Changes from plenary report to adopted text

103. Notes that, following the establishment of its framework for reduction and recoveries in case of fraud, corruption, and conflict of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by the Member State, the Commission undertook the first such reduction on 8 May 2025, when, following an OLAF recommendation, it adopted its first implementing decision reducing support to Slovakia by EUR 1,225 million in relation to an uncorrected irregularity; notes, however, the Court’s finding in Special Report 26/2025 that the Commission lacks a mechanism to monitor whether amounts ordered to be recovered by national courts following criminal proceedings are actually repaid in full to the Union budget;

104. Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2025 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm that the transparency of case allocation in lower courts has not been improved, and that undue pressure on some judges continues within the judiciary, notably in relation to internal debates on key issues related to judicial independence; notes with concern in the same vein that the implementation of the 2024-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy lags behind, with the decrease of the number of convictions for corruption crimes, the absence of progress in establishing a robust track-record on high-level corruption, and the continuous reporting by the Hungarian Integrity Authority of obstacles in fulfilling its oversight tasks effectively;

105. Reiterates its serious concerns about the Commission's decision of 13 December 2023, concluding that the Hungarian government had satisfied the Charter requirements in relation to judicial independence and lifting the suspension on the disbursement of funds for related programmes, resulting in Hungary becoming eligible to receive approximately EUR 10,2 billion from various funds governed by the CPR; reminds that on 25 March 2024, the European Parliament brought an action before the Court of Justice in order to review the legality of the Commission decision, as well as to bring legal certainty to the implementation of the rule of law mechanism; notes that while the CJEU ruling is still pending, the Advocate General proposed on 12 February 2026 that the Court of Justice annul the Commission's decision lifting the suspension on the disbursement of funds to Hungary;

106. Notes that from the EUR 19,8 billion allocations under the CPR, initially blocked due to fundamental rights concerns, only EUR 7,6 billion remain blocked for the Hungarian government in January 2026; further notes that from the EUR 6,4 billion initially blocked under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation because of rule of law and corruption concerns, EUR 1 and 1,1 billion have been decommitted at the end of 2024 and 2025 respectively; expresses deep concern that, while the rule law continues to deteriorate and corruption flourishes through entrenched oligarchic networks in Hungary, the amount of Union funds that remains frozen due to rule of law and corruption concerns decreases, and consequently, the pressure applied by the Commission on the Hungarian government to make reforms shrinks constantly;

107. Notes the requests by the Hungarian government on 28 and 29 March 2025 to transfer EUR 545 million from two cohesion programmes to new priorities under the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), of which EUR 395 million from funds frozen due to the failure to meet the horizontal enabling condition under the Charter of Fundamental Rights; deeply regrets the Commission’s approval of the amendments on 25 September 2025, that despite again blocking reimbursements for the new STEP priorities due to non-compliance with Charter requirements, nevertheless gave the Hungarian government access to EUR 317,3 million in pre-financing; reaffirms that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to governments non-compliant with Union values and with their obligations to protect the Union’s financial interests that losses can be offset elsewhere; recalls its position that funds suspended pursuant to the Conditionality Regulation or due to non-fulfilment of horizontal enabling conditions should not be eligible for programme amendments or transfers; calls, therefore, on the Commission to exercise its right of initiative and propose measures to close any existing loopholes in the Union's legislative framework that may enable governments to transfer funds suspended due to breaches of their rule of law or other Charter of Fundamental Rights obligations, and ensure that any future funding instruments are proofed for circumvention;

108. Notes that MOL Plc, a publicly listed Hungarian petrochemical conglomerate, is effectively controlled through three so-called public interest trusts affiliated with the Hungarian Government, each holding a 10 % share; recalls that Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 prohibits the Commission from entering into new legal commitments, under direct or indirect management, with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them when implementing the Union budget; notes with concern that at least one funding agreement appears to have been concluded between the Commission and MOL after the adoption of that Decision; takes note of the Commission’s reply that it is investigating the matter, and expects the Commission to provide the discharge authority without delay with a clear explanation of how such a commitment could have been signed;

