Changes from plenary report to adopted text

(iii) continue to monitor and scrutinise the steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full and timely implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026, and report to the Parliament on progress towards its implementation and grant the Parliament access to all relevant documents to facilitate effective democratic oversight of the implementation process;

(iv) provide support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

(v) increase the transparency and accountability of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds by ensuring detailed and comprehensive data, including as regards funds spent in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring democratic scrutiny of Union spending;

(vi) enforce transparent and independent human rights monitoring mechanisms of Union home affairs funds in third countries;

(vii) closely monitor Union-funded border management actions, in particular to ensure full compliance with Union fundamental rights obligations and the principle of non-refoulement;

Security and Defence

180. Notes that in 2024 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 2,1 billion (1,1 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: EUR 800 million (36,9 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), EUR 300 million (15,9 %) for military mobility, EUR 300 million (13,3 %) for Defence instruments and Union Secure Connectivity; EUR 300 million (12,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Union Drug Agency (EUDA), European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), EUR 300 million (11,9 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas, and EUR 200 million (9,9 %) for the Internal Security Fund (ISF);

181. Recalls that ISF funding for 2014-2020 had to be spent by June 2024 and the final accounts had to be submitted by 31 December 2024; notes the Court’s finding that, at the time of their audit, a material amount of ISF funding remained to be cleared (16 % or EUR 505 million) pending acceptance of these final accounts by the Commission; acknowledges the Commission’s reply that the total expenditure declared by the Member States during the period 2014-2020, including the submission of the final accounts, amounted to 94 % of ISF;

182. Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; notes that the Commissioner for Defence and Space has clarified during his hearing in the Committee on Budgetary Control on 6 November 2025 that the Court’s Annual Report 2024 does not include any errors found on defence projects; further notes that the Commission estimates that in 2024 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for expenditure on security and defence;

183. Recalls that the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood is giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; reaffirms its position that Russia represents the primary and most significant threat to the Union and its Member States; recalls that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a state sponsor of terrorism;

184. Recalls that defence capabilities in the Union suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap for the next decade currently stands at EUR 500 billion; welcomes that due to the urgent need to boost defence capabilities, the number of Union defence funding instruments has increased since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes that Union defence instruments include extra-budgetary ones such as the European Peace Facility (EPF), and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a temporary defence loan instrument; stresses, furthermore, that in addition to defence funding programmes, other Union programmes can serve dual-use purposes, notably the Military Mobility component of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the Union Secure Connectivity programme, established in 2023 primarily to provide Union Member States with guaranteed access to highly secure, sovereign and global connectivity services; also notes that after its mid-term review in September 2025, cohesion policy funds can also be used to improve military mobility and develop defence infrastructure, especially in the Eastern border regions;

185. Appreciates the Commission’s written replies that acknowledge that the multitude of defence-related instruments resulted in a fragmented funding landscape, with certain overlaps and gaps; underlines the need for a comprehensive and long-term Union approach to security and defence funding, responding to both conventional military threats and non-conventional threats; stresses the need for further improving the transparency of Union defence funding, including by guaranteeing the Court's audit rights for all instruments and ensuring that the discharge authority can exercise democratic scrutiny of all Union-funded activities; highlights the need for increasing the user-friendliness of information on Union defence funding published, with a view to also benefiting applicants and beneficiaries, especially SMEs; underlines that the participation of SMEs across all Member States should be facilitated and promoted, and their fair and equitable access to Union-funded projects ensured; encourages sustained investment and support for SMEs;

187. Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

188. Recalls that the EDF’s general objective is to foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) throughout the Union; notes that, as outlined in the Commission’s written replies, EDF funding amounting to EUR 227,9 million was allocated to 20 projects related to artificial intelligence and further EUR 171,1 million was allocated to 18 projects focused on aerial-drone technologies, while 50 projects focused on what can be classified as traditional defence equipment, relating to ground, air and naval combat, underwater, air missiles defence and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation, were supported with a total of EUR 1,49 billion from the EDF; notes that since 2021, less than EUR 400 million from EDF was spent on projects related to artificial intelligence and drone technologies, despite the fact that experience from ongoing and recent conflicts suggests that cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and unmanned systems, including drones, can play an increasingly important role in modern warfare; considers that in the funding of technologies those that provide the greatest operational advantage should be prioritised;

