deployers in relation to the ‘AI-generated’ labelling requirements set out in Article 50 of the AI Act and the Code of Practice on Disinformation, and specifying to what extent end users and platforms are covered under this framework; urges providers of AI systems to duly address and mitigate this phenomenon through their AI risk management systems; calls, furthermore, for the AI Office to enhance its efforts to monitor the security landscape of AI models and help develop methodologies for AI, including LLMs, ensuring improved transparency and respect for personal integrity in the training of data sources;

30. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Belgian regulator, to urgently complete its assessment of Telegram’s user base and functionality, as was done with WhatsApp, with a view to determining its classification as a VLOP under the DSA, and to take into consideration possible new evidence or changes in usage patterns; urges the Commission and relevant authorities to investigate Telegram’s potential role in facilitating criminal activity, election interference and the dissemination of disinformation, extremism and terrorist content within the EU, as well as to clarify its possible links to Russian intelligence services and the security of its servers and data handling practices; stresses the need to take all available enforcement steps to ensure that Telegram fully complies with all applicable EU rules on transparency, content moderation and data access requirements, to ensure a level playing field and uphold citizens’ trust in the digital information space; strongly encourages Telegram, furthermore, to join the voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation;

31. Recommends further examining the role of influencers, including nano- and micro-influencers, in shaping public discourse and influencing elections, both those countering and those contributing to foreign disinformation campaigns, whether knowingly or unknowingly; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to an assessment of the role of online influencers in the upcoming evaluation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive or as part of the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act; stresses, in this regard, the need for guidance and robust standards on transparency, including on platform-facilitated funding, remuneration and sponsorship arrangements, as well as on the distinction between advertised and organic content, and on information integrity for online political content creators, especially influencers operating in a grey area between commercial promotion and political messaging; welcomes existing codes of conduct, training and other initiatives that have been developed to make social media and influencers more responsible and more transparent; suggests that ethical standards and obligations for journalists could serve as inspiration for preparing standards for influencers; calls further on the Commission to continue enforcing the TTPA, especially in relation to online platforms, and to facilitate compliance for influencers via the planned EU network of influencers;

32. Urges the development of regulatory sandboxes and funding mechanisms to support EU tech start-ups and value-driven European alternatives, based on fair remuneration, such as those emerging in the Netherlands, to reduce strategic dependencies; welcomes the Commission’s EU Open Source strategy; further supports the long-term vision of EU social media platforms designed in accordance with EU values of transparency, data protection, fundamental rights, freedom of expression and democratic accountability;

34. Notes with concern the findings of the Dutch data protection authority, which are indicative of wider concerns across the EU, indicating that AI chatbots may provide biased and unreliable voting advice, thereby posing risks to electoral integrity; calls on the AI Office to investigate whether such practices breach applicable law, especially the AI Act, and to deliver on its commitment to prepare guidance on the application of AI in electoral processes in order to ensure the responsible use of AI;

Freedom of expression

35. Underlines that the European Democracy Shield must protect and uphold freedom of expression and information as a fundamental right applicable to both offline and online spaces; highlights the fact that human rights protections in the EU are among the strongest worldwide, and that companies wishing to operate in the EU and attract European customers share a responsibility to respect and safeguard those protections; therefore underlines that VLOPs and VLOSEs must acknowledge and effectively address the broader societal and democratic consequences of their services, including through robust systemic risk assessment and mitigation measures, in accordance with Union law; notes, in this regard, that the amplification of certain content or opinions, and the silencing of others, may constitute a systemic risk to civic discourse and electoral processes or a breach of freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to freely receive and impart information and ideas; calls on the Commission to ensure that platforms are held accountable in this regard under the DSA; underlines, in this context, that the EU must continue to actively counter false narratives that claim that its digital and democratic legislation undermines freedom of expression; stresses that freedom of expression and information has been designed to protect human beings, not machines or software that exhibits inauthentic behaviour, such as AI and bot-driven amplification and engagement, and automated software programs performing repetitive tasks over a network with the aim of imitating real users; further emphasises that the commitment to freedom of expression must not be used as a pretext for tolerating illegal content or the hybrid operations of authoritarian regimes that aim to destabilise the EU and its democratic processes;