109. Notes that the Hungarian government is set to receive the third-largest allocation under the SAFE instrument, amounting to EUR 16,2 billion, intended to support major defence-industry investments; recalls that the Commission has the power to withhold approval of national defence investment plans under SAFE where there are concerns regarding the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that the Hungarian government recently sold a controlling 75 %+1 vote majority stake in its state defence-industry holding to 4iG, a company widely seen as close to the government; strongly warns that, in light of the continued deterioration of the rule of law, persistent corruption risks and systemic weaknesses in oversight as described above, the Union’s financial interests cannot be considered adequately protected if SAFE funding were to be disbursed to the Hungarian government without, at the very least, setting strict conditions that must be met prior to any disbursement of funds;

110. Highlights with alarm that since the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia adopted a series of amendments to the Criminal Code, passed in the second half of 2024, including the closure of specialised anti-corruption entities, the National Crime Agency and the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which resulted in delays in investigations transferred to other bodies and significant drops in the number of corruption cases; notes with concern Slovakia’s Government plan to replace the current office for whistleblowers with an institution whose chair would be appointed directly by the parliamentary speaker, which risks politicising the office, aligning its work with the Government’s priorities, scaling back protection of whistleblowers, and undercutting scrutiny of how the Government handles Union funds; stresses that these developments pose an increased, substantial risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; emphasises that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation is not limited to last-resort measures, but also allows for early action with partial suspensions where rule of law breaches are identified that pose a serious risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; fully supports the Commission’s decision and calls on the Commission to start the first step of the conditionality mechanism and to launch an infringement proceeding regarding this matter;

111. Notes, in this context, that following the Committee on Budgetary Control mission to Bratislava on 26–28 May 2025, unfounded public statements by the Prime Minister of Slovakia and members of the National Council led to threats against the Leader of the mission, necessitating police protection; considers that such incidents further illustrate the deteriorating rule of law environment and the risks it poses to the Union’s financial interests;

112. Deplores that, according to civil society’s analysis, the vast majority of recommendations from the Rule of Law Report repeat the previous ones; considers that this raises concerns as to whether the recommendations are taken sufficiently seriously by Member States and whether the Commission is applying adequate pressure to ensure their effective implementation; stresses that, many of the shortcomings listed in the Rule of Law Report have a direct impact on the sound financial management of the Union budget and therefore considers it essential from a budgetary control perspective that the exercise produces tangible and measurable results; invites, therefore, the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual Rule of Law Reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States, and to trigger the Conditionality Regulation where systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the Report, have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the Union budget;

113. Notes the Commission reply that the Secretariat-General (SG) coordinates between the use of three different instruments of the Conditionality Regulation, the Rule of Law Report, the RRF and of the CPR horizontal enabling conditions to ensure consistency across all programmes, instruments and Member States, and that within each instrument, there is a lead service entrusted with the implementation and relevant associated services also feed into this work; further notes that the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) and SG jointly lead the work on the Rule of Law Report, DG EMPL leads for the work on the Charter horizontal enabling condition, SG REFORM with the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) for the work on the RRF and the Directorate-General for Budget (DG BUDG) for the work on the Conditionality Regulation; invites the Commission to further clarify the role of all decision-makers in these procedures; underlines that while a solid framework exists on paper, the practical application of procedures could be further enhanced; regrets that the Commission in the past only provided the bare minimum amount of information, without key details, and did not share the full documentation even after Parliament had requested it; stresses that timely, comprehensive and proactive information sharing is essential for it to exercise its budgetary and oversight responsibilities effectively and for citizens to maintain trust in the Union institutions and the EU’s credibility as a whole;

