Changes from plenary report to adopted text

221. Notes that the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the extremely short technological cycles in the field of unmanned systems, requiring continuous innovation and adaptation; underlines that cooperation and exchange of experience with Ukraine are essential, but stresses that the alignment of doctrines should take into account the differing operational realities and defence structures of each Member State;

222. Calls for the development of modular systems with interchangeable components, in order to keep pace with rapid innovation cycles in mass-produced drones and to adapt to the continuous evolution of air defence requirements in high-intensity contingencies;

223. Stresses, however, that maintaining such readiness and stockpiling capacity entails significant costs for industry, and that companies are unlikely to sustain inventories of critical components without clear public guidance and financial support; suggests that national supply security agencies could serve as importers and wholesalers for key components, thereby ensuring adequate stock levels, enabling regular stock rotation, and alleviating the financial burden on individual firms; underlines that this model would require coordinated public-private partnership and dedicated funding mechanisms at both national and EU levels to ensure resilience and supply continuity;

224. Calls for a ‘bankability kit’ to enhance defence financing efficiency by publishing standard European Investment Bank/EDF loan pack templates, including milestone schedules, warranty provisions and intellectual property clauses, to reduce legal friction with Member State banks involved in distributing defence-related credit lines;

225. Calls on the Commission to include, within the framework of its Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements, measures to ensure that the European drone industry and the Member States secure sufficient reserves of key materials and components essential for UAS development;

226. Urges the Commission to integrate these efforts into an overarching raw materials strategy that secures supply chains by reducing strategic dependency on China and recommends that Member States safeguard the security of supply for drones by identifying critical components and competencies that must be locally sourced;

Dedicated EDA Budget

227. Calls on the European Council to mandate the EDA to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAS that spans the full capability life cycle, including R&D, prototyping, training, fielding and maintenance, with flexible requirements and appropriations to accelerate acquisition and fielding;

228. Considers that Structure for European Armament Programmes (SEAPs) could be a useful tool for the development of UAS as it spans the full capability life cycle, accelerating the acquisition or production of relevant capabilities and their availability;

229. Calls on the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security and the Member States, in consultation with NATO, to establish dedicated EU funding lines for the rapid procurement, training, sustainment and spare-parts provisioning of combat UAS units;

Front line states detection systems

230. Considers that the numerous incursions by Russian drones into the airspace of many Member States show that the EU is no longer merely under threat but is being provoked;

231. Believes that the overflight of sovereign airspace by fighter jets or military drones is not a hybrid act, but a deliberate violation of sovereignty;

232. Calls on the EU and the Member States to develop the capacity to deter, swiftly detect, attribute, intercept and be ready to neutralise such attacks;

233. Recommends that the Member States, particularly front line states, significantly upgrade or adopt new missile and drone launch detection systems that can transmit information across the EU to serve as a ‘shield’ for Europe’s multilayered aerial defence capabilities;

234. Calls for full integration with NATO’s air and space defence structures to maximise interoperability;

235. Calls for the EU Sky Shield Initiative to integrate C-UAS capabilities within the broader architecture of the European IAMD system framework, and supports the EU-wide early warning and data-sharing network that integrates detection telemetry and launch indications with EU and national air-defence command systems;

236. Recalls that only with a comprehensive 360-degree approach can the EU effectively protect its borders;

237. Calls for targeted EU co-financing of counter-drone defences to protect critical energy and transport infrastructure in front line Member States;

238. Recommends that Member States implement baseline, layered C-UAS protection for critical infrastructure such as energy systems, transport nodes, telecommunications networks and space ground segments based on interoperable interfaces and common technical specifications, with harmonised incident reporting and clear civil-military coordination, underpinned by legally authorised and safely deconflicted EW training and testing;

Co-financing regular trainings

239. Recommends the co-financing of regular training and technical expertise development across service academies and military colleges via the EDA with coordination from the European Security and Defence College, which sponsors technical capability-building blocks via joint training that prioritise key areas such as human swarm interfaces, swarm intelligence algorithms, edge computing, secure datalinks, multi-viable programmes/platforms, simulation of experimentation platforms for AI tactical development, and simulations that optimise threat sequencing and weapon efficiency, ensuring that such activities will be aligned with NATO training standards and contribute to common European capability-building and interoperability objectives, including the incorporation of AI, robotics and aerospace technologies, in order to enhance competitiveness;

Joint C-UAS trainings in civil protection planning

240. Recommends the integration of C-UASs into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure that enables police, airport authorities and energy sector operators to access EU-wide training and standardised C-UAS capabilities;

241. Encourages strengthening industry-in-the-loop experimentation and iterative field trials to rapidly validate new counter-drone technologies and operational concepts;

242. Encourages the Member States to prioritise integrating command and control systems with first responders, civil defence and UAS defence doctrine to ensure that civil preparedness, sheltering, early warning, and technological integration are optimised to the fullest extent possible;

243. Considers that the implementation of the directive on the resilience of critical entities should take into account threats posed by the illegal use of drones, and calls on the Commission to establish a regulatory framework authorising state security bodies, including police, border guards and other interior forces, to procure and operate C-UAS systems; stresses that such authorisation should be subject to stringent oversight and accountability provisions comparable to those applied to lethal weapons, ensuring the effective protection of civilian infrastructure while upholding EU safety and security standards;

EU-wide UAS standardisation

244. Calls for EU-wide UAS standardisation, continued aerial worthiness to eventually be made obligatory, and Open-Earth-Monitor Cyberinfrastructure and EMAR to be necessary while fully respecting Member States’ sovereignty and ensuring that such requirements do not create unnecessary administrative burdens or impede innovation and the growth of SMEs;