189. Notes the Court’s Special Report 04/2025 on EU military mobility and the Commission’s replies; is concerned by the Court’s overall conclusion that the second EU action plan on military mobility, published in November 2022, was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and obstacles to implementation; notes with concern the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; notes the fact, highlighted by the Court, that parliamentary oversight of all Union military mobility activities is not always feasible due to the fact that not all projects are funded through the Union budget, as is the case for the European Defence Agency (EDA) or PESCO;

190. Expresses its concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has already been exhausted, while at least EUR 100 billion investment is estimated to be needed for addressing the 500 hotspots identified in the Union as needing urgent upgrading; notes the Commission’s written reply that the 2024 revision of the TEN-T Regulation introduced elements to integrate military mobility into Union transport policy; further notes that the European Commission and the High Representative adopted the Military Mobility Package 2025; reiterates the importance of further strengthening the responsiveness and efficiency of Union military mobility by reducing regulatory and procedural complexity, enhancing harmonisation and streamlining coordination to reduce delays and improve operational readiness;

Recommendations

191. Invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5;

192. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) continue its efforts to enhance the transparency of Union spending on defence across all relevant instruments, including by facilitating the Court’s audit work in line with the applicable legal framework and by ensuring that the discharge authority is appropriately informed so as to exercise democratic scrutiny of Union-funded activities during the adoption, design and implementation phases;

(ii) provide the discharge authority with regular consolidated reporting on the budget execution and performance of all defence-related expenditure from the Union budget, off-budget instruments and all other relevant instruments, such as military mobility and security-related programmes, in order to enable democratic scrutiny;

(iii) provide to the Parliament more systematic follow-up and reporting on Union defence and military mobility measures, implementation and funding, including those relating to EU-NATO cooperation, EPF, EDA and PESCO;

(iv) strengthen the EDF’s contribution to a comprehensive European defence approach by increasing support for projects addressing hybrid threats, including artificial intelligence, cyber and drone technologies;

(v) further strengthen Union security and defence measures by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, including through the harmonisation of joint and common defence procurement, as referred in the Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 ("EDIP Regulation"), and related procedures among Member States in order to enhance interoperability, efficiency and strategic coherence, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape;

(vi) take further action to ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the Union and simplify access to Union funding, including SMEs and Member States most vulnerable to external threats;

Neighbourhood and the world

193. Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,4 billion (8,0 % of the Union budget expenditure excluding RRF;) distributed as follows: 62,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 15,9 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 14,9 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III), 2,7 % for Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus and 4,1 % for other actions and programmes;

194. Welcomes that in 2024 the Court examined a statistically representative sample of 137 transactions covering all spending under this MFF heading, enabling it for the first time to calculate an error rate; notes with concern the estimated error rate of 4,9 %, significantly exceeding the 2,0 % materiality threshold; further notes that 56 of the 137 transactions (40,9 %) contained quantifiable errors that have a financial impact on the Union budget; observes that these errors concerned ineligible costs, serious breaches of public procurement rules, missing essential supporting documentation, ineligible beneficiaries, and expenditure not actually incurred; considers that these issues may indicate weaknesses in the functioning and reliability of control systems;

195. Is struck by the fact that in ten of the cases involving quantifiable errors, the Commission already had sufficient information at its disposal to prevent the error or to detect and correct it before accepting the expenditure; notes that, had the Commission effectively used this information, the estimated level of error would have been reduced by 1,4 percentage points;

196. Notes that, as in previous years, a significant share of the errors detected by the Court concerned contracts implemented under indirect management by pillar-assessed organisations, including international institutions; observes that for these contracts the Commission accepted expenditure on the basis of a financial report and a management declaration, the latter being a self-issued certification by the pillar-assessed organisation attesting to the completeness, accuracy and compliance of the financial information provided; notes with concern that 26 of the 42 quantified errors detected by the Court related to such contracts, contributing 3,1 percentage points to the estimated level of error, thereby highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in the assurance framework for indirect management with pillar assessed entities;