114. Regrets that the Commission took more than two years to open infringement proceedings against Malta for the non-application of Union law in the field of online gambling; notes with serious concern that, as a result of Malta’s legislation preventing the enforcement of valid judgments from other Member States, around 100 000 Union citizens entitled to repayments have been unable to obtain redress; notes further that several gambling companies licensed in Malta have begun transferring assets to other entities, thereby risking the effective enforcement of thousands of court judgments even if the contested legislation were to be withdrawn; deeply regrets, in this context, the Commission’s delay in initiating infringement proceedings;

115. Recalls the findings of the Court’s Special Report on the Digitalisation of Healthcare, which concluded that Union support to Member States has been overall effective in fostering the digital transformation of healthcare systems; notes, however, that Member States have faced difficulties in utilising Union funds allocated for this purpose and regrets that while the Commission monitors the progress achieved by Member States in the digitalisation of healthcare, it does not yet possess a comprehensive overview of how Union funds are being used to support these activities; calls on the Commission to implement in full the Court’s recommendations, in particular by improving guidance to Member States, strengthening monitoring and performance-based oversight of Union funds used for digital health and ensuring that digital health investments uphold the highest standards of data protection, cybersecurity and interoperability;

116. Acknowledges that the EU4Health programme has contributed to the InvestEU programme through blending with the Union guarantee, thereby mobilising additional investments; notes in particular the contribution of EUR 110 million via an InvestEU top-up supporting EIB investments in innovative life-science projects related to medical countermeasures; underlines the importance of ensuring transparency, efficient coordination with national and Union funding instruments, and broad access to Member States so that these investments deliver strong European added value and strengthen the resilience of the Union’s health systems; recalls the importance of investing in medical innovation and technologies at a European level and the importance of strengthening the cooperation between research institutions, private medical companies and public authorities to better serve the public interest;

117. Regrets the Commission’s decision to discontinue operating grants supporting the health sector which represented just over 1% of the EU4Health budget in 2024; observes that these changes have affected a continuity contribution to European public health objectives; stresses the importance of predictable and stable support mechanisms for stakeholder and civil society organisations active in health; suggests that future funding continues to be based on clear criteria of European added value, transparency, political neutrality, and measurable impact, to ensure resources are directed where they provide the greatest benefit for patients and health systems; highlights the role of stakeholder and civil society actors in contributing to Union health policy objectives and implementation;

118. Notes that the Commission allocated EUR 8 million in 2024 and EUR 20,9 million in 2025 for calls for proposals for the production of content on Union affairs by consortia of news media organisations, and that three media consortia currently receive Union funding; recalls that a free, independent and pluralistic press is a cornerstone of democratic accountability; considers that Union support for media can contribute to strengthening media pluralism and informed public debate across the Union, provided that strict safeguards are in place to ensure full editorial independence and transparency; underlines the importance of transparency regarding all financial support, including grants, contracts and indirect funding provided to media organisations, and that such information should be easily accessible and clearly presented;

119. Regrets that the Commission had not performed interim evaluations of the flagship programmes Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and Creative Europe before the legally defined deadline; stresses that evaluations should inform decision-making for the current programming period, as well as for the future one;

Recommendations

120. Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report to ensure that:

(i) audit authorities strengthen their control and detection capacity by verifying that they plan properly the sampling, confirm that compliance with eligibility criteria is proven, and keep proper documentation to support the audit trail;

(ii) when systematic weaknesses have been detected in operational programmes and a flat rate has been imposed, Member State authorities do not use the flat rate correction mechanism to avoid their responsibility to check the eligibility of the expenditure before declaring it to the Commission, and make individual recoveries as necessary;

121. Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

(i) continue to address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with the effective implementation of the action plan, aimed at increasing detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;

(ii) further strengthen guidance, coordination and monitoring in order to ensure greater legal certainty and more effective reuse of reflows across Member States;

(iii) work closely with Member States, in particular those facing structural or capacity constraints, to provide technical assistance, administrative simplification and sufficient flexibility in implementation in order to ensure the full and effective absorption of cohesion funds;

(iv) develop a methodology to measure the overall financial impact of EPPO and OLAF investigations, including amounts recovered following national court decisions in criminal proceedings, and to obtain regular information from Member States on asset recovery and the share returned to the Union budget as recommended by the Court;

