Changes from plenary report to adopted text

127. Notes the Court’s observation that EFCA applied a procurement formula for IT services that resulted in the effective weighting of the price criterion falling below the 30 % minimum recommended by the Commission's guidelines (Annex I, point 21.2 of the Financial Regulation); takes note of EFCA's commitment not to apply this formula in future procurement procedures;

128. Notes the Court’s made two observations concerning ACER’s procurement irregularities that resulted in irregular payments in 2024; points out that following a vendor policy change, ACER ordered IT support services without a legal basis for six weeks before signing the amended contract, resulting in irregular payments of EUR 8 179 in breach of Article 172(1) of the Financial Regulation; takes note of the Agency’s reply that this exception was formally approved to avoid service disruption and that payments were for duly delivered and documented services;

129. Notes that ACER accepted a revised financial offer in a negotiated procedure, increasing the contract value from EUR 51 450 to EUR 79 450 after submission, in contravention of Articles 151, 160(1), and 170 of the Financial Regulation;

130. Recalls that the Court’s observation concerning ACER’s structural reliance on interim workers has remained open since 2019, with interim staff continuing to perform long-term tasks that should normally fall to directly employed staff; notes that, although the number of interim workers decreased from 18 in 2023 to 16 in 2024, the situation persisted and ACER intends to subcontract part of these activities; takes note of the Agency’s replies to the questionnaire, according to which extensive outsourcing is necessary due to insufficient in-house resources and specialised expertise; observes that ACER outsources a wide range of functions, including highly specialised consultancies and studies in energy regulation, legal services, event organisation, and various general services, but that the most significant dependency concerns the IT domain, where the design, development, implementation, support, maintenance and security of its systems are carried out largely by external service providers; highlights in this regard that more than 100 external IT experts (not necessarily full-time) are engaged in delivering IT services to ACER, compared with only 17 internal IT staff, creating a substantial structural imbalance; notes furthermore that ACER states that this outsourcing model was explicitly recommended by the Commission in view of the Agency’s limited establishment plan and resource constraints; underlines, however, that such persistent dependence on external providers for core IT capabilities, combined with the continued use of interim workers for permanent tasks, raises concerns regarding knowledge retention, operational continuity and long-term institutional capacity; stresses that the heavy IT dependency must be urgently addressed to safeguard knowledge retention and operational continuity; requests that the Commission and ACER report to the discharge authority on the corrective measures adopted;

Recommendations

131. Calls on the agencies to act on the Court's observations, in particular to:

(i) the EEA to strengthen its procurement and contract-management procedures to prevent similar irregularities, in particular by systematically enforcing the Financial Regulation’s invoicing and price-indexation requirements for all framework contracts, integrating the Expert Meeting System with the EEA’s accounting and commitment systems to ensure that catering orders generate legally binding commitments and allow reliable monitoring of cumulative expenditure in line with Article 111, mandating the inclusion of the contract type (fixed price or time and means) in all specific contracts in accordance with Annex I, and implementing regular checks, staff training and reinforced supervisory controls while fully documenting all corrective measures taken;

(ii) EFCA to ensure strict compliance with Union procurement rules by maintaining at least 30 % price weighting criteria, provide internal training on the proper application of procurement weightings, introduce mandatory documentary proof (e.g. rental contracts), conduct periodic residence audits, and strengthen controls to prevent improper allowance payments and report back to the discharge authority on implementation;

(iii) ACER to prevent future procurement irregularities and ensure full compliance with the Financial Regulation;

Agencies in other fields

132. Notes that in two negotiated procedures the BEREC Office did not specify selection criteria in the tender specifications, contrary to point 18.2 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation with risk to the BEREC Office that the contractor might not have the capacity to implement the contracts; takes note of the BEREC Office’s explanation that the contractors’ capacity was assessed through prior consultations and that it will ensure selection criteria are specified in all future tenders;

