On EU-US political relations

(2025/2084(INI))

The European Parliament,

–having regard to the Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations of 1990,

–having regard to the joint statement of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue of 15 June 2025,

–having regard to its resolutions of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024 and on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024,

–having regard to its previous resolutions and recommendations on transatlantic relations, in particular its recommendation of 13 December 2023 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-US relations,

–having regard to the joint statement of 21 August 2025 on a United States-European Union framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade,

–having regard to the Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Madrid Summit on 29 June 2022,

–having regard to the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence adopted on 22 March 2022,

–having regard to the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, of 19 March 2025,

–having regard to the Hague Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

–having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 June 2025,

–having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

–having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

–having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0250/2025),

A.whereas the strategic partnership between the EU and the United States is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historical ties, on democratic values such as freedom, democracy and human rights, and on common interests and reciprocity; whereas this partnership has been instrumental in promoting peace, stability, democracy and prosperity across the Atlantic and globally and remains crucial for the future; whereas the EU and its Member States are taking more responsibility for European and transatlantic security; whereas weakened international cooperation would undermine collective efforts to address global security challenges and might contribute to increased geopolitical uncertainty and instability;

B.whereas today’s geopolitical landscape is characterised by new and complex challenges, including the growing appeal of authoritarianism, increasing nationalism and geopolitical competition, a departure from the established international order, mounting threats to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, technological disruption, disasters caused by climate change, organised crime and the persistent threat of various forms of terrorism;

C.whereas the transatlantic partnership remains indispensable, even though recent developments have demonstrated that divergences between the EU and the United States can and do arise; whereas there is an urgent need for a comprehensive, fair and nuanced approach to EU-US relations that balances enhanced collaboration, strategic engagement, mutual respect and the pursuit of shared interests as well as the protection of European interests;

D.whereas NATO remains the essential and irreplaceable cornerstone of transatlantic security, and whereas defence cooperation between Europe and the US is vital in deterring current and emerging threats to transatlantic and global security such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and threats faced by NATO'’s eastern flank; whereas US intelligence remains essential for the EU;

E.whereas a strong commitment to internationalism, shared democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, including judicial independence, constitute the very foundation and defining pillars of the transatlantic partnership and the international rules-based order and must therefore continue to be protected and promoted by transatlantic partners;

F.whereas reinforcing reciprocal public understanding, communication and outreach efforts concerning EU-US relations among citizens on both continents is critical to strengthening trust and mutual understanding; whereas the success of these efforts is contingent upon them being matched by adequate behaviour at leadership level;

G.whereas strategic autonomy in regulatory and technological domains is of critical importance for the EU and would contribute to the maintenance of a strong transatlantic partnership and to upholding respect for sovereignty;

H.whereas the increasing geopolitical challenges posed by the rise of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, notably those in Russia, Iran, North Korea and China, and their revisionist ambitions, require a coordinated, coherent and strategic transatlantic approach; whereas Russia’s aggressive actions, including acts of subversion, disinformation campaigns, documented cases of sponsoring arson and cyber-attacks, as well as military posturing along NATO’s eastern flank, pose a direct threat to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas the destabilising activities of regional actors in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, including persistent violations of international law and the sovereign rights of EU Member States, need to be addressed;

I.whereas the EU, its Member States and the US face similar, sustained hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns and other attempts to influence the democratic functioning of our countries, including through election interference;

J.whereas the profound economic interdependence between the EU and the United States, constituting the largest trade and investment partnership globally, remains a vital driver of worldwide economic stability and growth; whereas the EU-US goods and services trade relationship is balanced, with the difference between EU exports to the United States and US exports to the EU standing at EUR 48 billion in 2023, amounting to only 3 % of the total trade between the EU and the United States;

K.whereas on 27 July 2025, the EU and the United States reached a deal on tariffs in Turnberry; whereas on 21 August 2025, the details of this arrangement were made public through a joint statement on a United States-European Union framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade (the ‘Framework Agreement’); whereas this joint statement was followed by the presentation by the Commission of two legislative proposals aimed at reducing tariffs on imports from the United States and a prolongation of the lobster deal;