245. Calls on the Commission to monitor, using EU trade instruments, the proliferation of drone manufacturers that apply opaque data-handling practices; invites the development of a regulatory framework to ensure the full traceability of hardware and software technologies employed by drones operating within the EU;

Expanding testing grounds

246. Calls for the expansion of certified testing grounds for training on and integration of drone capabilities, where industry and armed forces can rapidly co-develop, test and iterate drone solutions in operational conditions;

247. Calls on the Commission to provide adequate financing for capacity and infrastructure building of these sites to achieve their optimal innovation potential; encourages the inclusion of SMEs and start-ups to accelerate R&D to strengthen Europe’s technological edge;

248. Recognises that the gradual integration of drone capabilities into multinational units, such as the recent incorporation of a counter-drone element into NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence brigade in Latvia, serve as a model for future force development; calls for greater use of existing certified testing grounds for training and integration; stresses that operators require access to secure ranges, simulation environments and live-fire exercises to train in swarm tactics, counter-UAS and autonomous targeting; notes that joint European centres, drawing on the Canada-led Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalion’s operational experience with drones on the eastern flank, would enhance cross-country training options, interoperability, doctrinal convergence and efficiency across the EU;

249. Encourages the Commission, in consultation with the Member States, to simplify regulations for unpopulated test areas to enable testing in line with common safety standards; encourages the incorporation of AI-enabled simulation and real-world exercises to ensure technology readiness and doctrinal relevance;

250. Encourages the Commission to reduce administrative burdens, if necessary, in order to streamline procedures in line with the provisions of the Defence Readiness Omnibus;

251. Notes that drones made in Europe must be tested in real wartime conditions such as in Ukraine;

252. Recommends the financing and building of an EDA managed ‘defence metaverse’ for simulated drone combat (naval and aerial), beginning with particle-based simulations and then moving towards high-resolution environments;

253. Recommends the development and frequent evaluation of intelligent coordination strategies for drone swarms using simulation environments supported by high performance computing;

254. Recognises that high performance computing infrastructure with graphics processing unit clusters and parallel processing are required for testing and synthesising drone swarms, and that scalability requires scalable computation; recommends, therefore, financing for the EDA to prioritise training in this field;

255. Emphasises the need for stronger civil-military airspace coordination, notably through the integration of drones into U-space corridors under the Single European Sky initiative; supports the expansion of joint simulation and interception exercises involving civilian, law enforcement and military actors to enhance preparedness for multi-domain threats; underlines that such exercises should be conducted on an annual mandatory basis to ensure sustained readiness and interoperability;

Threat monitoring platform

256. Recommends the establishment of a European hybrid-threat monitoring platform for unmanned systems, hosted by the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and coordinated with the EUMS under the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity;

257. Stresses that the platform should deliver strategic alerts to the Council’s Political and Security Committee, with military input from the Council’s European Union Military Committee and the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability, and be interoperable with, and informed by, the expertise of NATO, its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and Member State early warning systems; underlines the need to keep Parliament’s stakeholders regularly informed to guarantee proper oversight and enable evidence-based policymaking;

258. Underlines that front line EU Member States should leverage their regional expertise and strategic positioning to enhance situational awareness and operational effectiveness;

259. Calls for the deployment of an EU-wide situational awareness layer action by funding an integrated UAS tracking and threat database, modelled on NATO IAMD systems designed to improve detection, coordination and civilian protection across borders;

260. Calls on the Member States to designate a national C-UAS operations centre to ensure round-the-clock coordination and interoperable data sharing among competent authorities, including civil aviation and air navigation services, law-enforcement, defence, intelligence, border and coast guards, civil protection authorities and critical-infrastructure operators, and with other Member States, based on common or open interfaces, harmonised reporting formats and robust legal and privacy frameworks;

261. Recognises the ‘Danish model’ as best practice for the Member States to emulate in order to enhance the acquisition of cutting-edge weapons systems at the lowest price point available, while supporting the Ukrainian economy and stimulating faster research and development from the firms best positioned to innovate according to battlefield realities;

262. Highlights the opportunity for the Member States to allow for the production of defence capabilities through joint procurement and industrial cooperation with Ukrainian companies;

263. Encourages joint UAS experimentation between the EUMS and UAF that permits a streamlined pathway for European-level integration that accommodates scalability, interoperability, and utilises Ukraine’s strengths in modular, low-cost solutions, digital-native C2 and field-driven innovation;

Co-development of EW & counter-electronic warfare capabilities

264. Recognises that the intensification of EW in Ukraine has triggered a race in ‘barrage jamming’ capabilities, demonstrating the need for armed forces to overcome this challenge by jointly developing EW capabilities that can overcome anti-drone guns, frequency hopping, offline modes and other evasive manoeuvres;

C2 systems

265. Encourages investment in the creation of effective, efficient and EW-resistant matrix wireless data transmission communication methods, in order to allow for effective C2 on a battlefield expected to be flooded with unmanned flying vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles which require effective wireless data to function;

266. Calls on the Commission and the EDA to prioritise the integration of the GOVSATCOM and IRIS² programmes for reliable, secure and cost-effective satellite communications supporting EU defence missions and drone C2 links;

267. Urges targeted EDF investment in low-latency, high-bandwidth satellite terminals and resilient communications payloads to ensure real-time data transmission and protection against interference, interception and jamming;

268. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish interoperable C3 standards which integrate manned and unmanned systems across EU and NATO frameworks;

269. Encourages EDF and EDIP support for unified, secure architectures using AI and cloud-based data fusion to enable coordinated, real-time multi-platform operations while ensuring human oversight and cybersecurity;

EU-NATO cooperation in counter-drone warfare

EU-NATO drone centre of excellence