Changes from plenary report to adopted text

99. Recalls two of the ETF’s procurement irregularities, highlighted by the Court in 2022, that have resulted in irregular payments in 2024; notes that in one case, the ETF awarded a EUR 1 million contract for content support services to a tenderer that did not meet the required financial turnover threshold, thereby rendering the contract and related payments (EUR 186 175 in 2024) irregular; notes that in another instance, during a EUR 4 million open procurement for in-country support services, the winning bidder failed to demonstrate sufficient economic and financial capacity, resulting in further irregularities in payments (EUR 252 714 in 2024); notes furthermore that in a 2023 tender for LAN infrastructure on its premises, the ETF imposed excessive financial capacity requirements without proper justification, potentially discouraging competition; takes note that the ETF has acknowledged those issues and reviewed its methodology but insists that the ETF must implement stricter compliance mechanisms to prevent breaches of procurement rules in the future;

100. Is concerned that several procurement-related observations from previous years remain open for both the ELA (origin of qualified opinion in 2023 and 2024) and the ETF;

Recommendations

101. Calls on the agencies to act on the Court's observations, in particular to:

(i) the ELA to improve their budgetary management and formalise a contingency plan for salary adjustments, including early Union funding coordination;

(ii) the ELA, the ETF and EUOSHA to further strengthen their procurement and internal control systems by ensuring that all payments are supported by complete and verifiable evidence, that financial and technical capacity requirements are applied consistently and proportionately, and that ex-ante and ex-post checks are systematically documented;

102. Furthermore, calls on Cedefop, the ELA, the ETF, EU-OSHA and Eurofound to:

(i) significantly strengthen their monitoring and performance-measurement systems by fully embedding SMART objectives and robust, outcome-oriented key performance indicators, addressing data gaps and aligning metrics with operational priorities to enhance cost-effectiveness and stakeholder accountability;

(ii) adopt structured and coherent monitoring approaches, ensuring data completeness and comparability across reporting cycles, establishing consistent national-level indicators where relevant, and improving target-setting practices, while strengthening inter-agency cooperation to avoid duplication and reinforce evidence-based policy support;

(iii) intensify efforts toward a structured shared-services model covering HR, legal, ICT, administrative, and technical support to increase synergy, reduce administrative burdens, ensure sustainable workloads, and free up staff for core operational tasks; acknowledges that this will require a careful strategy as the agencies are located in different regions, namely the cities of Thessaloniki, Bratislava, Turin, Bilbao and Dublin respectively;

Agencies in the area of Health and food safety

103. Notes with concern that the issue regarding the EMA’s former premises in London persists, posing significant financial and operational challenges; is aware that despite the EMA's relocation due to Brexit, it remains financially responsible for these premises, a situation exacerbated by the subtenant's precarious financial position following the bankruptcy of WeWork's parent company in November 2023; takes note that the maximum exposure, including council tax liability payable by the EMA in the case of the premises being vacant for the remainder of the lease, amounts to EUR 543 million;

104. Notes that in October 2024, in accordance with the discussions held with the Union budgetary authorities and with the consent of its own landlord, the EMA agreed to amend the existing sublease with the subtenant, facilitating a rent reduction while maintaining full payments for service charges and landlord insurance; notes that it included provisions for either the EMA or the subtenant to terminate the sublease early, i.e. before the scheduled expiry date in June 2039, under certain conditions; is aware that in this respect, the EMA made a provision for an onerous contract, with a carrying amount of EUR 122,1 million at 31 December 2024; notes that in 2024 the EMA received a cash reimbursement from the Commission of EUR 11,2 million which has been recognised as income; commends the EMA's proactive steps, and prudent measures to mitigate some of the financial burden caused as a result of this issue;

105. Highlights that when the EMA issued its accounts, the subtenant had met its contractual obligations, with rental and service charge payments covering the period up to 30 June 2025;

106. Expresses support for the EMA’s Management Board’s request to resolve this matter at the highest political level, thereby enabling the EMA to concentrate its resources on its formal mandate and address public health priorities across the Union;

107. Recalls two of the EMA’s procurement irregularities, highlighted by the Court in 2020, that resulted in irregular payments in 2024; notes that the EMA exceeded the financial ceilings of several IT framework contracts, with increases ranging from 77 % to 124 %, in breach of Article 172(3)(a)(iii) of the Financial Regulation resulting in irregular payments amounting EUR 3,1 million in 2024; takes note of the EMA’s reply that the increases were necessary to respond to exceptional operational needs arising from unforeseen legislative and public health developments, and that all contract modifications were recorded in the register of exceptions;

109. Lauds the work of the EMA in addressing the medication shortage of amoxicillin antibiotics in Europe and working together with national medicines agency to address the shortage with the result that Amoxicillin was removed from the shortages list in 2024; encourages the EMA to continue to apply staffing and budget resources for similar goals;