L.whereas in 2023 the EU adopted a Regulation on the protection of the EU and its Member States from economic coercion, enabling the EU to deter coercion, and if necessary, to respond to it;

M.whereas achieving strategic autonomy requires the EU to reduce dependencies on authoritarian regimes and to cooperate closely with the United States in enhancing the EU’s economic security and pursuing a coordinated response to unfair trading practices;

EU-US strategic partnership

1.Emphasises the importance of a more coordinated, coherent and forward-looking approach to the transatlantic partnership in the face of current bilateral uncertainties, focusing on common objectives in order to build a resilient and predictable relationship capable of responding effectively to evolving global realities and emerging challenges and threats; notes that the relationship should build strategically on the EU’s own strengths and capabilities, while reducing its vulnerabilities and dependencies;

2.Calls for additional and deepened strategic dialogues between the EU and United States to address key turning points and challenges in the relationship with a particular emphasis on trade, security and defence, technology, energy and emerging geopolitical threats, as well as critical areas such as the rule of law, societal resilience and protection of the environment, while also extending coordination with subnational and non-governmental actors; highlights that the transatlantic partnership constitutes the core of the community of democracies and remains crucial for maintaining the liberal world order, while at the same time acknowledging the need to enhance EU strategic autonomy to ensure resilience at a time of changing US foreign policy;

3.Acknowledges the historic and ongoing American leadership role in global affairs, which has been based on unwavering US support for security on the European continent and US presence in international organisations, and important US contributions to multilateral cooperation; calls for the EU to continue its dialogue and partnership with the United States on common security interests, including through the continued US military presence in Europe, in particular on the eastern flank; firmly believes that, given the persistent threat from malign regimes, deepened transatlantic cooperation is strategically important and beneficial for both sides, provided it fully respects the EU’s sovereignty and strategic interests and that Europe also builds greater military capacity to act independently when necessary;

Multilateralism

4.Urges the EU, a staunch promoter of multilateralism, to assume greater strategic responsibility for and global leadership in multilateral cooperation; regrets the US’s retreat from its international commitments and from its support for international institutions and calls for the United States to maintain a strong presence in international organisations; urges close coordination between the EU and the United States to counter authoritarian influence within multilateral institutions, including the UN and the World Trade Organization (WTO); calls for joint efforts to ensure that democratic states maintain leading roles in setting global norms;

Cooperation on foreign affairs

5. Highlights the need to significantly strengthen consultation, cooperation and contingency planning for joint responses to geopolitical developments and escalating situations; welcomes the important role of the United States in maintaining security and stability in the EU’s neighbourhood, including the Western Balkans, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, the South Caucasus region and the Middle East; highlights that the EU and the United States have a shared interest in countering the destabilising actions of malign foreign regimes in these countries, including interference in electoral processes;

6.Urges the continuation of the close coordination between the EU and the United States and their joint commitment to supporting Ukraine in its ongoing defence against Russian aggression, including through the predictable and timely supply of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine and the strengthening of sanctions frameworks against Russia, holding it accountable for its crime of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity; recognises Ukraine’s sovereignty as being of strategic importance for the security of Europe; underlines the need for common efforts in rebuilding Ukraine after the war; advocates, furthermore, for the use of Russia’s immobilised state and private assets to assist in Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; underlines the shared interest of the EU and the United States in the European integration of Ukraine;

7.Urges the US administration to strengthen its role and leadership in supporting Ukraine and confronting Russia in a consistent manner; expresses its concern about certain statements and initiatives by the US administration regarding Russia, such as the ‘Alaska summit’, and expresses its concern that such moves risk legitimising Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine; notes with concern the lack of proper transatlantic coordination on sanctions against Russia, which weakens the overall coherence and impact of EU restrictive measures aimed at countering Russian aggression; underlines the importance of the alignment of G7 countries, including the US, as regards the revision of the oil price cap agreed upon at EU level on 18 July 2025 as part of the EU’s 18th sanctions package; reiterates its repeated calls for the effective implementation of the sanctions imposed on Russia, and for Russia to fully withdraw its troops from all occupied territories and pay reparations for the damages caused by its war of aggression; maintains that the EU and its Member States, together with the United States and other partners and allies, must contribute to robust and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression;

