Changes from plenary report to adopted text

More independent and more effective EU competition enforcement

16. Calls on the Commission to explore avenues towards strengthening the independence of EU competition enforcement;

17. Stresses that strengthening the existing enforcement capacity is essential in the short term; calls on the Commission to ensure as a matter of urgency that its Directorate-General for Competition is sufficiently staffed with the necessary resources and technical expertise to effectively enforce antitrust law, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and merger rules;

18. Underlines the importance of competition enforcement being conducted in an impartial, politically independent manner; calls on the Commission to present an impact assessment on the merits of establishing a dedicated European competition authority, examining subsidiarity, the proper delineation between competition and regulatory functions, democratic accountability to Parliament, and the potential implications for the European Competition Network (ECN); stresses the need for adequate staffing, expertise and powers;

Competition in the digital age and enforcement of the DMA amid global challenges

19. Urges the Commission to fully enforce the EU competition rulebook, including the DMA, in a consistent, impartial and legally robust manner, to safeguard Europe’s regulatory autonomy against political pressures; notes with concern external pressure surrounding the DMA and warns against foreign interference;

20. Underlines that effective enforcement can only be achieved if rules to address the abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and the DMA work together, combining ex ante and ex post approaches; calls on the Commission to streamline and better articulate the competition and digital rulebook;

21. Welcomes the publication of the Commission’s report on 28 April 2026 on the review of the DMA; notes the Commission’s conclusion, in this first review of the DMA, that the DMA is fit for purpose and does not need to be amended at this stage, although it identifies particular areas of focus going forward, namely AI and cloud computing services, while highlighting that the DMA should not be seen in isolation when it comes to regulatory tools aiming to capture the AI or cloud value chain;

22. Calls for the process of the DMA review, which is expected to take place every three years, to be transparent, evidence-based, proportionate, targeted and ambitious, while ensuring regulatory stability and avoiding unnecessary expansion of obligations for market participants; insists that the periodic review of the DMA, every three years, should assess systematically the effectiveness and practical impact of existing obligations, legal certainty for market participants, the DMA’s interaction with sector-specific regulation, and the need for any adjustments to gatekeeper designation thresholds in the light of market developments; calls on the Commission to systematically include SMEs in the DMA review consultations;

24. Recalls that enforcement of the DMA is still suboptimal; supports stronger enforcement of the DMA in relation to all market participants falling under the scope of its regulation regardless of nationality and encourages the Commission to conclude open investigations within the time frames provided for under the DMA; notes that effective DMA enforcement requires adequate and sustainable resources; calls on the Commission and the budgetary authorities to ensure that adequate and stable resources are allocated to DMA enforcement through the EU budget; calls therefore for sustainable finance solutions to be explored, while respecting institutional balance, notably for introduction of a ‘DMA fee’, similar to the fee under the DSA, to be explored;

25. Calls on the Commission to make full and proactive use of all enforcement instruments provided for under the DMA, including further market investigations, non-compliance proceedings, inspections, interim measures, fines and periodic penalty payments, in order to prevent circumvention and ensure effective compliance;

26. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the Commission’s reluctance to address market dominance through structural remedies;

27. Welcomes the Commission’s recognition, in its first review of the DMA, that the future-proofing tools incorporated by the co-legislators are crucial in enabling the framework to respond to developments in markets and technologies; calls therefore on the Commission to enforce the DMA, in a consistent and future-proof manner, in relation to technological developments, by addressing AI-driven services and cloud-based infrastructure in a timely manner, in order to prevent new forms of lock-in, foreclosure or gatekeeping practices, including where gatekeepers leverage control over data, computing resources or integrated services to the detriment of emerging AI developers and innovative market entrants;

28. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is already monitoring the deployment of AI tools within designated core platform services under the DMA; notes that, in its first review of the DMA, the Commission reports that, with respect to AI services, it has started addressing various fairness and contestability issues that featured prominently in the public consultation, for instance, through its regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers on ensuring that default settings can be changed easily and that AI services have equal access to operating systems; notes that two specification proceedings were opened in January 2026 in relation to Alphabet that also have an AI dimension relating to interoperability and access to search data; calls on the Commission to develop and apply new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the incumbents and assess, within the upcoming DMA review, whether the current list of core platform services adequately reflects market realities, including in areas such as AI models, AI chatbots and cloud services, main virtual assistant services and connected TV operating systems; calls on the Commission to include SMEs, start-ups, industry associations, academic experts and consumer organisations across all Member States in the DMA review consultations;

29. Stresses that DMA enforcement applies to all designated gatekeepers regardless of nationality or origin, and calls on the Commission to apply DMA obligations consistently; welcomes the coordination between the Commission and NCAs on DMA-related conduct; urges the Commission to take decisive action accordingly;

40. Notes the existence of oligopolies in the provision of certain services that are critical for EU financial market participants, such as market aggregators and connectivity providers that are characterised by limited numbers of providers, significant difficulty switching from one provider to another, or asymmetrical pricing power to the benefit of the provider, which ultimately inflates costs for investors; further notes that the three largest credit rating agencies and the four biggest companies in the audit market still hold market shares of over 90 %; urges the Commission to investigate existing oligopolies and take the appropriate measures to the benefit of EU competition;

41. Recalls that the European Central Bank has noted that food prices remain high, affecting vulnerable consumers in particular; expresses concern about the high market concentration at certain levels of the agricultural and food supply chain; urges the Commission to assess the scale and impact of buying alliances, and further analyse their effects not only on prices but also on farmers’ and agri-food producers’ ability to supply healthy, safe and sustainable products to consumers; invites the Commission to assess whether additional guidelines are needed on the application of Article 102 TFEU on exploitative abuses, including excessive or unfair prices, in order to improve legal certainty and make enforcement more effective in highly concentrated consumer markets;

Merger control

42. Stresses that Europe lacks large-scale companies capable of competing globally in numerous key strategic areas; considers scaling up within the single market as a strategic EU imperative to mobilise investments, drive competitiveness, invest in innovation and enable EU companies to compete effectively on global markets, as highlighted by the Letta report; stresses that the completion of the single market and the removal of internal barriers remain key priorities in this regard; notes that structural barriers to scaling up within the EU may result in innovative EU companies being acquired by non-EU players, with potential negative effects on long-term competition and innovation capacity in the EU; considers therefore that merger control should take full account of the ability of EU companies to invest in innovation;

43. Considers that competition policy should not create unnecessary obstacles for companies that need to scale up in order to compete globally, while noting that not all EU companies are in need of scaling up; underlines that the EU thrives on the vital link between big and small enterprises; considers that competitive scale should primarily result from fair competition, robust antitrust enforcement and the deepening of the single market, which are the foundation of the EU social market economy and remain the true driver of innovation;

44. Calls on the Commission to apply merger policy dynamically, based on an economic and legal assessment, analysing fully the concept of consumer welfare in the assessment of competition, and to consider the broader economic effects of mergers, adapt the policy to new market realities including digital ecosystems, AI, energy and defence, and analyse the effects of concentrations in the long term, taking a forward-looking approach; encourages the Commission to continue to monitor the evolution of market power in Europe, including the impact of mergers on sustainability, innovation and long-term resilience;

45. Calls for an ambitious and evidence-based revision of the EU merger guidelines so they are better aligned with new market realities and the EU’s priorities in fostering a more resilient and competitive Europe while continuing to safeguard a high level of consumer welfare; insists that, while remaining grounded in competition analysis and safeguarding effective competition on national markets and within the single market, merger control should assess pan-European mergers in a forward-looking manner and ensure that any consolidation creating ‘EU champions’ enhances consumer welfare, market contestability and long-term resilience, particularly in key sectors such as telecoms, banking, payments, defence and energy; calls for the new merger control guidelines to ensure legal certainty for businesses in creating pan-European players fostering pro-competitive scaling up, while ensuring that national intervention powers, including veto powers, are used only in duly justified and proportionate cases;

46. Calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking and dynamic approach to mergers, taking into account efficiency gains, including, for example, economies of scale and sustainability gains, as early as possible in the procedure, while ensuring transparency and predictability and allowing companies to form alliances when they contribute to innovation, climate resilience and security, and reflecting an approach to the assessment of market power and sector-specific realities that extends beyond prices and market shares and also includes effects on wages and employment conditions;

47. Recalls that competition safeguards consumer choice, market diversity and affordable prices; notes the decision by Warner Bros. Discovery stockholders on 23 April 2026 approving the merger agreement with Paramount Skydance; calls on the Commission to apply rigorous merger control in the audiovisual and media sector, monitoring the impact of market consolidation in the single market and enabling EU players to scale up;

48. Notes that online platforms under the scope of the DMA have acquired nearly 700 smaller companies since 2000, while the Commission was only notified about 19 of these transactions, as most fell below the turnover-based notification thresholds; calls on the Commission to detect ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e. when a company acquires control of an innovative company to eliminate them as a possible source of future competition) and to adapt regulation in order to prevent such acquisitions, particularly in digital, AI, pharma and other strategic sectors; maintains that a single market legal base should be added to the EC Merger Regulation if it is reviewed, so as to fully involve the co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the DMA; urges the Member States to give national competition authorities ‘call-in’ powers so they can review mergers and acquisitions, if this is not already the case, while ensuring legal certainty and avoiding undue burden on SMEs and start-ups;

49. Acknowledges the increasing trend of foreign investment and multi-club ownership in European sports, as well as the rise of dynamic ticket pricing, and calls on the Commission to take into account the implications of this development when supporting efforts to safeguard the financial integrity and competitive balance of European sport; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all regulatory options, including the prohibition of dynamic pricing at live sports and cultural events in the Digital Fairness Act, with a view to protecting consumers and upholding the social and public value of sport and culture;

State aid

50. Underlines the need for a thorough analysis of State aid rules, particularly for companies operating in strategic sectors such as energy, technology and innovation; stresses the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of State aid in agriculture, logistics and transport; notes the divergent fiscal capacities of Member States, warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field and calls on the Commission to monitor these effects; considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU law and principles, including EU environmental and social policy objectives;

51. Welcomes the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF); calls for the CISAF to be implemented in a targeted and proportionate way, ensure minimum burden on Member States, prevent subsidy races and preserve the integrity of the internal market, while including strong safeguards on transparency, proportionality and environmental effectiveness;

52. Recalls that temporary, targeted State aid can be appropriate in times of crisis; reiterates the importance of the CISAF in supporting vulnerable sectors, in the context of rapidly increasing fuel prices due to the current geopolitical situation; notes nevertheless the European Court of Auditors’ findings (Special Report 21/2024) identifying shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring of State aid in times of crisis and calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring by the Commission and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency in line with the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations;

53. Notes that more than three quarters of State aid is concentrated in only two Member States, highlighting risks of fragmentation and an uneven level playing field in the internal market;

54. Highlights the role of State aid as a tool to reduce economic disparities between the most developed EU regions and islands, inland areas, outermost regions, economically disadvantaged zones, and all parts of the EU affected by natural constraints; calls for greater flexibility and fewer restrictions on State aid for the EU’s islands and more vulnerable regions;

Parliamentary involvement

59. Deplores the lack of information it receives on the revision and implementation of competition rules and stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; further emphasises the need to be transparent with Parliament on all discussions with non-EU countries that may affect DMA enforcement;

60. Calls, in that context, for a structured and regular dialogue between the Commission and Parliament on competition policy, including on the review and implementation of competition rules; calls on the Commission to provide Parliament’s competent committee with timely and comprehensive information on significant enforcement decisions, legislative proposals and significant major soft-law instruments; calls for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement to formalise Parliament’s role in competition policy oversight, including consultation on priority-setting for guidelines and frameworks;

61. Cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments such as guidance and temporary frameworks in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; invites the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7)(2) of the Treaty on European Union providing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure;

62. Promotes the exchange of best practice in international forums, such as the International Competition Network and the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, while regretting that this has not been sufficiently pursued in the past; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy for the EU to take a leading role at international level in promoting effective competition;

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63. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.