197. Expresses concern that, once again, the Court encountered delays in obtaining requested documentation from certain international organisations and international financial institutions, thereby hindering the timely conduct of its audit work, despite its previous recommendation from 2020; notes that in 19 audited transactions these entities limited access to documents to temporary, view-only electronic consultations, without allowing the Court to retain copies, which impeded proper planning, execution and quality control of the audit; regrets that these obstacles persisted despite the Commission’s efforts to resolve the issue through sustained communication with the organisations concerned, as also highlighted in the report of the 2024 annual report on the EDFs;

198. Expresses serious concern that no Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions took place in 2024, owing to the termination of the two existing ROM service contracts in 2025; highlights with concern that the planned 2024 restricted tender for the new generation of ROM contracts had to be cancelled due to the unavailability of NDICI support expenditure credits, forcing DG INTPA to rely on operational credits and to prepare a standalone NDICI Support Measure to finance ROMs; notes that a new restricted tender procedure was relaunched in October 2025 under a suspensive clause, with the new three-year ROM contract expected to be signed only in April 2026; underlines that this funding and procurement disruption has resulted in a full suspension of the ROM system since early 2025, delaying independent performance monitoring of programme implementation and weakening the overall results-orientation of external action;

199. Notes that, Union investment in trade-related assistance to the world’s least-developed countries (LDCs) has declined, with only 12,0 % of Aid for Trade (AfT) flows reaching LDCs in 2022 compared to 18,0 % on average between 2010 and 2015; notes with concern that this underperformance persists despite the 25,0 % spending target for LDCs set in the revised 2017 EU Aid for Trade strategy; takes note of the findings of the European Court of Auditors in Special Report 17/2025 ‘EU aid for trade to least developed countries’, which concluded that EU Aid for Trade is not on track to meet the 2030 target; welcomes the Commission’s acceptance of the Court’s recommendation to analyse the underlying causes of this decline and notes that this assessment is planned for 2026, stressing the need for timely corrective action to ensure that Union trade assistance reaches those most in need;

200. Notes that budget support reported in 2024 by INTPA and DG NEAR to countries outside of the Union amounted to EUR 1,56 billion; regrets the absence of publicly available data identifying beneficiary countries, as published statistics refer only to regions or country groupings; further regrets the lack of transparency regarding the use of these funds and the identification of final recipients; emphasises that budget support should be aligned with partner countries’ needs and the Union’s strategic policy objectives;

201. Stresses that Union aid must under no circumstances, directly or indirectly, finance terrorism or any activities incompatible with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and therefore must not support any entity linked to Hamas or to any other terrorist or extremist organisation; recalls that, to this end, it is both legitimate and essential to clearly identify all final beneficiaries of Union assistance, also in third countries; emphasises the need for rigorous oversight of the distribution and use of aid to ensure that no funds are misused; further calls on strengthening due diligence, monitoring and control mechanisms in order to prevent any form of ideological infiltration in programmes financed by the Union; underlines that anti-terror safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied rigorously without undermining humanitarian principles and the delivery of life-saving assistance;

202. Recalls that education is a central pillar of peacebuilding, coexistence and preparation for a negotiated two-state solution, and a key mean of countering extremism, intolerance and radical ideologies; recalls that Union financial assistance and political engagement should support education that promotes peace, tolerance and coexistence; welcomes the Commission’s continued engagement with the Palestinian Authority on curriculum reform and acknowledges the tangible progress reported in 2025, including the ongoing review and amendment of textbooks by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education to ensure alignment with UNESCO standards; notes in particular that some revisions were made to Grade 12 and more comprehensive revisions to Grades 1-4, and new learning material has been published in December 2024 and October 2025 respectively and is currently undergoing review by the Union; recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards, in particular those containing antisemitism, incitement to violence, glorification of jihad and martyrdom, and the rejection of peaceful conflict resolution; reminds the Commission to base its review on public and verifiable evidence and to publish the result of its reviews;