8.Calls for the EU and the United States to deepen their cooperation in countering the Russian shadow fleet, and stresses the need for coordinated measures to enhance maritime security, enforce sanctions effectively and prevent circumvention practices;

9.Notes the efforts made by the US administration towards ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; stresses, however, that such negotiations must be preceded by an unconditional ceasefire; underlines that any peace must be just and sustainable, in full respect of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; reiterates that only Ukraine can determine the terms of a peace agreement acceptable to its people; insists that both Ukraine and the EU need to be present and fully involved in any talks about the future and security of Ukraine and the European continent;

10.Reiterates the importance of the EU-US strategic partnership and cooperation in the Western Balkans with the aim of securing peace and stability in the region, which is essential to the stability of the whole European continent, by supporting the countries on their Euro-Atlantic integration path and addressing issues in the region such as electoral and constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, as well as by opposing secessionist policies; stresses the importance of EU-US cooperation in preserving peace and security in southeast Europe and encourages all EU Member States to contribute to the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s KFOR mission in Kosovo;

11.Welcomes the signing of the joint declaration between the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United States as a crucial milestone in the normalisation process and encourages EU-US cooperation in the related infrastructure project;

12.Reiterates joint EU-US condemnation of Iran’s malign and hostile influence and destabilising actions in the Middle East, including its support for the despicable terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas against Israel, as well as Iran’s active support for the Russian war effort against Ukraine and for terrorism and destabilising actions around the world; underlines the immense danger that the Iranian nuclear programme constitutes to global security; calls for increased cooperation on counter-terrorism;

13.Welcomes the recent commitment to ending the war in Gaza and takes note of the 20-point peace plan proposed by the US administration, which now must be fully implemented and protected against any attempts by regional actors to undermine it; welcomes the release of all Israeli hostages kept by Hamas and the resumption of humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza; underlines that while the plan constitutes a crucial first step toward ending the dispute, several challenges remain, in particular concerning enforcement, governance, accountability and maintaining trust; underlines that the full disarmament of Hamas, its exclusion from any form of governance in Gaza and the withdrawal of Israeli forces remain central goals for any further steps; calls for the EU to play an active role in shaping the peace and reconstruction process in close coordination with key regional actors; reiterates that the objective must continue to be a negotiated two-state solution, in line with international law, as the only viable path to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, with the Israeli and Palestinian people living side by side in peace and security;

14.Reiterates the importance of jointly continuing and enhancing the fight against Daesh in the Middle East, especially given the current transitional period in Syria; welcomes the parallel lifting of sectoral sanctions against Syria by the United States and the EU as well as the ongoing work on updating UN sanctions; urges the United States to consider the impact its sudden withdrawal from Syria would entail for security in the region and beyond and to refrain from such a course of action in this context;

15.Calls for the EU and the United States, together with like-minded partners, to jointly address the multifaceted challenge posed by China, underlining the need for a comprehensive and well-coordinated transatlantic strategy that recognises China as an increasingly more assertive strategic competitor, including by jointly countering Chinese espionage and influence operations, while continuing to provide support for Taiwan’s democracy by coordination on issues such as joint freedom of navigation exercises in the region, civil-military cooperation, civil protection and disaster management; underlines the need to work together with regional partners to ensure freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China and East China Seas, as well as to enhance efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral actions, in particular when based on the threat or use of force, which undermine cross-Strait peace and stability;

16.Notes that China is a critical enabler and supporter of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and therefore urges China to halt the transit to Russia of dual-use items that are under EU and US sanctions due to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; highlights China’s increasingly assertive geopolitical and economic approach, including its growing presence in the EU’s neighbourhood, and points out to the need for the EU and United States to jointly address socio-political and security threats related to this growing influence;

