Changes from plenary report to adopted text

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement,

– having regard to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the European Parliament report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties,

– having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations in its resolutions,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘EU Strategy for Civil Society’ (COM(2025)0790),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 June 2026 on European Tech Sovereignty, accompanied by an EU Open Source Strategy (COM(2026)0503),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 June 2026 entitled ‘Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the Energy Sector’ (COM(2026)0501),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 1 April 2025 on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy (COM(2025)0148),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2025 entitled ‘2025 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2025)0900),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 December 2018 entitled ‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2018)0036) and of 14 June 2019 entitled ‘Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation’ (JOIN(2019)0012),

– having regard to the Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, established on 19 May 2025,

– having regard to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America of November 2025, and to the US National Defense Strategy of January 2026,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the 2024-2029 Commission term, presented by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s Choice’,

– having regard to the Commission Implementing Decision of 28 March 2025 on the financing of the Digital Europe Programme and the adoption of the multiannual work programme 2025-2027 (C(2025)1839),

– having regard to the preliminary findings of the Commission, announced on 6 February 2026, regarding TikTok’s failure to comply with the Digital Services Act with regard to risk assessments in relation to its recommender systems and addictive design features,

– having regard to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation (established as the Code of Practice on Disinformation in 2018 and strengthened in 2022) endorsed by the European Commission and the European Board for Digital Services on 13 February 2025 as a code of conduct under Article 45 of the Digital Services Act, with the conversion taking effect from 1 July 2025,

– having regard to the report by the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group of 23 January 2020 entitled ‘Cybersecurity of 5G networks – EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures’,

– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, in his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2836 of 12 December 2023 on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes,

– having regard to the establishment of the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE) in 2019 by the Commission,

– having regard to the Commission press release of 13 November 2025 on its opening of an investigation into a potential Digital Markets Act breach by Google in demoting media publishers’ content in search results,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 May 2024 on the Future of Cybersecurity: implement and protect together,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 October 2022 on ICT supply chain security,

– having regard to the Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 of 24 April 2023 on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) ,

– having regard to the action plan entitled ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the information from Lithuania, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Slovenia and Spain for the meeting of the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council on 6 June 2025 calling for common actions in response to Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing threats,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register,

– having regard to special report 05/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 29 March 2022 entitled ‘Cybersecurity of EU institutions, bodies and agencies – Level of preparedness overall not commensurate with the threats’,

– having regard to the UN Global Principles for Information Integrity – Recommendations for Multi-stakeholder Action, published on 24 June 2024,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular Article 20 thereof,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, which entered into force on 16 November 1994,

– having regard to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in November 2001,

– having regard to the Reykjavik Declaration, adopted at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, held from 16 to 17 May 2023,

– having regard to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, established at the G7 Summit in Charlevoix, held from 8 to 9 June 2018,

– having regard to the working paper presented on 13 June 2025 to the International Civil Aviation Organization by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden on the recurring GNSS radio frequency interference in the Baltic, eastern and northern European regions and its implications on the safety and security of international civil aviation,

– having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, published on 9 May 2022, and, in particular, to proposals 27 and 37 thereof,

– having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield entitled ‘Strengthening Resilience – Towards the European Democracy Shield’, published by its Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs in October 2025,

– having regard to Parliament’s Eurobarometer autumn 2025 survey published in February 2026, outlining public concerns about security risks,

– having regard to the Commission’s Special Eurobarometer 568: Protecting and Promoting Democracy, published in May 2025,

– having regard to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd reports by the European External Action Service (EEAS) on foreign information manipulation and interference threats,

– having regard to the 2024 report of the Council of Europe entitled ‘Press Freedom in Europe: Time to Turn the Tide – Annual assessment of press freedom in Europe by the partner organisations of the Safety of Journalists Platform’,

– having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) of 1 October 2025 entitled ‘ENISA Threat Landscape 2025’,

– having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) entitled ‘EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment – The changing DNA of serious and organised crime’ (EU-SOCTA report), published in 2025,

– having regard to the report of the Dutch data protection authority’s Department for the Coordination of Algorithmic Oversight of October 2025 entitled ‘AI chatbots as voting aid’,

– having regard to the measures adopted by Italy’s communications regulatory authority (AGCOM) on 3 September 2025 regarding influencers,

– having regard to the Code of Conduct for Influencer Advertising, adopted by AUTOCONTROL in Spain on 7 July 2025,

– having regard to the warning issued by Czechia’s National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) on 3 September 2025 regarding cybersecurity threats associated with the transfer of data to and remote administration from the People’s Republic of China and its special administrative regions,

– having regard to the report entitled ‘Manipulation d’algorithmes et instrumentalisation d’influenceurs: enseignements de l’élection présidentielle en Roumanie & risques pour la France’, published by the French Government’s Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) in February 2025,

– having regard to the Influencer Handbook, produced by Finland’s Mediapooli in 2020,

– having regard to the report by the US Department of State of August 2020 entitled ‘Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem’,

– having regard to the joint cybersecurity advisory by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the US National Security Agency, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and international partners of August 2025 entitled ‘Countering Chinese state-sponsored actors compromise of networks worldwide to Feed global espionage systems’,

– having regard to the report by Reporters Without Borders of 25 September 2025 entitled ‘The Propaganda Monitor: The Russian Edition’,

– having regard to the article published by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the European University Institute on 1 November 2025 entitled ‘Influencers as news creators: implications for media regulation’,

– having regard to the article published by the AlgoSoc Consortium on 28 October 2025 entitled ‘1 in 10 Dutch citizens are likely to ask AI for election advice. This is why they shouldn’t’,

– having regard to the report by What to Fix of June 2025 entitled ‘Bankrolling sanctioned entities: How Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd. may have violated EU sanctions and channeled money To RT, Sputnik and other EU-sanctioned entities via Facebook’s revenue redistribution programs’,

– having regard to the special report by NewsGuard of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘A well-funded Moscow-based global “news” network has infected Western artificial intelligence with Russian propaganda’,