133. Draws attention to the fact that by December 2023, the Commission was required to complete a five-year evaluation of the BEREC Office under Article 48 of its founding regulation intended to assess potential structural or mandate changes for the BEREC office, along with any financial implications; notes that as of the end of 2024, the Commission had not yet finalised this evaluation and as per request by an MEP, the Commission informed the Parliament that the evaluation report will be submitted in December 2025;

134. Notes that the Court’s observation concerning the CdT’s procurement irregularity in a contract for IT equipment rack rentals, awarded in 2016 through a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice; highlights that the contract was renewed 13 times, incorrectly relying on the building contract exemption under Article 134(1)(h) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012, a provision the Court determined does not apply to IT rack rentals;

135. Notes that ENISA did not adopt a proper financing decision prior to launching procurement procedures for operational expenditure, undermining effective planning and oversight and contravening Articles 32(1) and 72(3)(b) of its financial rules; takes note of ENISA’s reply that it agrees with the observation and has taken necessary steps to address the issue;

136. Observes that for four conferences (20222024), ENISA’s average hotel rates exceeded applicable Union staff ceilings, with high cancellation fees (30 % of total costs) for two events; highlights the lack of guidelines or ex ante checks for conference organisation; takes note of ENISA’s reply that it agrees and will take corrective action;

137. Draws attention to a procurement procedure for research and development services that lacked sufficient documentation to justify the estimated contract value and failed to define specific and measurable selection criteria, as required by Article 167 and Annex I, point 18.2, of the Financial Regulation; notes ENISA’s reply that it has already addressed the concern;

138. Notes the Court’s observation concerning the EIT, in particular an external ex-post verification of a representative sample of cost items under grant payments resulted in an overall error rate of 0,4 %; observes that the court recalculated the overall error rate for the sample, incorporating an additional ineligible amount detected by them in its audit, and concluded that the grant payments were affected by an estimated error rate of 0,8 % which applied to the EUR 6 million of cleared EIT grant payments in 2024 and indicates that approximately EUR 50 000 may be affected by error;

139. Notes that, in 2023, the EIT transitioned its grant agreements from an annual to a multi-annual structure; draws attention to the fact that this change impacts the Court’s assessment of legality and regularity, which can only be performed during interim and final payments; notes that in 2024, the EIT paid EUR 412 million in pre-financing for multi-annual agreements, comprising 92,9 % of total payments for the year; takes note that these payments' legality and regularity will be assessed in future years; stresses that such a high share of pre-financing payments requires strengthened monitoring and control mechanisms in order to mitigate the risk of future financial corrections or recoveries;

140. Expresses concern regarding OLAF’s investigations on three different cases concluded in 2024 and its subsequent Financial and Administrative recommendations; notes that OLAF recommended that the EIT recover substantial amounts from the beneficiaries subject to the investigation; takes note that the amount to be recovered relates to grant agreements awarded from 2020 to 2023; notes that, in 2024, the EIT made a pre-financing payment of EUR 52,1 million in relation to the 2023 grant agreement and it was not part of the Court’s audit population of payments in 2024;

141. Takes note with particular attention to the explanations provided by the EIT Director during the hearing held on 1 December 2025 that the irregularities concern beneficiaries of EIT grants and not members of EIT staff, and that in the two major cases, the irregularities were detected and proactively reported by the Agency itself to OLAF; further notes that, following receipt of OLAF’s final reports, the EIT has taken immediate corrective action, in particular for the main irregularity, including the suspension of all payments to the concerned beneficiary, the premature termination of the ongoing grant agreement, and the launch of recovery procedures for past affected grants, as well as requiring the beneficiary to improve his processes and procedures; expects the EIT to fully implement all follow-up actions derived from OLAF’s recommendations and to ensure that strengthened control mechanisms effectively mitigate similar risks in future funding cycles;

142. Points out that due to the complexity of one of the three cases, the EIT is working closely with the Commission’s legal services, OLAF and DG BUDG and the estimated amount to be recovered is currently assessed to be in the region of EUR 1520 million;