17.Stresses the need for reinforced transatlantic cooperation between the EU and the United States to jointly address the growing distortions to global trade caused by unfair practices, notably those of China; acknowledges the significance of EU-US collaboration in responding to China’s export restrictions on rare minerals that are essential for green and high-end technologies;

18. Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the United States in the Arctic region, recognising its growing geopolitical, environmental and economic importance; underlines the need for coordinated action to ensure the Arctic remains a zone of peace, stability and constructive international dialogue; calls on the Commission and the Member States to build on the EU’s Arctic strategy and to upgrade it focusing on deterrence and defence plans, including freedom of navigation and provisions for addressing aggressive moves by state actors; condemns any attempts at unlawful interference in the internal affairs of the EU Member States, in particular those related to the jurisdiction of Greenland, as made in previous statements by the US administration; expresses, once again, the EU’s full solidarity and unwavering support for Greenland and its territorial integrity;

Security cooperation

19.Stresses the need for the EU to remain vigilant, well-prepared and ready to adapt to all possible contingencies, building on the lessons learned from EU vulnerabilities in areas such as defence and security, cybersecurity and digital services, in order to protect and promote its interests within the transatlantic partnership;

20.Stresses that Europe must be capable of ensuring its own security and defence policies, and thus calls for the EU to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and EU-NATO cooperation, enhance its defence capabilities and strengthen the common security and defence policy while maintaining close cooperation with the United States and its key allies;

21.Emphasises the indispensable and continuing role of the United States in NATO leadership and collective security efforts, reaffirming strong support for NATO as the foundational institution of transatlantic defence and deterrence, particularly in countering aggression and destabilising actions by Russia and other totalitarian regimes such as Iran, Belarus and North Korea, and in addressing all activities undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of EU Member States; recognises NATO’s role in promoting peace and stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic area; stresses the urgent need to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank along the borders with Russia and Belarus through enhanced military presence, joint exercises and rapid response capabilities to ensure robust deterrence against Russian aggression;

22.Supports and encourages increased European defence spending and initiatives that are fully aligned with NATO objectives, including efforts to build a more capable and credible European pillar within the Alliance; underlines the importance of fairer burden-sharing and the need for Europe to take on greater responsibility for security on the European continent which requires the EU to strengthen its own defence capabilities and strategic decision-making autonomy; in this regard, highlights the need for the coordination of European industrial defence policies and cooperation among industries in order to make European defence more autonomous, more competitive and less dependent on non-EU countries; insists on the importance of the notion of European preference;

23.Calls for the EU and United States to enhance coordination on arms export controls to prevent the transfer of dual-use goods and technologies to authoritarian regimes;

24. Urges enhanced coordination between the EU and the United States on cybersecurity and resilience against state-sponsored cyberattacks as well as deepened cooperation in the fight against hybrid threats, including acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure and disinformation campaigns; stresses that EU-US cooperation is all the more important as hybrid threats aim to destabilise our democratic systems and therefore directly threaten the values and the very foundations of the EU and the United States; calls for the reinforcement of intelligence sharing and the sustained exchange of information and best practice, enhanced support for independent journalism and civil society groups in frontline states as well as coordinated actions aimed at exposing and countering campaigns and operations that erode public trust in institutions and democracy as a whole, or that attempt to influence the results of democratic elections;

25. Highlights the importance of close EU-US cooperation on maritime security, including the protection of critical sea lanes, the fight against illicit trafficking and hybrid threats, and the upholding of international law at sea, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea; calls furthermore for the United States and the EU to step up their cooperation and coordination in the fight against organised crime, in particular drug trafficking;

26. Reaffirms that closer EU-US cooperation in the field of space, a strategic domain that serves as an enabler for both economic growth and security and defence objectives, is paramount; calls for increased investment in EU space capabilities and the further deepening of the EU-US Space Dialogue to jointly address shared technological, environmental, and geopolitical challenges;

