Changes from plenary report to adopted text

225. Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing;

226. Notes that the Director-General’s declaration of assurance in DG INTPA’s 2024 Annual Activity Report contains no reservations, continuing a trend in which the Directorate-General reduced the scope of reservations from 16,0 % of expenditure in 2017 to 1,0 % in 2018 and to zero from 2019 onwards; notes further that DG INTPA estimates the amount at risk at payment at EUR 89,7 million (1,1 % of 2024 expenditure) and the amount at risk at closure at EUR 78,6 million (0,97 %), and that it expects EUR 11,1 million (12,4 % of the amount at risk at payment) to be corrected in subsequent years through its own checks; observes however that, of the EUR 5,0 million reported as recovered in 2024, the Court’s testing showed that EUR 0,2 million should not have been counted as implemented corrective capacity, raising concerns about the reliability of the DG’s reporting;

227. Notes that DG INTPA commissioned its 13th Residual Error Rate (RER) study in 2024, an important component underpinning the Director-General’s declaration of assurance and the regularity information disclosed in the Annual Management and Performance Report; observes that the 2024 study, based on a sample of 401 transactions, estimated a residual error rate of 0,48 %, remaining for the ninth consecutive year below the Commission’s 2,0 % materiality threshold; recalls, however, that the Court has repeatedly identified methodological shortcomings that may underestimate the true residual error rate, particularly concerning the treatment of high-value items; notes that while the Commission has revised the RER methodology as of 2025 to clarify certain aspects and limit reliance on management checks and other auditors’ work, the updated methodology still permits the exclusion of ‘isolated’ errors from extrapolation; expects the Commission to implement the revised methodology rigorously and looks forward to the Court’s verification of its application in the next audit cycle;

228. Recalls that the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, established to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration, has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, of which 88 % from the EDF and the Union budget; regrets the lack of transparency in the management and allocation of these funds and the difficulty in verifying compliance with Official Development Assistance principles, as highlighted by the Court’s Special Report 17/2024; calls for the EUTF to sufficiently support the agreed priorities; also notes with concern the findings of the Court’s Special Report 20/2025 on the Commission’s support to fight hunger in sub-Saharan Africa, which identified weaknesses in cost assessment and project planning, including insufficient scrutiny of budgets and cases of unused or inappropriate equipment; stresses that such shortcomings undermine sound financial management and calls on the Commission to strengthen cost analysis, procurement planning and needs-based implementation;

Recommendations

229. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) strengthen preventive and corrective controls under heading 6 by addressing recurrent weaknesses such as ineligible expenditure, procurement irregularities, missing supporting documentation and expenditure not actually incurred; calls for reinforced guidance to delegations and implementing partners;

(ii) perform a comprehensive review of the assurance framework for indirect management, particularly with pillar-assessed organisations and international financial institutions;

(iii) ensure that the new ROM contract is operational without delay in April 2026 as the interruption of ROM undermines performance monitoring and the results-orientation of NDICI implementation; prevent future disruptions in ROM by securing stable financing and ensuring that monitoring tools are available continuously throughout the MFF period;

(iv) reverse the decline in Aid for Trade funding to LDCs, conduct the planned 2026 analysis without delay and propose corrective measures ensuring that Aid for Trade resources prioritise countries most in need;

(v) integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission's evaluation, including increased use of blending in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

(vi) ensure impartial and evidence-based assessments in enlargement reporting so that political considerations do not override objective evaluation criteria;

(vii) ensure that no Union assistance to third countries benefits entities that are involved in human rights violations, repression or democratic backsliding, and apply conditionality rigorously, including through suspension of assistance where fundamental Union values are undermined; provide a detailed outline of the safeguards, monitoring mechanisms and corrective measures implemented to uphold the integrity and accountability of Union external assistance;

(viii) continue to support reliable humanitarian partners, coupled with independent oversight by external experts and the Court, to ensure effective control and confidence in the use of Union funds;

(ix) provide a consolidated and transparent overview of all Union financial support to Ukraine, including grants, loans and guarantees under multiple instruments and facilities, in order to strengthen democratic scrutiny and ensure full accountability;

(x) monitor closely the serious fraud allegations in Ukraine, and continue to apply conditionality where systemic risks or misuse of funds are identified; to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