(v) link recommendations from the Rule of Law Report to the implementation of concrete measures by the Member State concerned to have a stronger impact and contribute to protecting the Union’s financial interests, and refers in this regard to the recommendations made in Parliament’s resolution of 18 June 2025 on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report;

(vi) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats to the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;

(vii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;

(viii) exercise its right of initiative and propose measures to close any existing loopholes in the Union's legislative framework that could enable governments to transfer funds suspended in accordance with the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation or on account of non-fulfilment of horizontal enabling conditions, and ensure that any future funding instruments contain adequate safeguards against circumvention;

(ix) urgently reassess and address the deterioration of the rule of law and risks to the Union budget in Hungary and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation and other available tools, including full suspension of Union funds;

(x) carry out an ex-post evaluation of the financial impact of cohesion policy amendments on eastern border regions, notably the ERDF funds initially earmarked for cross-border cooperation with Russia and Belarus as well as funds reallocated in the context of the 2025 cohesion mid-term review, covering the extent to which Union funds originally intended for regions sharing a border with Russia and/or Belarus have ultimately remained in them or conversely been directed elsewhere, share its evaluation with the discharge authority, and urgently propose targeted financial support for these regions to counter the disproportionate impact of Russia's war of aggression, including remedying losses suffered as a result of the amendments during the current programming period;

(xi) reconsider the single audit approach until the weaknesses identified in the managing and audit authorities in Member States have been tackled;

(xii) ensure operating grants are provided under the EU4Health programme;

Natural resources and environment

122. Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources and environment’ was EUR 64,4 billion (33,7 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 59,2 % of this expenditure went to the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) – direct payments (EUR 38,1 billion), followed by EAFRD (EUR 15,5 billion, 24,0 %), Just Transition Fund (EUR 6,2 billion, 9,5 %), European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) – market-related expenditure (EUR 2,7 billion, 4,1 %), Maritime and Fisheries (EUR 1,3 billion, 2,0 %), Environment and Climate (LIFE) (EUR 600 million, 0,9 %) and other (EUR 200 million, 0,3 %);

123. Underlines that in 2024 the common agricultural policy (CAP) represented the main share (87,3 %) of Union spending on natural resources and environment; recalls that 2024 was the second year of the CAP 2023-2027, which introduced a new delivery model incorporating performance-based elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as the basis for payments;

124. Notes that at the end of 2024, payments from EAFRD 2023-2027 amounted to EUR 6,3 billion (in 2023: EUR 700 million), representing an absorption rate of 9,5 % (compared to 1 % in 2023); stresses that delayed payments undermine farmers’ income stability; notes the 32 % absorption rate of the Just Transition Fund; notes with concern the low absorption rate of European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), which reached only 3 % by the end of 2024;

125. Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 228 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading in 19 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes with concern that the Court estimates the level of error for this heading to be 2,6 % (in 2023: 2,2 %); further notes that the Court found eight quantifiable errors (i.e. errors with a direct financial impact on the Union budget) in rural development, eight in eco-scheme transactions, a new type of intervention introduced under the 2023-2027 CAP to support agricultural practices that contribute to the climate and the environment goals and animal welfare, three in direct payments excluding eco-schemes, two in market measures, and one in a shared management transaction under the EMFAF; observes that the Court also detected 19 other compliance issues with no financial impact on the Union budget;

126. Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with administrative errors accounting for 44 % of errors, ineligibility issues for 28 %, non-respect of agri-environmental, climate, or eco-scheme commitments for 16 % and provision of inaccurate information on areas or animals for 12 %;

127. Expresses its concern that in case of 13 quantifiable errors, the Court considers that the Member State authorities had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this heading would have been 2,2 percentage points lower;

128. Draws attention to the need for simplification, further development and promotion of digital tools, and stronger controls to reduce the level of ineligible expenditure; stresses the importance of reducing administrative burdens on farmers to strengthen sound financial management;