110. Notes that the ECA recommended in its Special Report 12/2024 that the EMA continues to work on making their communications readily accessible to the public, so the public has a better insight into the use of Union funds by this agency;

111. Notes that the ECA, in its December 2024 Special Report, recommended that the EMA coordinate with the ECDC and HERA to improve pandemic preparedness through clearer roles, more efficient use of Union funds, and review of the tools, procedures, and guidance developed during the pandemic to determine which should be retained or adapted in line with scientific and technological progress, and encourages adequate resources to support this effort;

112. Highlights that the EMA has flagged, inter alia, ongoing shortages of critical medicines in members states of the European Union and the EEA, including key cancer drugs (Fludarabine, Vindesine, Fluorouracil, Cisplatin, Topotecan, Methotrexate) for leukaemia, lymphoma, ovarian, and small-cell lung cancer, as well as essential diabetes treatments (various insulins, liraglutide, dulaglutide) needed for type 1 and type 2 diabetes management;

113. Expresses serious concern about the repeated breaches of the Financial Regulation identified in the EUDA’s procurement processes, taking note of the five irregularities flagged by the Court in 2024; stresses that those irregularities include:

– unauthorised contract splitting and improper use of negotiated procedures without justification for three Lisbon event contracts (venue and catering, totalling EUR 210 668), alongside lack of key documentation and the non-respect of requirements for procurement publicity;

– serious deficiencies in a EUR 410 000 contract for a drug trafficking reporting system, including lack of proper tender specifications, award criteria, and an evaluation committee, rendering both the contract and its EUR 60 000 payment irregular;

– excessive payments of EUR 14 007 above the agreed contract value for inauguration ceremonies, in breach of Article 73 of the EUDA’s financial regulation;

– flawed procurement for a EUR 10 000 data collection contract in Ukraine, which was missing award criteria and proper documentation;

– non-compliance with publicity requirements and conflict-of-interest declarations in a EUR 100 000 interim services procurement;

114. Takes note of the EUDA’s response, acknowledging both procedural shortcomings and the necessity for follow-up actions to ensure compliance;

115. Takes note of the ongoing implementation delays in the EUDA concerning the Internal Audit Service's recommendations on human resources management and ethics, particularly the open recommendation regarding workload and performance management, which remains unresolved in the area of implementation challenges in workload assessment and activity-based management methods for staff/FTE allocation and cost budgeting; is aware that the Agency has revised its target implementation deadline to 31 December 2025;

116. Notes the Court’s observation that three of the ECDC’s procurement procedures were launched without prior financing decisions, contrary to Article 72(3)(b) of its Financial Regulation; further notes control weaknesses in the evaluation of a EUR 2,8 million conference contract, including insufficient verification of selection criteria, and a lack of checks on abnormally low offers, breaching Articles 151 and 167 and section 23 of Annex I of the Financial Regulation; takes note of the Centre’s reply outlining corrective measures, including reinforced ex-ante verification and enhanced documentation for procurement evaluations;

117. Highlights that the ECA recommends the work of the ECDC with Member States to strengthen a harmonised Union-wide infectious disease surveillance system, improve internal processes to provide timelier and more practical guidance, and communicate more clearly with the public using plain language, to better reflect the use of Union funds, as noted by the ECA in its Special Report 12/2024;

Recommendations

118. Calls on the agencies to act on the Court's observations, in particular to:

(i) the EUDA to immediately address irregularities, strengthen internal controls, and ensure strict adherence to procurement rules to prevent further breaches;

(ii) the EMA to enhance its procedures for identifying and preventing possible conflicts of interest when selecting advisory board members;

(iii) the ECDC to ensure consistent implementation of procurement rules, including reinforced ex-ante verification;

(iv) to offer adequate training to staff in procurement rules;

119. Furthermore, calls on the following agencies:

(i) the EUDA to report back to the Discharge Authority on the details of its progress in implementing the Internal Audit Service's recommendations on human resources management and ethics, particularly the open recommendation regarding workload and performance management;

(ii) all agencies to take note of the ECA’s observations in particular in regard to procurement rules and to take action accordingly by implementing the ECA’s recommendations;

(iii) the ECDC and the EMA to apply some of their budget towards implementing the recommendations outlined by the Court in Special Report 12/2024 and listed above;

(iv) the EMA, the Commission and Member States to take immediate action to address ongoing shortages of critical medications listed above, and in this regard urges the EMA to collaborate closely with national authorities and the Commission to: i) allocate enough resources to address the problem ii) analyse and propose ways to address the causes of these shortages, including manufacturing, supply chain, distribution challenges, and internal market obstacles or national protectionism, including the necessity of production of European medicines iii) develop contingency plans to ensure uninterrupted patient access, including prioritisation of high-need cases; highlights that immediate and coordinated action is vital to prevent delays in treatment, avoid deterioration of patient outcomes, and protect public trust in European healthcare system; encourages the EMA to apply additional internal resources from their budget towards this goal;