(xi) report on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in LDCs and for transparency on how the quota of allocations within country MIPs is respected;

(xii) report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy;

(xiii) accelerate the closure of the 9th EDF, noting that it remains open 17 years after the sunset clause, and review the reasons that contributed to the prolonged implementation cycle;

(xiv) engage with the EIB to ensure that its lending operations in non-EU countries are aligned with the Union’s external policy objectives and accompanied by effective cooperation frameworks with partner countries;

(xv) increase transparency by publishing accessible dashboards tracking high-value external action contracts, performance indicators and the status of the Court’s recommendations;

(xvi) reinforce financial due-diligence and procurement safeguards under Global Gateway;

(xvii) ensure that implementing partners strictly comply with visibility rules to present transparent information for the public and requests stricter follow-up in cases of repeated non-compliance;

Administration

230. Notes that MFF heading 7 ‘European public administration’ accounted for EUR 13,3 billion equal to 6,9 % of Union budget spending in 2024; notes that the European Commission spends EUR 8 billion equal to 60,6 % of the total amount; notes with satisfaction that also for 2024 the Court concludes that administrative spending is a low-risk spending area; stresses that the Commission should without hesitation follow-up on the issues identified by the Court in their Annual report 2024 concerning the payment for IT services;

231. Continues to be critical of the process whereby the Commission in 2023 decided to sell 23 of its office buildings in Brussels and lease 17 of them back for a period until 2029; notes that apparently the decision to do this was taken without clear impact assessments of all transactions; finds it especially worrying that the Commission only received one bid for the transaction from a Belgian state-owned company, which had submitted an indicative offer before the Commission launched the call for applications and that the offer did not fulfil the requirements in the call for tenders concerning the time period for the validity of a bank guarantee; expresses its deep concern that the Commission’s evaluation committee lacked independence since all members were subordinates of the authorising officer; notes with concern in this context the recent evidence-collecting activities carried out by the EPPO in relation to this transaction, which further reinforce serious doubts regarding the handling and governance of the sale;

232. Notes that the Commission reports that 54 requests for article 24 assistance under the Staff Regulation were submitted in the period 2021-2024 and that only 8 have been followed up on with the opening of an administrative inquiry; finds that this number is worryingly low, as it means that 85 % of the requests have been dismissed without any follow-up; welcomes that the office of the Chief Confidential Counsellor has been strengthened, taking into account that around 300 Commission staff asked her for help in harassment related cases within one single year; further notes that 14 complaints were submitted directly to the Investigation and Discipline Office of the Commission (IDOC), where four cases were closed as non-cases after assessment, two cases were closed without follow-up after administrative inquiry; pre-disciplinary proceedings led to one warning, one written warning, and three reprimands, one case is still in pre-disciplinary phase and two cases are currently with the Disciplinary Board, while two case were reported directly to OLAF both of which were dismissed on grounds of insufficient suspicion; stresses that these numbers seems to be very low for an organisation with more than 30.000 employees and encourages the Commission to improve the possibilities for employees to come forward with cases of harassment in a safe environment;

233. Notes that, in the period 2021–2024, no cases were reported to OLAF by Commission staff members where the source qualified as a whistleblower; regrets that the Commission did not provide information on whether, or how many, cases were instead reported through internal hierarchical channels or to the Secretary-General; considers that, in the absence of comprehensive data on the number of cases raised, the channels used, and the follow-up actions taken by the Commission in each case, it is not possible to assess whether the whistleblowing system is effective; notes in this context that the Commission is currently reviewing its Whistleblowing Guidelines in light of case law and practical experience with the implementation of the Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law in the Member States, with a view to aligning them as closely as possible with the Directive;

234. Notes with interest that the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration in his mission letter was tasked to carry out a large-scale review of the Commission’s organisation and operations; agrees in principle that it is important for all organisations to examine periodically whether their organisation and procedures are up to date; underlines that it is important that the process remains transparent and that relevant organisations representing the Commission’s staff and other relevant actors are fully involved in the process, also to foster trust and acceptance of the review’s outcome by all stakeholders, including in particular the staff affected;