129. Is reassured by the Court’s conclusion that the direct payments under CAP, excluding eco-schemes remained free of material error in 2024; acknowledges the Commission’s assessment that this confirms the important role the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) plays in preventing and reducing the risk of errors, as direct payments are managed by each Member State through IACS, which interlinks databases of holdings, aid applications, animal registries and agricultural areas;

130. Recalls that under the performance-based model of CAP 2023-2027, Member States set the rules to be complied with by final beneficiaries in accordance with the general framework of the Union, while the Commission focuses on performance results and the functioning of the systems that Member States put in place to ensure the respect of those conditions and no longer on the individual transactions; further recalls that accordingly for CAP 2023-2027, Member States are obliged to report to the Commission on output and result indicators related to policy performance, and not on control statistics; notes the Court's observation in its special report 07/2024 ‘The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure’ that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50/50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court's warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

131. Notes the Commission’s replies to the Court that it considers that the audit work of the Certification Bodies continues to be a key element of assurance for the CAP expenditure under the Strategic Plans; notes, furthermore, that for CAP 2023-2027, Member States are required to report to the Commission their assurance packages, including the new annual performance reports and the Certification Body’s opinion and accompanying reports, which the Commission then uses, together with the results of its own audit findings and those of the Court, to conclude on the assurance for CAP expenditure; underlines that the Commission does not calculate an error rate or risk at payment for expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans; acknowledges the Commission’s explanation that since 74,8 % of the expenditure of the MFF heading 3 in 2024 corresponded to performance-based expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans, no risk at payment could be determined for this heading and, as a consequence, for the Union budget as a whole;

132. Observes that for 2024, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) assessed 82 % of CAP 2023-2027 spending as low-risk, 11 % as medium-risk, and the remaining 7 % as high-risk; notes the Court’s clarification that low-risk spending corresponds to interventions unaffected by potential serious deficiencies in their governance systems and that most low-risk spending relates to direct payments and other support covered by the IACS; further notes that in its Annual Activity Report for 2024, DG AGRI combined the result of the performance-based and compliance-based payments and concluded that overall 77 % of CAP spending in 2024 was low-risk (compared to 69 % of CAP spending in 2023 and 72 % in 2022), 10 % was medium-risk, and 13 % was high-risk;

133. Notes with concern the reservations issued in DG AGRI’s 2024 AAR, namely, ten reservations for nine Member States for IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, 6 reservations for five Member States concerning non-IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, six reservations for four Member States concerning market measures due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 14,92 million, one reservation for one Member State concerning direct payments under programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 28,83 million, 12 reservations for ten Member States concerning rural development due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 209,80 million;

134. Welcomes that as part of its 2024 audit, the Court also collected and analysed information on the introduction of annual performance reports for CAP 2023-2027; is reassured by the Court’s overall conclusion that that annual performance reporting has, for the most part, been introduced as planned and that it has not identified any issues with the reported data; is reassured by the Court’s finding that for the nine paying agencies it reviewed, correspondence can be established between the payments made and the outputs recorded in their IT systems for producing annual performance reports;

135. Notes the Court’s finding, based on its survey of 19 Member States, that paying agencies’ performance reporting systems were still under development in 2024, with 18 paying agencies having automated the production of performance indicators and two using a manual or partly automated approach to produce some key output indicators for their 2024 annual performance reports; notes with concern that the IT systems used for producing the annual performance reports, at the time of Court’s audit work, had not yet undergone full testing to check their compliance with the international information security standards (ISO 27001);

136. Recalls that CAP 2023-2027 is structured around ten key objectives, including ensuring a viable, fair and stable income for farmers, safeguarding food security and strengthening the resilience of the agricultural sector; considers that direct income support under CAP should be better targeted to farmers actively engaged in agricultural production, while preserving legal certainty and avoiding excessive administrative constraints, with a specific focus on supporting those most in need, such as family-sized farms, small farms, farms located in areas facing natural constraints or other specific challenges, young farmers and female farmers; calls on the Commission to improve the efficiency and targeting of Union agricultural funds and ensure that only active farmers receive direct income support, while at the same time ensuring proportionality and maintaining robust controls;