Agencies in the area of Transport and mobility

120. Notes the Court’s observation that EASA made irregular payments in 2024 totalling EUR 43 000 under a contract for a service not covered by the contract; takes note of the Agency’s reply acknowledging the issue and stating that the Agency has taken corrective action and the service has been included in the Framework Contract as from 2025;

121. Takes note of the Court’s observations regarding the ERA’s management and control systems, including:

– poor documentation that prevented the agency from matching EUR 144 153 in payments for the 2024 European Rail Traffic Management System Conference, potentially risking the full collection of revenue;

– late issuance of debit notes in contravention of Article 43 of the ERA’s founding regulation, which requires debit notes to be issued within 60 days of service provision;

Recommendations

122. Calls on the agencies to act on the Court's observations, in particular to:

– the ERA, to establish and enforce a standardised tracking system for all fee-paying events and implement a system to automate invoicing processes to ensure debit notes are issued within 60 days of service delivery, reducing reliance on manual triggers, enforce internal controls and include invoicing timeliness as a Key Performance Indicator (KPI) in financial reporting;

Agencies in the area of Environment, and Energy

123. Notes the Court’s three observations concerning procurement irregularities in the EEA including:

– irregular payments under a framework contract for canteen and catering services, refunding EUR 6 514 without an invoice addressed to the Agency contrary to Article 111(2) of the Financial Regulation and increasing lunch prices by 34 % above the agreed indexation mechanism; takes note of the Agency’s reply that these were isolated incidents, with procedures since clarified and strengthened, and that the price adjustment was due to exceptional inflationary conditions;

– use of its internal Expert Meeting System to order catering services, instead of the order forms required by the framework contract, preventing reliable monitoring of cumulative expenditure and risking contract ceiling overruns in breach of Article 111(1) and (3) of the Financial Regulation; acknowledges the EEA’s reply that the Expert Meeting System provides a streamlined control process and that it will amend the framework contract accordingly; highlights that in order to fully address the Court's concerns, the Expert Meeting System should be integrated with the accounting system to ensure that all catering orders automatically generate legally binding commitments;

– type of contract: notes that the EEA failed to specify the type of specific contract (fixed price or time and means) for an IT consultancy contract for an amount of EUR 731 000, contrary to section 1.1 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation, making it impossible to reconcile the total contract amount with the price per consultant; takes note of the EEA’s explanation that the omission had no financial impact, and the commitment to ensure all future contracts include this information;

124. Notes the Court’s observation that ECHA signed a specific IT infrastructure contract valued at EUR 8,1 million, exceeding the authorising officer’s delegated limit by EUR 1,3 million; takes note of the Agency’s explanation that the contract was based on non-binding service volume estimates within the limits of annual appropriations and that actual budgetary commitments did not exceed delegated authority; encourages ECHA to ensure clear alignment between financial delegations and contractual commitments; calls on the Agency to introduce enhanced forward-looking screening mechanisms for external contractors involved in work related to the Agency's regulatory decision-making;

125. Draws attention to the concerns raised by several civil-society organisations regarding a potential professional conflict of interest in the case of Ramboll Germany GmbH, a consultancy that previously carried out technical studies for ECHA while also providing services to industry stakeholders seeking to influence upcoming PFAS restrictions; stresses that expert advisory structures should reflect balanced representation of scientific, industrial and civil-society expertise in order to strengthen legitimacy and evidence-based decision making; acknowledges the organisations’ claim that Ramboll’s parallel activities could have compromised the impartiality required under Articles 2(56) and 143(d) of the Financial Regulation; stresses that the principle of sound financial management requires the Agency to ensure that procurement and contract execution are conducted in a manner preserving institutional impartiality and public confidence; notes that unidentified conflicts of interest may affect the credibility of Union-funded activities even in the absence of procedural irregularity; calls for adequate safeguards addressing both actual and apparent risks;

126. Takes note, however, of ECHA’s clarification that the work carried out by Ramboll Deutschland for the Agency on PFAS was performed between 2020 and 2021, prior to the consultancy’s 2022 engagement with industry, and that conflict-of-interest assessments were performed in accordance with ECHA’s procedures at the time the contract was awarded; notes furthermore that under the current 2024 framework contract Ramboll has not submitted tenders for specific contracts; welcomes ECHA’s statement that it conducted a detailed internal review in response to access-to-documents requests and found no unmanaged conflict of interest; stresses nonetheless the importance of ensuring robust, proactive and forward-looking conflict-of-interest checks for all external contractors, particularly those involved in technical work feeding into sensitive regulatory decisions; emphasises that expert groups should contain a balance of members from various sectors including the private sector, science sectors and civil society to represent different competencies and viewpoints; invites the Agency to integrate contractor independence checks into its broader internal control and risk management framework; stresses the need to ensure robust and proactive procedures to prevent any risk of conflict of interest or undue influence;