236. Notes with concern that in 2024 the Commission revised its internal rules on public access to documents; considers that these changes are incompatible with the right of access to documents as developed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001; stresses that, for example, the rules state that only “content that constitutes important information that is not short-lived shall be registered” and require the automatic disappearance of text messages; notes that the legality of these rules is currently being challenged before the European Court of Justice;

237. Stresses that access to documents is a key principle to ensure transparency in public administration; points out that unfortunately the Commission in many situations has not provided answers within stipulated deadlines especially concerning cases under the confirmatory applications where the European Ombudsman has found systemic and significant delays in the Commission administration; highlights that it is essential for the credibility of the Commission that journalists and the general public can have access to documents within the legally applicable deadlines; stresses, furthermore, that transparency requires not only timely access but also that the documents themselves are drafted in clear, comprehensible language, as overly technocratic communication might hinder citizens’ meaningful access to information even when documents are available;

238. Recalls that the European Ombudsman has found cases of maladministration in relation to several legislative proposals that the Commission presented in 2025; notes with great concern that these cases include the Omnibus I package; stresses the importance of adhering to the rules regarding better law-making; underlines the importance of robust, durable and legally sound legislation that ensures a stable and predictable regulatory environment, also with a view to strengthening the Single Market and boosting the Union’s global competitiveness;

239. Expresses its deep concern that there has been a number of allegations of corruption linked to the Commission, including former Members of the Commission and senior officials; notes in particular that, following the opening of a criminal investigation into corruption allegations involving a senior Commission official by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in late 2024 and further to the recommendation issued by OLAF in 2024, the Commission launched its own disciplinary procedure concerning that official; notes that the Commission recently announced that it had concluded the procedure, finding that the official concerned had breached the applicable rules of the Staff Regulations, including provisions relating to conflicts of interest, transparency, gift acceptance and document disclosure; recalls that the disciplinary procedure followed the findings by OLAF, which examined allegations that confidential information concerning a major aviation agreement with the State of Qatar had been exchanged in return for gifts; notes that, given the senior official’s position as Director-General at the Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport at the time, he exercised significant influence over the negotiation process and, consequently, over the resulting Agreement on Air Transport between the European Union and its Member States and the State of Qatar, signed on 18 October 2021; in light of the nature of the facts which led the Commission to initiate a disciplinary procedure and of the nature of the measures decided upon by the College of Commissioners in respect of that senior official, considers that the application of that Agreement should be evaluated and, if necessary, suspended;

240. Recalls that the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission provides for a two-year scrutiny period for former Members of the Commission for professional activities following the end of their term; considers it vital to ensure that former Members of the College only undertake post-term activities that are compatible with Article 245 of TFEU; recalls also that the Code of Conduct stipulates that Commissioners must avoid any activity that could compromise their independence or the perception thereof, particularly during politically sensitive periods such as election campaigns;

241. Notes with serious concern the recently reported exchanges between staff from the Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security (DG TRADE) and tobacco industry representatives, which suggest that DG TRADE staff may have acted in ways benefiting a company in the sector by encouraging third countries to weaken regulatory restrictions and tax policies on certain tobacco products; notes that, in its decision of 19 December 2023, the European Ombudsman found that the Commission’s failure to ensure a comprehensive approach across all departments to transparency in meetings with the tobacco industry constituted maladministration; recalls that, as a Party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the Union must protect its policies from the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry and limit interactions to what is strictly necessary for regulatory purposes; stresses, therefore, that no interactions concerning third country tobacco control policies should be permitted; regrets that the meetings reportedly held were not disclosed; calls for full implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, ensuring interactions are strictly limited and fully transparent;

242. Deplores the persistent and critical technical, organisational and procedural shortcomings of the functioning of EPSO over the last years which have led to serious reputational damage to the general Union recruiting process and have had severe negative consequences for many candidates who have invested considerable time and resources in trying to participate in selection procedures that have been cancelled, delayed or have had serious technical shortcomings; recalls that the European Ombudsman has concluded, in several separate inquiries, that EPSO committed maladministration in its handling of candidate complaints, particularly in relation to remote testing procedures, platform deficiencies and inconsistent communication regarding technical issues; stresses that these deficiencies risk undermining the attractiveness, credibility and long-term administrative capacity of the Union's institutions and therefore require urgent corrective action;