36. Recalls that online platforms play an essential role in enabling open public debate, journalistic activity and political pluralism; recognises, therefore, the importance of effective safeguards for users when exercising their democratic rights, including the ability to challenge the content moderation and monetisation decisions of platforms, including before administrative and judicial authorities, and to enforce the obligations of online platforms to inform users when their content gets removed or restricted; underlines, in this context, the importance of ensuring access to high-quality content moderation in all EU languages; recalls the obligation under the DSA for online platforms to provide full transparency and a separate complaint-handling mechanism for this purpose and to ensure that notice, reporting and the possibility of redress remain easy to access and user-friendly; notes that not all online platforms have implemented such mechanisms in accordance with the provisions of the DSA and urges the Commission and the Member States to complete enforcement actions; highlights that safeguarding the fundamental rights of individual users also involves conducting thorough assessments and mitigating systemic risks affecting the integrity of the information space;

Media and information integrity

37. Takes the view that measures to promote and support free, credible and editorially independent media, including media at local and regional level, are a central part of achieving the objectives set by the European Democracy Shield; further stresses that safeguarding the media sector from political, economic or structural capture is a precondition for ensuring democratic resilience; notes that protecting independent media is vital for countering hybrid threats from hostile actors; further observes, in this context, that the current digital information environment often disadvantages media actors that assume editorial responsibility and public-interest obligations in favour of intermediaries that do not bear comparable duties; welcomes the groundbreaking common minimum standards on media freedom and pluralism established through the adoption of the EMFA; reminds Member States of the obligations in the regulation to protect media from undue media market concentrations; underlines, however, that the significance of the EMFA can only be assessed on the basis of its implementation in practice; calls on the Member States to swiftly implement the EMFA and on the Commission to ensure robust enforcement of its provisions, including taking action when obligations, in particular those of VLOPs aimed at protecting editorial content from undue removal or restriction of visibility, are not respected; welcomes the new commitments announced on media support via the Media Resilience programme and calls for matching long-term commitments in the upcoming MFF; further highlights that the financing crisis facing European media points to the need to explore new funding solutions;

38. Emphasises the need to carefully assess the potential impact of EU initiatives on journalism and editorial media, with particular regard to safeguarding media pluralism and to the sustainability of media companies’ business models; calls for evidence-based impact assessments and the appropriate consultation of media stakeholders ahead of initiatives that may affect the viability of European media companies; stresses, in this context, the importance of monitoring developments affecting media freedom and pluralism across the EU, and considers the annual rule of law report, with its chapter on media freedom and media pluralism, as a central tool in this endeavour; calls on the Commission to further develop this pillar of the report to better capture emerging challenges;

39. Underlines, in the context of media companies offering subscriptions via apps, the importance of the full implementation and effective enforcement of the DMA; notes the Commission’s non-compliance decision of 23 April 2025 with regard to Apple and Meta, as well as ongoing investigations into a potential breach of the DMA by Google in demoting media publishers’ content in search results; stresses that robust and timely enforcement of the DMA is essential to ensure fairness, contestability and pluralism in the EU’s digital environment and to address structural dependencies and market concentration, including in the context of AI-driven services;

40. Welcomes the fact that the joint communication includes new support actions on promoting digital and media literacy, such as the Media Resilience programme, the basic skills support scheme for schools, and the strengthening of the media literacy expert group, including the setting up of a new expert network for media literacy, and updated guidelines for teachers and educators; points out that current media literacy initiatives remain fragmented across the EU; calls for more coherent, EU-wide approaches and for complementary measures to be explored, including the creation of digital tools and platforms at EU level; encourages the systematic exchange of best practice between national authorities, including through the reinforced media literacy expert group and EDMO; further highlights the role of cultural education in strengthening democratic literacy and resilience to disinformation; underlines that the upcoming revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive should strengthen the provisions on minimum requirements for Member States’ work on media literacy; stresses the importance of fostering a critical understanding of AI-generated content, as part of broader media and digital literacy efforts;