137. Notes the Court’s 2025 conclusions on Union funding for forest-fire-related action: while Member States increasingly used Union funds for prevention, the Commission had an incomplete overview of total forest-fire spending and monitoring of results was weak, an issue with clear agricultural and rural implications; calls on the Commission to improve aggregation of forest-fire related spending and to strengthen monitoring of outcomes and long-term sustainability of preventive measures;

138. Stresses that in the context of growing natural-disaster risks the Commission and Member States must ensure that Union-funded prevention measures are well-targeted, based on up-to-date risk assessments, and sustained beyond one-off project cycles so that investments deliver lasting benefits for agriculture and rural communities;

139. Is concerned by the allegations of large-scale fraud affecting Union agricultural funds, which were first reported in the media in February 2025, concerning the Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aids (OPEKEPE); recalls that EPPO published a press release in May 2025 confirming that they were conducting an investigation into an alleged organised fraud scheme involving agricultural funds and corruption involving public officials of OPEKEPE; recalls that EPPO has, according to press reports, handed over information to the Greek Parliament with a view to investigating two ministers who later stepped down; notes with concern EPPO’s press release of 22 October 2025 that explains that in the course of EPPO’s preliminary investigation, an organised criminal group, allegedly involved in a systematic large-scale subsidy fraud scheme and money-laundering activities, has been identified; acknowledges the measures taken by Greek authorities without delay, including inter alia the decision to establish a special investigative task force, comprising the Financial Police and the Independent Authority for Public Revenue; underlines, in this context, that the assets of several individuals suspected of involvement in the alleged criminal activities have been seized;

140. Acknowledges that DG AGRI issued in its AAR 2024 four reservations related to expenditure managed by OPEKEPE; notes that one such reservation covers all the IACS interventions under the CAP Strategic Plans, as DG AGRI’s conformity audit and the work of the certification body revealed a number of potential serious deficiencies in relation to the implementation of the identification system for agricultural parcels, as well as in the design and functioning of the management and control system; notes another reservation was issued concerning non-IACS expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans covering the wine sector and apiculture due to potential serious deficiencies in relation to the design or set-up of the systems not covering the principles of economy, efficiency and measures to avoid double funding; notes that the third reservation for OPEKEPE concerns 2014-2022 rural development programmes, for which the adjusted error rate is estimated to be 7,45 %, due to DG AGRI’s audits in 2023 and 2024 that identified several weaknesses related to land parcel identification system, weaknesses in the OPEKEPE’s on-the-spot checks, serious deficiencies with regard to the supervision and checks of the local action groups, procedures to verify the potential creation of artificial conditions, checks on double financing and public procurement and deficiencies in the evaluation of the reasonableness of costs and verification of SME status; notes the fourth reservation concerning market measures outside of CAP Strategic Plans was issued covering fruit and vegetable producer organisations and exceptional measures, for which an adjusted error rate of 10 % is estimated following DG AGRI’s audit in 2024 that identified deficiencies in administrative and on-the-spot checks impacting exceptional measures and due to fact that, based on the Certification Body’s assessment, adjustments were made to the error rates for fruit and vegetable producer organisations and promotion; acknowledges that the Greek Authorities drew up an Action Plan, which has been accepted by DG AGRI as a sufficient basis for remedying the above mentioned deficiencies; recalls that all corrective measures are subject to ongoing monitoring by the Commission; insists that the Commission report to the discharge authority on the implementation of the action plan and on measurable improvements in control performance;