203. Notes that, as in previous years, no Union funding in 2024 has been used to support the production of Palestinian textbooks, and that Union direct financial assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority via the Union mechanism PEGASE under both the 2024 Emergency Support package and the Multiannual Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience (2025-2027) is strictly limited to traceable expenditure items such as salaries, social allowances and arrears to hospitals; notes that this financial support to the Palestinian Authority is partially linked to the achievement of reforms agreed in an ambitious Reform Matrix with the Palestinian Authority in 2024, which includes a progressive and systemic review of learning materials; recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards, particularly those encouraging antisemitism and including violence, to which Palestinian children should not be exposed; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards; calls on the Commission to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly to educational materials that contain antisemitic references or examples which incite hatred and violence;

204. Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population to cooperate with reliable partners on the ground to guarantee the uninterrupted and secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to terrorist or extremist movements opposed to the Union’s fundamental values; recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023; acknowledges the United Nations' response to those allegations including the investigations launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), after which nine staff members had their employment formally terminated in the interest of the Agency and the recommendations issued through the Colonna Report; notes that the Commission has been working with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA; notes the Commission’s assessment that UNRWA remains committed to implementing the agreed recommendations as well as the fulfilment of all conditions agreed with the Union for continued funding in 2024; encourages, in this regard, the Commission’s continued engagement and close monitoring to ensure that funding is met with solid guarantees on neutrality, transparency and accountability;

205. Notes that during the period between 2019–2024 six out of nine senior management positions in DG NEAR remained vacant for extended periods; notes in particular that the post of Director-General remained vacant for 28 months, Director A for 25 months, Director NEAR B (Southern Neighbourhood) for 48 months, Director NEAR D (Western Balkans) for 35 months, Director of the Support Group for Ukraine for 32 months, and Director R for 22 months; underlines that these prolonged vacancies affected some of the Union’s most politically sensitive and operationally critical portfolios, including during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel; further notes the results of the April 2022 DG NEAR staff survey showing significant declines in confidence in senior management’s leadership;

206. Notes that between 2020 and 2023 the Support Group for Ukraine, leadership was provided on an interim basis by the Deputy Director-General of DG NEAR in addition to her many other functions, further notes that the Ukraine Support Group was dissolved in 2023 with portfolios redistributed to the Ukraine Facility and other units; notes that the information provided by the Commission in this regard during the exchange of views with the discharge authority was inaccurate and calls on the Commission to ensure clear and accurate reporting to Parliament by all Members of the Commission;

207. Notes recent investigative reporting published in October 2025 by several European media outlets alleging that Hungarian intelligence services engaged in espionage activities in Brussels, including attempts to recruit Hungarian nationals working in Union institutions; notes that these reports refers to the 2015-2019 period and that the Commission has confirmed that it is examining these allegations internally; expects the Commission and competent authorities to conduct a thorough analysis and investigation based on evidence and to inform the Parliament as soon as the investigation has been finalised;

208. Notes that Commissioners exercise significant political and regulatory authority and their conduct must therefore reflect the highest standards of independence, transparency, accountability, and ethical behaviour; stresses that strict adherence to the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Commission is essential to safeguarding the integrity, credibility, and democratic legitimacy of the Union’s executive; underlines that full compliance with the Code of Conduct is also indispensable to preventing conflicts of interest, avoiding undue influence, and ensuring that decisions are taken solely in the European interest; considers that, taken together, the past serious and prolonged management failures in DG NEAR, the provision of inaccurate information to Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure, and the additional concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the standards of accountability, reliability and sound administration required of a Member of the Commission;

209. Notes with concern that Union funding to Ukraine is spread across numerous instruments and facilities, creating a fragmented and complex financing landscape; underlines that the absence of a consolidated and transparent overview of how these funds, including loans guaranteed by the MFF headroom, are allocated and spent hinders effective democratic oversight, accountability and the ability to assess the overall impact of Union support;

210. Notes that Ukraine’s anti-corruption specialised bodies (NABU, SAPO and HACC) continue to deliver investigations, prosecutions and judgments in high-level cases, demonstrating that independent anti-corruption institutions are starting to function and that recent resignations of accused ministers show a degree of governmental responsiveness and accountability; commends the reforms undertaken by Ukraine in the midst of a full-fledged invasion; notes that the attempts to place NABU and SAPO under the authority of the Prosecutor General, risked undermining the independence and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework; welcomes the swift reversal of these amendments following domestic and international pressure, but expresses concern at reports from anti-corruption institutions and civil society highlighting challenges in maintaining the effectiveness and independence of the anti-corruption framework; calls on the authorities to prevent backsliding, address procedural delays and obstructions in high-level cases, and revise statutes of limitation in line with European standards;