EU-US trade relations

27. Recalls that the EU-US economic, trade and investment relationship is the largest in the world, with over USD 1 trillion worth of goods and services exchanged annually; further recalls that it significantly shapes, defines and impacts the global and rules-based trading system, and is a key driver of global economic stability; stresses that the EU-US trade relationship is almost evenly distributed between exchanges of goods and services, and opposes the view that only goods should be taken into account when determining the trade balance;

28. Highlights that the United States and the EU are each other’s primary source of and destination for foreign direct investment, with EUR 5.3 trillion worth of investments in each other’s markets; highlights that EU-headquartered companies have invested a total of USD 2.4 trillion in the United States; highlights that the transatlantic economy supports 16 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic and that US exports of goods and services to the EU support 2.3 million jobs in the United States and EU firms’ investments in the United States serve to employ 3.4 million people directly; encourages both sides to work towards the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, and to resolve any trade disputes through dialogue and cooperation;

29. Underlines the strategic trade partnerships the EU holds with a number of US allies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan; notes that the EU-US trade relationship has a direct impact on a number of other strategic relationships, including with allies, and therefore supports all efforts that enable a predictable trade environment for both companies and consumers;

30. Stresses that while diversifying trade routes and seeking new partnerships with like-minded partners is welcome and necessary, close trading relations with the United States cannot be neglected or replaced, as the bilateral EU-US partnership is unparalleled on a global scale;

31. Emphasises that a balanced and cooperative transatlantic trade relationship is in the common interest of citizens and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic; calls for de-escalation and notes that any further escalation of transatlantic trade tensions could have a negative impact on the Member States’ ability to efficiently achieve their defence spending targets;

32. Recalls that the tariffs imposed by the Unites States on European goods undermine trust in transatlantic economic cooperation; further stresses that baseline tariffs have a major negative impact on both European and US enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as on citizens and consumers, as they increase the cost of living, disrupt supply chains and ultimately weaken the resilience and competitiveness of our economies on both sides of the Atlantic;

33. Takes note of the outcome of the Turnberry meeting of 27 July 2025 as well as the joint statement of 21 August 2025; notes that the deal was concluded without any formal mandate and will not constitute a precedent for trade negotiations in the future; stresses that the resulting deal should be seen as temporary and exceptional with regard to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); notes the US commitment for tariffs, including the most favoured nation (MFN) tariff, not to exceed 15 % for selected Section 232 investigations, and the US commitment to reduce tariffs on EU cars and car parts retroactively from 1 August 2025, following the timely adoption of the legislative proposals initiating the agreement’s implementation; emphasises that this agreement could represent a first step towards restoring trust in transatlantic trade and could be viewed as an initial step towards a broader, more ambitious and balanced partnership; expresses particular concern at the expansion of the 50 % US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium to cover an additional 407 derivative products following the Turnberry meeting; stresses that this expansion risks disproportionately affecting EU SMEs and downstream industries, undermining their competitiveness in the US market and leading to a potential long-term loss of market share;

34. Regrets that the commitments resulting from the joint statement are neither reciprocal, fair, nor balanced; regrets that the deal, while offering short-term predictability, produces imbalances and dependencies that undermine the EU’s long-term economic autonomy and resilience; highlights that, while the Commission has committed the EU to eliminating tariffs on all US industrial goods and granting preferential market access for a wide range of US seafood and agricultural products, the United States will maintain a baseline tariff of 15 % on most EU products and will continue to apply MFN tariffs exceeding 15 %; deplores, furthermore, the fact that US agricultural exports are granted preferential access to the EU market, while EU exports face higher duties in the US;

35. Calls on the Commission and the US administration to take swift and concrete steps to follow up on the commitments outlined in the joint statement on the Framework Agreement to further expand the scope of EU-US trade relations over time to cover additional areas and to continue to improve market access and increase the EU-US trade and investment relationship; highlights the urgent need for further progress regarding fair conditions for EU exports of steel and aluminium, noting that without tariff relief, US exports of these products would enter the EU tariff-free, while EU exports of the same products would face a 50 % tariff;