243. Urges the Commission and EPSO leadership to evaluate all aspects of the selection procedure, including governance, digital infrastructure, communication with candidates and handling of candidate complaints, in order to ensure that the Commission and other Union institutions can rely fully and without delay on EPSO for the identification and selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions; at the same time encourages the Commission to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

European Schools

244. Notes that the overall budget for the European Schools for 2024 was EUR 439,5 million, representing an increase of 5,3 % from 2023; recalls that European Schools are primarily funded by the European Commission, other European Institutions, Member States and fees from parents;

245. Notes with satisfaction that neither the IAS nor the Internal Control Capability unit (ICC) have found critical issues in their audits and controls in 2024; notes however that identified weaknesses in human resource management and public procurement procedures should be addressed as a matter of priority;

Observations concerning the discharge procedure

246. Stresses that the Parliament would expect the Commission to provide the detailed replies to the discharge resolution ahead of the initiation of the discharge hearings for the following year, which normally start in early November; finds it regrettable that it received the Commission’s detailed replies to the specific requests made by the European Parliament in the discharge report for the 2023 financial year only in the beginning of December 2025; stresses that such delays undermine the efficiency of the discharge process by increasing the workload for both institutions and reducing the focus of parliamentary scrutiny;

247. Underlines that when oral questions cannot be answered by the responsible Commissioner directly during a discharge hearing in Parliament, follow-up answers in writing should be provided to Parliament within the agreed timeframe; recalls that the provision of timely and substantive replies constitutes a core component of effective parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability;

248. Notes with satisfaction that most Commissioners respect the discharge procedure and take part in the hearings as requested by the budgetary control committee; underlines that the Commission President in her role as head of the Commission has a decisive role in the formulation and the implementation of all major Commission initiatives and policy proposals; considers that in that function the Commission President should actively participate in the discharge procedure and underlines in this context the importance of the President of the European Commission taking part in the plenary discharge debate;

Recommendations:

249. Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

(i) ensure that any future decisions concerning sale and sale and lease back operations concerning buildings are done on basis of thorough impact assessments, that more than one offer should be received and that evaluation committees must be independent from the authorising officers;

(ii) design the future phases of the large-scale review of the Commission’s organisations and operations in a transparent way and ensure that relevant organisations representing the Commission staff and other relevant actors are fully involved in the process;

(iii) provide the discharge authority with all relevant information and documentation concerning the 2023 sale of 23 of its buildings, including a detailed account of all procedural steps taken such as the valuation methodology used and the assessment of competing bids, in full transparency and in due respect of the ongoing EPPO investigation;

(iv) commission an external study by independent experts under the auspices of the Chief Confidential Counsellor analysing the functioning or malfunctioning of the formal harassment procedure and proposing means to make it more effective;

(v) provide the discharge authority with a comprehensive overview, for the period 2021–2025, of whistleblowing cases raised by staff members, including the number of cases, the reporting channels used (including the respective hierarchy, Secretary-General and OLAF), the follow-up actions taken in each case, and the employment status of the reporting persons;

(vi) in the context of its review of the Whistleblowing Guidelines, take all necessary measures to align them with the standards set out in the Directive;

(vii) implement the guidelines concerning the use of text messages in relation to workflows, in order to ensure that any information related to decision-making, or workflow is transmitted through official channels, in full respect of transparency requirements;

(ix) ensure timely and correct handling of applications for access to documents, at all stages of the process;

(x) ensure a predictable, consistent and non-arbitrary application of its Better Regulation rules, by defining ‘urgent’ situations that justify a derogation from the requirements set out in the rules and establish, where derogations are granted, a procedure to ensure that the urgent preparation of legislative proposals still complies with the principles of a transparent, evidence-based and inclusive law-making process;

(xi) ensure that the principles of independence and integrity, as set out in the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission, are upheld in observance of the highest standard of ethical conduct;

(xii) speed up work in order to ensure that EPSO functions properly in order to provide Union institutions with sufficient and highly qualified candidates;

(xiii) in cooperation with EPSO and the other Union institutions, ensure the full and timely implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations concerning EPSO and restore confidence in the fairness, accessibility and reliability of EPSO selection procedures, and report on the progress to the discharge authority;