41. Welcomes the announced update of the Commission recommendation on the safety of journalists and the forthcoming review of the Anti-SLAPP Recommendation; underlines that these updates and reviews must take into account the evolving and recurring nature of threats, violence, sabotage and other actions aimed at hindering journalistic work, including emerging challenges, for example, identity thefts and coordinated deepfake campaigns, which may undermine journalists’ safety and independence; stresses that particular attention should be paid to the chilling effects created by sustained climates of fear, political pressure or undue interference by public or private actors; calls on the Member States, in accordance with their national legal frameworks and established practices, to consider introducing specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities; further notes the potential relevance of developing support measures to assist journalists in dealing with emerging issues such as AI-driven impersonation and deepfake content;

42. Stresses the importance of protecting journalists from abusive lawsuits; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the Anti-SLAPP Directive and the announced update of the mandate and composition of the expert group against SLAPPs; calls on the Member States to be ambitious in the ongoing implementation process and on the Commission to continue providing support to ensure full and timely implementation of the directive as a matter of priority; calls on the Commission to draft a comprehensive evaluation report on the effectiveness of the implementation; further invites the EU and the Member States to consider additional measures to complement the directive in order to protect journalists engaged in investigative work, especially in cross-border or sensitive contexts; underlines, in this context, the ongoing discussion on the establishment of a European protection status for investigative journalists as a possible avenue to explore;

43. Recognises the essential role of public service media in ensuring that all citizens, including those in remote and minority communities and candidate countries, have access to reliable, impartial and diverse news across multiple platforms, formats and languages, thereby contributing to the fight against news desertification; further stresses that access to quality and reliable information is essential in the fight against misinformation and disinformation; reaffirms that safeguarding public service media from political interference and capture is fundamental to preserving democratic accountability and the rule of law, stresses that the credibility of public service media depends on full editorial and organisational autonomy in accordance with Article 5 EMFA, and invites the Commission to actively monitor threats to the independence of public service media and to take effective measures against practices that compromise media freedom; notes, in this context, that attempts to undermine the independence of public service media can be early indicators of democratic backsliding;

44. Strongly emphasises the need to guarantee the highest level of protection for journalists and other media actors from illegal spyware, intrusive surveillance technologies and other forms of digital threats; recalls that the EMFA strictly prohibits the Member States from deploying intrusive surveillance software on any material, digital device, machine or tool used by media service providers or their editorial staff, with the exception of national security cases; further stresses that the surveillance of journalists constitutes interference with the rights guaranteed under Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; notes that the use of spyware undermines journalists’ work by eroding their sources’ trust in them, and that the failure to effectively enforce EU legislation poses a serious threat to freedom of information;

45. Reaffirms the importance of transparency, fair competition and the sustainability of European editorial media within the existing legal framework, including the DSA, the DMA, the EMFA and the TTPA; notes that these instruments address manipulation, foreign interference and anticompetitive practices while safeguarding editorial responsibility and free expression; calls on the Commission to assess how these instruments can best be used for these purposes; urges VLOPs and VLOSEs not to unjustifiably delist, demote or otherwise interfere with the visibility and fair ranking of lawful European editorial media content, and to ensure transparent and non-discriminatory ranking systems;

46. Calls on the Commission to further study and, where relevant, consider measures to improve competitiveness, accessibility and fairness in online advertising for all value chain players, including editorial media; notes that editorially independent, high-quality and fact-based journalism faces challenges from engagement-driven recommender systems and AI-based search features of VLOPs, which reduce the visibility of high-quality content and limit traffic to media websites; notes, with concern, that traffic numbers correlating with the roll-out of Google AI-summaries have declined – up to 70 % in one measured case; encourages incentives for advertisers to support trusted European media, the use of contextual advertising instead of behavioural targeting, and stronger traceability and transparency in the online advertising supply chain to address market distortions and prevent malicious actors monetising disinformation content and purposefully destabilising society in the EU; calls on the Commission, in this context, to assess possible measures to boost the development and uptake of European infrastructure for contextual online advertising;