36. Notes that there is no standstill clause in the deal and that stability and predictability are not properly guaranteed; supports, nevertheless, the Commission’s efforts to continue to work with the US administration to improve the tariff situation from July 2025; believes that negotiations should include a standstill clause to protect the EU from future tariffs resulting from Section 232 investigations or other types of tariffs; further calls on the Commission to do its utmost to also ensure that agri-food products from the EU be excluded from the scope of the 15 % tariff that the United States applies to most European exports; regrets that the joint statement is of an indefinite nature and does not include any review clause or mechanism that may be activated when the letter or the spirit of the agreement is not respected by either party;

37. Stresses that EU commitments cannot be open-ended, and that the elimination of tariffs on US industrial goods and the preferential treatment granted by the EU must be conditional on the United States implementing its commitments, including additional tariff relief, particularly for steel, aluminium, copper, wine and spirits; underlines that renewal of the EU regulations implementing the agreement, if adopted, should occur at regular intervals, under strict conditions, and following impact assessments; demands that, in the event of additional new tariffs or the expansion of the existing ones, the Commission respond firmly by announcing tailored countermeasures, engaging in time-bound negotiations and, with the support of Member States, applying the announced countermeasures in the event of unsuccessful negotiations;

38. Considers that the ‘pause’ on the ‘baseline’ tariffs did not warrant a delay in the application of EU countermeasures on steel and aluminium prior to the Turnberry meeting; notes that the EU did not proceed with rebalancing measures regarding US steel and aluminium tariffs, even after these were doubled by the United States on 3 June 2025; stresses the importance of the EU maintaining a credible list of rebalancing measures as leverage in the ongoing negotiations; considers that the second list of rebalancing measures should also have been prepared before the deadline of 8 July 2025 when the US ‘pause’ was set to expire;

39. Underlines that the EU cannot accept extortive policies; stresses that, in the event of actions or threats to impose tariffs and export restrictions on the EU, including against digital legislation, the Commission should immediately react by making full use of its trade toolbox, including the Anti-Coercion Instrument;

40. Reaffirms the importance of anchoring EU-US economic relations in a multilateral framework that respects the principles and rules of the WTO; stresses that a comprehensive, balanced and mutually beneficial free trade agreement covering substantially all trade would be compatible with Article XXIV of the GATT; notes, however, that the conditions for such an agreement are not met at the current time;

41. Underlines that, in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting emergency in international relations, the EU has been compelled to adopt exceptional and temporary measures; notes that such measures are justified under Article XXI of the GATT on security exceptions and reflect the need to strengthen EU-US cooperation across all fields;

42. Firmly believes that there continues to be ample room for a positive EU-US trade agenda that would help shape global standards, expand market access, reinforce economic security, tackle global non-market overcapacity, decarbonise industries, support sustainable development, address unfair trading practices and reinvigorate the rules-based trading system;

43. Welcomes the commitment in the joint statement to intensify EU-US dialogue to jointly address global overcapacity in steel and aluminium and their derivatives, and to work towards a lasting solution that guarantees fair and balanced export conditions for European producers of steel and aluminium;

Sectoral cooperation

44. Highlights the need to preserve and strengthen EU regulatory autonomy, urging full respect for the EU’s sovereign decision-making processes and institutional integrity; remains committed to reinforcing the accountability and resilience of our democratic systems;

45. Underscores that, while regulatory cooperation can be beneficial in improving the design and implementation of public policies and holds significant potential for mutual benefit, the EU’s sovereign and democratic right to regulate, and the EU acquis, cannot be part of any negotiations with the United States;

46. Reaffirms in the strongest terms its firm stance in defence of all legislation adopted at EU level in relation to digital matters or very large online platforms, in particular the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), whose undisputable legitimacy stems from EU co-legislators acting on behalf of Europeans and which are not a matter for negotiation with non-EU countries; calls once again for the DSA and the DMA to be applied in full;

