Changes from plenary report to adopted text

159. Calls on the Commission to ensure that all pillars of the rule of law report receive equal attention when issuing recommendations, in order to address persistent and well-documented challenges and safeguard structural aspects that are essential for the proper functioning of democratic systems, including civic space and fundamental rights;

160. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the concerns identified in the rule of law report are consistently translated into recommendations; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to ensure that similar issues are treated in the same way across Member States, so that no Member State facing comparable or more serious shortcomings is left without appropriate recommendations;

161. Asks the Commission to strengthen the follow-up mechanism for non-implemented recommendations by introducing measurable benchmarks, noting that 93 % of recommendations are repeated from previous years and only 6 % were fully implemented in 2025; calls for the use of all available enforcement tools to be strengthened, where appropriate, including infringement proceedings and budget conditionality, as provided for by the Financial Regulation, Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases, and to trigger actions regarding the non-implementation of the CJEU’s judgments; notes with concern that in the most recent report only two Member States received an additional recommendation compared with the previous reporting cycle, despite the fact that the rule-of-law situation in several Member States warrants urgent action and in others Member States requires recommendations to be implemented urgently;

162. Regrets the fact that Hungary has consistently failed to address the Commission’s recommendations, with six recommendations remaining completely unaddressed since 2022;

163. Stresses that the policy outlined in the Commission’s 2022 communication on enforcing EU law, which clarifies that infringement proceedings are not intended to serve as mechanisms for individual redress, limits access to effective remedies in situations of persistent or systemic non-compliance by Member States with EU law, including CJEU judgments; calls on the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the instruments available to address breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the Member States; recalls the recent opinion of Advocate General Ćapeta in Case C-769/22 confirming that Article 2 TEU can serve as a separate legal basis for infringement proceedings in cases where the negation of a value is the root cause of other breaches of EU law; underlines that the forthcoming judgment in this case could offer an important opportunity that the Commission should seize to engage in more systematic and robust infringement action, subject to the CJEU’s final determination;

164. Stresses that issuing the rule of law report is not enough to reinforce the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, but that the report should lead to concrete action; stresses that the findings of the annual rule of law report should be systematically followed up, where appropriate, through the use of available enforcement instruments, in line with the Commission’s prerogatives; calls for the transparent monitoring of Member States’ compliance with judgments of the CJEU and, where relevant, judgments of the ECtHR, including by taking instances of persistent non-compliance into account in the application of such instruments;

165. Considers that the benchmarks of the rule of law report should also cover the independence and effective functioning of key independent and regulatory authorities; stresses that those authorities should ensure transparent, open and merit-based procedures for the appointment and dismissal of their leadership;

166. Recalls the Commission Communications of 3 April 2019 entitled 'Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and possible next steps' and of 7 August 2019 entitled 'Strengthening the rule of law within the Union – A blueprint for action'; calls for their update to reflect current challenges and ensure full operationalisation;

167. Underlines the need to assess human resources and capacity requirements, given the call for more proactive monitoring of the rule of law; stresses the importance of interdepartmental coordination across the relevant competent directorates-general in the Commission;

Horizontal recommendations

168. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement, underlining the added value of a structured and predictable framework; stresses that the argument that such an agreement would be excessively rigid cannot justify inaction; calls for pragmatic solutions to already improve cooperation; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting representatives of other institutions such as the Venice Commission and Parliament; emphasises that the effectiveness of the expanded EU toolbox depends on coherent and consistent application across institutions;

169. Proposes that, until an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights is established through an interinstitutional agreement, the EU institutions further develop mechanisms for cooperation in this context by introducing an annual cycle on the rule of law that is structured in different phases, enhancing continuity, coordination and impact across institutions, and designed in a way that allows it to be progressively extended to cover all the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, ensuring a comprehensive and coherent approach to their protection;

170. Recalls that recommendations should be proportionate to the challenges identified, sufficiently specific to enable concrete and actionable follow-up by Member States and systematically assessed in subsequent editions; calls for a more balanced, transparent and credible approach to ensure equal treatment and effective follow-up; underlines that a more consistent application of the Commission’s approach, particularly by signalling recommendations that remain unresolved over several cycles, would enhance transparency, accuracy and the credibility of the monitoring framework;

171. Stresses that particular attention should be paid in the future to those Member States in which the Commission has identified serious and systemic violations, and calls on the Commission to clearly distinguish such cases in its recommendations;

172. Reiterates its call on the Commission to expand the scope of the report to cover all aspects of Article 2 TEU;

173. Urges the Commission to include in its future rule of law reports a pillar on civil society, and a pillar on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter;

174. Calls on the Commission to include in its future rule of law reports the protection of academic and artistic freedom, and measures to combat disinformation on online platforms by domestic or external actors under the media freedom pillar; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to include the recording and monitoring of hate crimes under the justice systems pillar;

175. Reiterates its call for broader indicators, such as fundamental rights, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, and respect for international law;

176. Recalls that the protection of minorities forms part of the Copenhagen accession criteria; underlines the lack of EU-level legal guarantees to ensure that Member States uphold the commitments made during the accession process regarding minority protection;