143. Acknowledges that, in 2024, the EIT assessed its internal controls and identified three main risks with a high likelihood of occurrence and significant impact on its activities:

– Insufficient Human Resources: notes that the Court and the Commission’s Internal Audit Service acknowledge this risk, highlighting irregularities due to understaffing; urges that personnel numbers be increased and that funding is increased accordingly;

– KICs’ Strategic Progress: regrets that Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) may not achieve strategic objectives due to non-alignment, fraud, or other factors; is concerned that some KICs still lag in antifraud systems, with ongoing reviews of OLAF investigations related to KICs potentially requiring fund recovery;

– Cybersecurity Threats: cyber-attacks pose a very high risk, potentially impacting business continuity, causing data loss, and damaging reputation;

144. Draws attention to two budgetary irregularities in the EIT's 2025 amending budget:

– budgetary equilibrium: notes the original version showed EUR 463,6 million revenue vs. EUR 446,7 million expenditure, breaching Articles 8 and 16 of the Framework Financial Regulation; acknowledges corrected version on 31 March 2025;

– revenue classification error: notes that the EIT included EUR 16,7 million in external assigned revenue under Title 2 'Contributions' rather than creating a dedicated chapter, contravening Articles 8, 20, 21 and 25; notes that the EIT has since committed to restructuring its budget to properly classify such revenues in 2025;

145. Notes that the EIT's framework contract for travel services lacks compliance with contractual terms, as order forms or specific contracts are not used to order travel services; observes that the EIT relies on staff mission orders as legal commitments but fails to communicate them to the contractor, delegating instead full responsibility to travelling staff members who are required to order their travel services directly by email; highlights three instances where mission orders and cost claims were not approved by properly delegated staff, and that the EIT lacks a reliable system to monitor adherence to the contract ceiling; acknowledges the EIT’s reply confirming the contract ceiling has not been exceeded but calls on the Agency to ensure proper delegation of approval authority, and to implement a monitoring system to track contract ceiling compliance;

146. Observes that the EIT carried over EUR 118 697 in staff cost commitments to 2025 as C9 appropriations, despite Article 12(5) of the Framework Financial Regulation requiring cancellation of such commitments by year-end; notes the EIT's acknowledgment of the issue and commitment to strengthen internal controls to prevent recurrence;

147. Notes the strategic role of EUSPA as a key pillar of the EU Space Programme in reinforcing the Union’s industrial base, competitiveness and innovation; invites the Commission, when preparing the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), to ensure that EUSPA is adequately empowered and resourced to strengthen its performance and delivery capacity in support of the Union’s strategic autonomy and sovereignty, including through the implementation of new tasks under the EU Space Act; underlines the importance of prioritising European procurement in areas critical to the Union’s resilience, security and technological independence;

148. Calls on the agencies to act on the Court's observations, in particular to:

(i) the BEREC Office to ensure full compliance with procurement rules by systematically defining selection criteria in negotiated procedures and to strengthen capacity-assurance mechanisms;

(ii) the CdT to reinforce procurement controls to prevent recurrence of non-compliant with Union and internal financial rules;

(iii) ENISA to adopt financing decisions prior to procurement, introduce guidelines and ex-ante checks for conference organisation, and ensure complete documentation and measurable selection criteria in all procedures;

(iv) the EIT to strengthen the supervision of external verifiers and enhance its review checklists, ensure proper budgetary equilibrium and revenue classification, improve implementation of its travel-service framework contract, and reinforce internal controls to avoid irregular carry-overs;

149. Furthermore, calls on the following agencies:

(i) the BEREC Office to report to the Discharge Authority on the timely completion and follow-up of the Commission’s overdue five-year evaluation;

(ii) ENISA to inform the Discharge Authority of progress in implementing corrective actions on procurement planning, conference management, and research and development procedure documentation;