47. Stresses the importance of close EU-US cooperation on economic security, and underlines the need for joint efforts to address supply chain resilience, critical technologies and economic coercion to safeguard shared interests;

48. Encourages intensified cooperation in technological innovation, including the development and deployment of strategic and emerging technologies, such as advanced manufacturing, dual-use technologies, AI and quantum computing, as well as enhanced coordination related to the democratic and global convergence on frontier technologies; calls for measures to enhance economic resilience by improving the flow of cutting-edge technological resources between the EU and the United States, creating appropriate standards for the safety of these technologies and strengthening related supply chains, in full respect of each other’s regulatory autonomy, as well as fundamental rights including data protection; stresses that technological cooperation with the United States must include robust safeguards to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies to adversaries, particularly via third-party re-export or dual-use loopholes; urges enhanced transatlantic screening mechanisms;

49. Calls on the United States to rejoin the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce to facilitate electronic commerce, ensuring an open environment for digital trade and promoting trust in e-commerce, thus safeguarding continued cooperation and promoting the free and rules-based flow of data;

50. Stresses the importance of maintaining and strengthening close coordination in the field of energy security, particularly on cooperation in the development and promotion of clean energy solutions, and recognises the need to reduce geoeconomic dependencies on global rivals, in particular to avoid Russia’s economic coercion by accelerating energy diversification and phasing out Russian fossil fuels including liquified natural gas (LNG); highlights that 48 % of Europe’s LNG supplies come from the United States; highlights that Europe accounts for 55 % of global US LNG exports

51. Regrets that the Framework Agreement’s investment and procurement provisions risk undermining the EU’s open strategic autonomy; underlines that, in the light of the pressing need for the EU to wean itself off Russian energy imports, the United States is a natural partner for increased energy imports; underlines, however, that the commitment to procure USD 750 billion worth of US energy products should not lead to a new dependency and stresses that EU-US energy cooperation should be consistent with the EU’s decarbonisation objectives; notes that the total volume of investments will ultimately be determined by market operators; stresses that the commitments on chips used in artificial intelligence (AI) computing and military equipment purchases should not create undue over-reliance on US suppliers in critical sectors; stresses that these procurement pledges risk being incompatible with the EU’s trade policy objectives of diversifying trading partnerships and enhancing supply chain resilience; calls on the Commission to prioritise balanced trade and investment relationships that strengthen the EU’s economic competitiveness rather than institutionalising commercial dependencies;

52. Welcomes the mutual commitment by the EU and the United States to enhance coordination and joint action in response to export restrictions imposed by certain countries on critical minerals and other strategically important resources; stresses that this cooperation will reinforce supply chain security and economic resilience;

53. Calls for reinforced EU-US cooperation on the development of resilient energy corridors, thus contributing to European energy security;

54. Expresses concern about the US’s decision not to implement the OECD global tax agreement, underlining that such unilateral decisions risk undermining the credibility of the shared commitment to a rules-based global economic order; believes that a coordinated international scheme on fair taxation is instrumental to making the global economy more equitable and sustainable;

55. Calls for deeper and more concrete cooperation with the United States on key aspects of economic security, particularly on semiconductors and other critical technologies, including aligning export controls and standards, jointly building and monitoring resilient supply chains, safeguarding strategic assets and critical technologies from hostile actors and developing shared systems to detect and respond to supply chain disruptions while limiting critical dependencies on the United States;

56. Calls for the pursuit of new sectoral trade agreements to address emerging sectors and challenges; notes that more targeted agreements focusing on key industries would strengthen the transatlantic dialogue and offer an effective, high-level platform for coordinating approaches to major global trade, economic and technological issues; underlines the potential benefits of a digital trade agreement between the EU and the United States, drawing inspiration from the Digital Trade Agreement recently concluded between the EU and Singapore;