47. Welcomes the recently adopted Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, in particular the provisions that include the media sector as a factor to be considered when determining whether an investment is likely to negatively affect security or public order; regrets, however, that the media sector is not listed within the mandatory scope in the annex to the regulation; stresses, in this context, the need for more transparency of investment in European news outlets; further points out that EU-based audiovisual media are subject to stricter requirements than media based outside the EU that are available to EU audiences through other means of distribution; stresses the importance of ensuring that media that are accessible to EU audiences respect fair and pluralistic information standards;

48. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to carefully analyse the consequences of the US administration’s shift in aid policy in the context of media pluralism and independent journalism and, if necessary, to act to fill the void left in media markets both within the EU and in the bordering regions, including via the use of Global Europe; welcomes the EU emergency funding provided to RFE/RL; calls for the development of a solution to provide RFE/RL with stable, long-term funding; invites the Commission to explore new ways of supporting free and editorially independent media in the EU neighbourhood, particularly in regions disproportionately affected by Russian disinformation and propaganda such as the Western Balkans;

49. Underlines that society-based independent fact-checking networks can play a role in detecting and combating disinformation campaigns and provide valuable insights for DSA risk assessments and mitigation; notes that independent fact-checking organisations need technical support and stable conditions in which to operate; considers that the European Network of Fact-Checkers, announced by the Commission in 2025, could serve as a valuable tool to achieve this; stresses that, to be credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, independence from online platform providers, and methodological objectivity; emphasises the importance of collaboration between fact-checkers, OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and policymakers; further underlines the importance of supporting networks of fact-checkers in candidate and potential candidate countries;

Civil society, academia, culture and civic participation

50. Stresses the crucial role that active, vibrant and independent civil society plays as one of the core pillars in defending our democracy, not only in acting as a watchdog by exposing and actively combating malicious interference in democratic processes, but also in serving as a fundamental force in the long-term effort to build stronger and more resilient societies; underlines, in particular, the important role of civil society in upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

51. Welcomes the Commission’s EU Strategy for Civil Society, published alongside the joint communication on the European Democracy Shield; welcomes the Commission’s approach of linking this strategy to its work on the European Democracy Shield, as a tool to further bolster civic engagement; considers the strategy an important first step, as it represents the EU’s first comprehensive approach to civil society, while noting the need for the next steps to include a more ambitious approach, encompassing measures to effectively safeguard the role of civil society in democratic processes; highlights that future initiatives in this area should address the shrinking of civic space, while also recognising that civil society organisations and human rights defenders are particularly vulnerable, and emphasises that this is especially true for organisations working on specific topics, such as LGBTIQ+, gender equality and anti-racism issues;

52. Calls on the Commission to strengthen its work on civil dialogue and to establish new tools for this purpose; welcomes, in this context, the Commission’s commitment to establishing an operational Civil Society Platform by 2026 to support a more systematic approach that will be used to strengthen dialogue in line with the EU’s values; considers that the announced online Knowledge Hub on Civic Space may contribute to the coordination of the activities of civil society organisations in the area of protecting democracy and countering hybrid threats, FIMI and transnational repression as well as improving situational awareness; underlines, in this context, the importance of diaspora-focused civic engagement; recalls, furthermore, that parts of civil society have extensive experience with foreign interference and should, within the context of civil dialogue, be involved in shaping policy to address it;

53. Highlights the role and responsibility that civil society has shouldered in democratic processes in candidate countries; calls on the Commission to liaise, where possible, with civil society organisations from candidate and potential candidate countries on current and future initiatives of the EU Strategy for Civil Society, particularly those organisations consistently engaged in fostering digital alignment, information integrity, election integrity and democratic resilience;

54. Calls on the Member States to ensure sustainable and diversified funding, including stable operating support and capacity-building measures, for civil society organisations, recognising their essential role in upholding democratic values and enabling them to operate effectively and independently; stresses the importance of concrete EU funding programmes to complement these efforts, such as the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme; and welcomes the Commission’s intention to maintain the CERV programme by incorporating it into the new AgoraEU programme for 2028-2034; calls on the co-legislators to ensure ambitious and predictable funding for this strand of AgoraEU, which meets the needs of civil society organisations and is implemented under the direct management of the Commission;