211. Notes the recent fraud allegations in Ukraine’s energy sector; underlines that these allegations, if confirmed, point to structural vulnerabilities in governance, oversight and internal control systems; stresses the need to build public trust to strengthen Ukraine’s reform credibility through robust public procurement and internal control systems;

212. Notes that, to ensure sound financial management of the Ukraine Facility, the Commission established in June 2024 a dedicated Audit Board through Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1697, composed of independent experts appointed by the Commission; notes that the Audit Board’s mandate is to detect systemic weaknesses in Ukraine’s management and control of Facility funds, including deficiencies in fraud prevention, anti-corruption safeguards and conflict-of-interest systems, and to report such issues directly to the Commission;

213. Underlines that, beyond its oversight role, the Audit Board may issue recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities on addressing financial irregularities or structural shortcomings in the management of Union funds; stresses that Ukraine, represented by the Ministry of Economy, must provide a written response to each recommendation, either outlining implementation measures or providing a justified explanation for non-implementation; highlights that the Audit Board’s findings may carry significant financial consequences; underlines that sustained Union financial support must be accompanied by sound financial management, transparency and performance monitoring in order to ensure effective use of Union funds and maintain the credibility of the enlargement policy;

214. Recalls that, under the Ukraine Facility, regular payments are conditional on the Commission verifying the implementation of Ukraine’s recovery and reform plan and the continuous respect of democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights; notes that, to date, the Commission has on five occasions concluded that individual reform steps were not fulfilled under instalments one to five, leading to the suspension of corresponding amounts, one of which has since been remedied; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s strict conditionality approach and its demonstrated willingness to verify implementation thoroughly and to withhold funds where conditions are not met;

215. Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO;

216. Expresses concern that allocation under the EFSD+ new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope benefits countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs and fragile and conflict-affected countries;

217. Notes that despite longstanding Union funding to strengthen Libyan border and migration controls, reports indicate that such assistance continues to raise serious operational and humanitarian concerns as well as concerns with regard to fundamental rights and governance, potentially exposing the Union to reputational risks; stresses the need for rigorous monitoring, transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that migration-related assistance does not indirectly contribute to further harm;

218. Notes that, as of 1 February 2025, the European Commission reorganised the former Directorate-General for DG NEAR, dividing its responsibilities between two newly established directorates: the Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), responsible for candidate countries and the Eastern Neighbourhood, and the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA), which now covers the Mediterranean region;

European Development Funds (EDF)

219. Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 85 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 16 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 54 transactions authorised by 14 Union delegations, 14 transactions approved by Commission headquarters and 1 transaction related to the Bêkou Trust Fund;

220. Notes with concern that, out of the 85 transactions examined, 34 (40,0 %) contained errors, compared to 62 (44,3 %) in 2023 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 27 errors (52 in 2023), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2024 to be 6,5 % (8,9 % in 2023);

221. Highlights with concern that the three most frequent types of errors detected in the 2024 financial year were: ineligible expenditure (40,0 %), the absence of essential supporting documentation (32,0 %) and the over-clearing of pre-financing (14,0 %);

222. Notes with bewilderment that, as of 31 December 2024, the full accounting closure of the 9th European Development Fund, covering the period 2000-2007, had still not been completed, more than 17 years after the introduction of the sunset clause, with eight contracts still ongoing, illustrating the exceptional complexity and duration of certain EDF programmes;

223. Notes positively that the Commission has improved the calculation of cut-off estimates by systematically taking into account extensions of contract implementation periods occurring after the reporting year, following a recommendation made by the Court in its 2023 annual report;

224. Notes with concern that, as in previous years, significant pre-financing balances remain uncleared for excessively long periods, including EUR 446,0 million outstanding for more than 10 years, largely linked to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, whose long-term operations result in very slow clearing of pre-financing;