177. Calls on the Commission to ensure a more consistent and comprehensive assessment of electoral integrity under the checks and balances pillar and across the country chapters, covering the legal and institutional framework, its practical implementation and key risks; stresses the need for scrutiny of corruption, misuse of state resources and electoral manipulation; calls for systematic cooperation with the Venice Commission, the OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and other relevant international bodies, and for their recommendations to be duly reflected in the assessments and country-specific recommendations of the rule of law reports;

178. Notes that the updated Rule of Law Checklist of the Venice Commission recognises that AI and digital technologies may enhance efficiency and accessibility in public administration and judicial systems; emphasises at the same time, that their use by public authorities may pose significant risks to legal certainty, equality before the law, transparency and effective judicial protection, in the absence of a clear legal basis, human oversight and robust safeguards; calls on the Commission to address these risks and to ensure that AI systems are deployed in full compliance with rule-of-law requirements, including transparency, accountability, non-discrimination, proportionality and effective remedies;

179. Calls for the Commission to engage in structured dialogue and broad consultation with civil society and independent oversight bodies and institutions that are active in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, when drafting the rule of law report;

180. Calls on the Commission to conduct visits to the Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

181. Stresses the essential role of local and regional authorities (LRAs) in the functioning of democracy and as part of the system of checks and balances underpinning the rule-of-law; recognises that LRAs are on the front line, directly confronting challenges that may affect rule of law and the enforceability of fundamental rights; stresses the importance of preventing undue interference with LRAs and of safeguarding their autonomy, as protected under Article 4(2) and Article 5(3) TEU, which recognise regional and local self-government as part of the Member States’ constitutional identity, and Article 41 of the Charter, on the right to good administration;

182. Strongly believes that EU institutions must fulfil their obligations regarding the rule of law, and underlines that assessing the adherence of EU institutions to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, including the Union’s internal consistency in upholding these values across its policies and external actions, is essential in order to safeguard the EU’s credibility and legitimacy; believes that the EU institutions must lead by example in upholding the highest rule-of-law standards; criticises the exclusion of the state of the rule of law within the EU institutions from the scope of the Commission’s 2025 Rule of Law Report; requests that a dedicated chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in future rule of law reports;

183. Calls on the Council to make its Rule of Law dialogue , the Article 7 process, and the application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation fully transparent, interactive and outcome-oriented, including by issuing detailed conclusions and providing feedback on Commission and Parliament findings; deplores the inability of the Council to make meaningful progress in the ongoing Article 7(1) TEU procedure and believes that any further delay to the Council’s action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself;

184. Urges the Council to ensure that the hearings under Article 7(1) TEU take place at least once per presidency; stresses, however, that this minimum frequency must not be construed as a ceiling, nor should such hearings be reduced to a mere box-ticking exercise allowing a presidency to discharge its responsibilities by holding a single formal meeting without pursuing meaningful follow-up; calls on the Council to publish comprehensive minutes after each hearing, and provide concrete recommendations and deadlines for their implementation; insists that Parliament should be fully involved in all proceedings related to Article 7 TEU; underlines that, even in the absence of unanimity, the Council is not prevented from advancing the procedure, in particular by adopting concrete recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned, notably Hungary, and stresses that the process should not be reduced to periodic hearings without substantive follow-up or tangible outcomes;

185. Reiterates the findings and recommendations of its resolution of 25 November 2025 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded; takes note that the Commission has initiated an infringement procedure against Hungary for failure to comply with several provisions of the EMFA, as well as certain requirements under the Audiovisual Media Services Directives; underlines that, in her Opinion in Case C-829/24, Commission v Hungary, Advocate General Juliane Kokott considered that Hungary had infringed EU law by adopting legislation on the protection of national sovereignty, which may undermine fundamental Union principles, in particular regarding protection against foreign political interference; underlines that, in her Opinion in Case C-225/24, Parliament v Commission, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta proposed that the CJEU annuls the Commission’s decision to lift the suspension of EU funds to Hungary, thereby raising concerns regarding compliance with rule of law conditionality;

186. Calls on the Commission to strengthen the link between preventive and reactive instruments and to make use of all available tools to address rule-of-law deficiencies, including infringement procedures, Article 7 TEU, the general conditionality mechanism, and the horizontal enabling conditions in the Charter

187. Welcomes the updated Rule of Law Checklist adopted by the Venice Commission and calls on the Commission and the Council to fully integrate it into their decision-making processes; calls on the Commission to explore closer cooperation with the Council of Europe to promote the Council of Europe-EU rule of law acquis with and within the Member States, across the four chapters of the annual rule of law report;

188. Calls on the Commission to ensure full coherence and consistency across all rule-of-law reporting instruments, including the annual rule of law report, the enlargement reports, and the country-specific recommendations under the European Semester; stresses the need for a unified methodology and close coordination among directorates-general;

189. Encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and civic education programmes on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; underlines the potential impact of misinformation and disinformation on the functioning of democracy and the protection of fundamental rights; encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster among citizens of all ages an understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law, and fundamental rights;

190. Asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous debate on these issues; reiterates the need for a similar exercise on democracy; urges the Commission to ensure wide dissemination of its findings in all Member States;

The annual cycle on the rule of law

191. Stresses that the EU has developed a comprehensive set of instruments to safeguard the rule of law; insists that greater complementarity between the work of each EU institution and enhanced accountability for the implementation of these instruments are essential; underlines that repeatedly invoking the need for new tools or additional procedural elements must not serve as a pretext for inaction or as a distraction from fully deploying the instruments already available; emphasises that the credibility of the EU’s rule-of-law framework depends not on the proliferation of mechanisms, but on the political will and operational capacity to use existing mechanisms to their full potential, and on the EU institutions themselves fully complying with and upholding the rule of law in their own actions;

192. Notes that the proposal for an integrated annual cycle on the rule of law, mentioned by the President of the Commission in the 2025 State of the Union address, and the reinforcement of the link between budgetary tools and the rule of law in the Commission’s 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework are elements aligned with Parliament’s own proposals and consistent with the need to progress with the effective and coherent implementation of all existing instruments, and the strengthening of cooperation across the EU institutions;

193. Encourages a series of improvements, based on the Commission’s rule of law report, to enhance the continuity, coordination and impact of the annual rule-of-law cycle:

(a) establishing a specific date for the annual publication of the Commission’s rule of law report, preferably in June, with a view to ensuring greater predictability and enabling the effective planning of the work of both the Commission and relevant stakeholders, while providing for an appropriate transitional period so as not to disrupt the existing internal timeline of the cycle and to ensure that sufficient time and resources are preserved.

(b) incorporating into its rule of law analysis, both its general communication and its country-specific assessments, references to internationally recognised indicators and comparable authoritative sources that enable a more quantitative and data-driven evaluation and contribute to greater transparency, comparability, and methodological consistency across the EU’s rule-of-law monitoring instruments;

(c) noting the relevance of the EU Justice Scoreboard as a source of comparative data;

(d) safeguarding impartiality in the Commission’s assessment and subsequent action when addressing rule-of-law issues in the Member States; ensuring an impartial assessment process within the Commission, involving the relevant directorate-general in the preparation of the report; strengthening the Commission's cooperation with EU and international bodies, to enable it to assess compliance with, and the upholding of the rule of law within the EU institutions themselves;

(e) ensuring that recommendations are formulated in clear and precise wording;

(f) clarifying the methodology governing the formulation of its recommendations;

(g) distinguishing recommendations relating to serious and systemic concerns from the other observations, thus highlighting those situations where there is a potential risk of a serious and systemic breach of the rule of law;

(h) linking recommendations identified as serious and systemic to the release of funds, with disbursement contingent on demonstrable progress verified through appropriate monitoring mechanisms; clearly identifying recommendations with an impact on the financial interests of the EU and duly monitoring these under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and other budgetary tools;

(i) assessing not only the degree of implementation of previous recommendations but also, where necessary, issuing new ones; not limiting the evaluation to measuring progress only in relation to the previous reporting year but instead providing an evaluation that reflects the overall evolution since the publication of the initial recommendation, in order to provide a clear baseline for implementation;

(j) including in each country chapter of the rule of law report a dedicated section on the implementation of judgments of both the CJEU and the ECtHR;

(k) including in the analysis a dedicated section on the transposition and implementation of EU legislation when it relates to safeguarding the rule of law;

194. Stresses that, at a later point in the cycle, Parliament must fully exercise its powers and prerogatives deriving from the Treaties through its resolution in response to the Commission’s rule of law report, which could provide tangible added value and, to this end, proposes that Parliament’s resolution would:

(a) be adopted by March at the latest, to ensure that its input can be duly taken into account;

(b) make fuller use of existing structures, in particular the DRFMG, to organise hearings and missions based on the issues identified by the Commission, which could then contribute to the drafting of the Commission’s report;

(c) bring together the most relevant findings arising from the Commission’s report, DRFMG monitoring activities, the Council’s annual dialogues and contributions from civil society;

(d) highlight best practices identified during the annual Inter-parliamentary Committee Meeting on the rule of law, with a view to supporting Member States in the implementation of specific recommendations;

(e) assess the implementation of the Commission’s previous annual recommendations across successive years, identifying trends and positive or negative developments;

(f) include an in-depth analysis of all countries for which an Article 7 procedure has been activated or for which serious and systemic rule-of-law concerns have been identified in the Commission’s reporting;

195. Requests that, in the closing phase of the cycle, the Commission provide, in addition to the annual rule of law report presented in the June plenary, a structured follow-up, at another time, on how Parliament’s resolution and recommendations have been taken into account; calls, furthermore, for a dedicated exchange with its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on this follow-up;

196. Requests that the Council take due account of the findings and recommendations set out in the Commission’s rule of law report, and of Parliament’s resolution adopted in response thereto; stresses that those conclusions and recommendations should be duly reflected in the Council’s deliberations and follow-up actions and systematically integrated into its assessment of ongoing procedures under Article 7 TEU;

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197. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.