141. Acknowledges the Commission’s written replies that in 2023 and again in June 2024, DG AGRI requested that the Greek competent authority places OPEKEPE’s accreditation under probation; notes the explanation in DG AGRI’s AAR that deficiencies affecting several accreditation criteria were identified by the Certification Body and by DG AGRI, and as a result, Greek authorities put the accreditation of OPEKEPE under probation in September 2024 and drew up an accreditation action plan; further notes that the Commission is following the progress of the implementation of this remedial action plan; insists that the Commission share the latest revised action plan and its assessment with the discharge authority; acknowledges that Greek authorities have taken corrective measures without delay to address the identified structural weaknesses, enhance transparency of beneficiaries and reinforce controls and anti-fraud measures; welcomes in this context, the reform recently introduced by law to fully transfer OPEKEPE to the Independent Authority for Public Revenues (AADE);

142. Notes the Commission’s reply that in June 2025, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 415 million for the deficiencies identified in the management and control system in Greece during the years 2015-2022; notes with concern that the Commission was aware of serious deficiencies related to OPEKEPE since at least 2021, as a then ongoing accreditation related conformity enquiry was already reported in DG AGRI’s AAR for 2021; regrets the fact that the Commission has not taken action earlier to thoroughly investigate the serious deficiencies found in relation to OPEKEPE’s work, mitigate risks and better protect the Union budget;

143. Expresses its concerns over the number of irregularities and allegations of fraud related to Union-funded guesthouses; notes the Commission’s written replies that for the 2014-2022 programming period, guesthouses were financed, together with other types of investments, under Rural Development sub-measure 6.4 (investments in creation and development of non-agricultural activities) and the Leader programme; finds it regrettable, that since the Member States are not reporting to the Commission the number and type of investments supported by these measures, the Commission could not provide to the discharge authority an overview of Union-funded guesthouse projects; notes that the Commission’s audits on rural development measures are system-based and do not assess the legality and regularity of individual transactions; acknowledges the Commission’s written reply that findings on the management and control system implemented by the Member States in connection with guesthouses have been raised in Hungary, Slovakia (measure 6.4) and in Greece (Leader); considers that given the number of fraud allegations connected to guesthouses, the Commission should also monitor and audit individual guesthouse projects, including their use beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent further misuse as well as to introduce strict conflict of interest checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

144. Recalls that a former Prime Minister of Czechia was found to have been in a situation of conflict of interest during his previous term in office and the related European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2018; notes the Commission’s written replies concerning the measures taken in response to the conflict of interest arising from his ownership of a private holding company while holding public office and that the Commission suspended in March 2020 the payment of one project worth EUR 30 606,96; notes that in June 2022, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 3,3 million to Czechia, part of which (EUR 30 606,96) concerned the situation of conflict of interest of the Prime Minister during his mandate that ended in 2021; insists that the Commission should continue to monitor possible conflicts of interest that might affect Union funds, especially in relation to elected officials, and take action to protect the Union budget;

145. Notes that following national elections, a new government took office in Czechia in December 2025; takes note of public statements by the Prime Minister, indicating an intention to relinquish ownership and control of business interests potentially benefiting from Union funds through the creation of an allegedly irreversible trust arrangement; notes, however, that as of mid-January 2026, no publicly available legal documentation has been provided to demonstrate the effective establishment and operational safeguards of such arrangements and that the Prime Minister of Czechia continues, at present, to own Agrofert and other business interests which could potentially benefit from Union funds; stresses that the mere announcement of future arrangements is insufficient to dispel concerns of conflict of interest; insists that any future arrangements must ensure the effective removal of economic interests and influence, in line with Union rules on conflict of interest; welcomes recent media reports that the Commission has formally requested detailed information from the Czech authorities on the measures put in place to prevent potential conflicts of interest in relation to companies owned or controlled by the Prime Minister, and has sought assurances that no further Union funds are directed to Agrofert until the situation is fully clarified;

146. Recalls that climate and biodiversity are two of the horizontal policy priorities for the 2021-2027 Union budget; notes that the Commission defines climate and biodiversity mainstreaming as the systematic consideration of climate and biodiversity objectives in the design, preparation, implementation and evaluation of each spending programme;