57. Stresses the importance of revitalising the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), launched in 2021, which has enhanced dialogue and the exchange of best practices in trade and digital spheres and green trade, and delivered concrete outcomes such as administrative tools, mutual recognition arrangements, technical roadmaps and agreed standards, such as a joint roadmap on AI, and technical alignment to enable seamless digital invoicing between EU and US businesses; calls for the TTC to be granted an expanded mandate to include areas such as supply chain resilience and/or data governance and to enable further cooperation with international bodies to effectively translate outcomes into tangible policy changes while respecting each other’s regulatory sovereignty;

58. Affirms the importance of re-establishing technical-level dialogue to maintain uninterrupted communication and swiftly address emerging issues in transatlantic relations;

Democratic values, parliamentary diplomacy and the involvement of stakeholders

59. Underlines the importance of a genuine partnership of equals between the EU and the United States, grounded in shared democratic values and common strategic interests; reiterates that the EU remains committed to these principles, as well as to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide, particularly given the growing authoritarian pressures and emerging global threats to the international order; reiterates the EU’s strong and unwavering stance against the death penalty and appeals to the United States to abolish the death penalty; highlights the importance of continuing to provide development aid in promoting and upholding the aforementioned values and standards; recognises the challenges posed by current US foreign policy; in that context, reiterates the importance for the EU of strategically empowering itself in order to protect its core interests and values; expresses its concerns about attempts by some US figures to openly interfere in domestic political life of EU Member States; highlights, furthermore, the shared interest of the EU and the United States in promoting stability, prosperity and the rule of law in the EU’s neighbourhood;

60. Expresses concerns about the withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the scaling down of US development programmes, which has created significant financing gaps in essential services, regrets that this policy shift has also affected democratic actors within the EU, including NGOs and outlets such as Radio Free Europe; highlights the importance of close dialogue between the United States and the EU in order to realise the joint objectives of fostering democracy, development and prosperity;

61. Notes with concern that the volatile decision-making climate in the United States, particularly regarding trade and foreign policy, as well as the marked evolution of rhetoric regarding the EU, are already having tangible effects on transatlantic people-to-people contacts and business activities;

62. Stresses the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the International Criminal Court (ICC); expresses its profound concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

63. Highlights the importance of enhancing and diversifying communication channels with the United States; recalls the central role of parliamentary diplomacy as illustrated by the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue; calls for stronger engagement between the European Parliament and the United States Congress through enhanced dialogue and regular interparliamentary meetings, encourages the House of Representatives to establish a standing congressional delegation for the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue; recalls the prerogative of the European Parliament and the United States Congress to independently scrutinise their respective executives’ policies, upholding accountability and transparency as a core democratic function; calls for increased exchange with the United States Congress and other relevant US stakeholders and for the development of new dialogue and exchange formats to be considered in areas such as trade and technology, connectivity and cybersecurity which could complement and extend existing initiatives; emphasises the need for the EU also to engage in dialogue at the level of the US states; underlines the importance of establishing staff-level exchange programmes between the European Parliament and the United States Congress to promote the sharing of best practice and to strengthen institutional understanding; emphasises, furthermore, the critical role of the European Parliament Liaison Office in Washington in fostering transatlantic relations and enhancing the connection between the US and EU parliaments;

64. Calls for both the EU and the United States to significantly enhance their public outreach and communication strategies to raise awareness and increase understanding of the transatlantic partnership among citizens and stakeholders, promoting engagement beyond the federal level in the US by involving state authorities, with governors’ offices, state assemblies and other bodies that can support the development of such cooperation;

65. Calls for increased EU support for think tanks, civil society, academia, social partners and other non-governmental stakeholders in order to enhance public understanding and foster informed debate on transatlantic relations; calls for the promotion of academic exchanges between students and researchers from the United States and the EU, in order to ensure that current and future generations remain committed to this partnership, that young Americans gain a better understanding of Europe, become familiar with our way of life, culture and interests, and are aware of the importance of the transatlantic bond; also calls for the promotion of cultural exchanges, including apprenticeships and scientific fellowships, to build a strong, lasting transatlantic community;

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66.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of the European Union, the Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the United States Congress.