Changes from plenary report to adopted text

RemovedDRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

AddedP10_TA(2025)0330

Changedon the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasingPhasing out Russian natural gas imports,imports and improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

Removed(COM(2025)0828 – C100123/2025 – 2025/0180(COD))

AddedCommittee on International Trade, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

AddedPE775.677

AddedEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 17 December 2025 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 (COM(2025)0828 – C10-0123/2025 – 2025/0180(COD))

▸5 unchanged paragraphs

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0828),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 194(2) and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C100123/2025),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Removed– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

Added– having regard to the reasoned opinions submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Hungarian Parliament and the Slovak Parliament, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

Changed– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of the18 Regions,September 2025,

Change 1

Added– after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

Added– having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committees responsible under Rule 75(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 10 December 2025 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection,

Added– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0195/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

Change 2

Added2. Takes note of the statement by the Commission annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the L series of the Official Journal of the European Union together with the final legislative act;

3. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Change 3

RemovedAMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT*

AddedP10_TC1-COD(2025)0180

Removedto the Commission proposal

AddedPosition of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 17 December 2025 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2026/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on phasing out Russian natural gas imports and preparing the phase-out of Russian oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

Removed---------------------------------------------------------

Added(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2026/261.)

Removed2025/0180 (COD)

AddedANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

RemovedProposal for a

AddedStatement from the European Commission on future action regarding Russian oil

RemovedREGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

AddedIn order to avoid essential security risks and energy dependencies resulting from continued energy trade with the Russian Federation, the European Commission remains committed to ensuring the phase out of all remaining oil imports from the Russian Federation by end of 2027, in line with the Versailles Declaration.

Removedon phasing out Russian natural gas and oil imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

AddedThe Commission intends to table a legislative proposal at the beginning of 2026 to ban oil imports from the Russian Federation as soon as possible, but not later than by end 2027.

RemovedTHE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

AddedThe Commission will carefully assess the potential impact of an accelerated termination of oil imports on the security of supply, economy and competitiveness of the most affected Member States.

RemovedHaving regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 194(2) and 207 thereof,

AddedThe Commission will work actively, in a spirit of solidarity, with the directly affected and other relevant Member States, in order to identify appropriate measures to minimise possible risks identified in the assessment, facilitating access to alternative supplies.

RemovedHaving regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

RemovedAfter transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,

RemovedHaving regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,

RemovedActing in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

RemovedWhereas:

Removed(1) The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas on markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, Heads of States therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8 March 2022 and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 2022 proposed concrete measures to allow the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process to diversify gas supplies away from Russia was achieved since then. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, the Commission announced in its REPower Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports of 6 May 2025 a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for energy dependencies. In order to achieve full independence from Russian energy imports, it is equally urgent to phase-out Russian nuclear energy imports, in line with the REPowerEU Plan.

Removed(2) Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, show that the Russian Federation systematically used existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies as a political weapon to harm the Union’s economy. This leads to serious negative effects on Member States single market stability, the Union’s consumers, and the Union’s economic security and competitiveness in general. The Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by the Union.

Removed(3) In January 2006, Russia stopped its natural gas supplies to Bulgaria and other countries in South East Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices increases and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, Russia again fully cut off gas transiting through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. The supply disruption led to serious disturbances of gas markets in the region and the whole of the Union. Some Member States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing lasting shutdowns of heating in schools and factories, and requiring them to declare the state of emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea, ceased Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several Member States which had announced to supply Ukraine with gas, leading to market disturbances and price increases and harming economic security. In the past, Russia’s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom has been the subject to several Commission investigations for a possible breach of the EU competition rules and has subsequently modified its conduct on the market to address the Commission’s competition concerns. ▌The competition issues at stake concerned, in several cases, so-called ‘territorial restrictions’ in Gazprom’s gas supply contracts, prohibiting the resale of gas outside the own country, as well as evidence that Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies dependent on political concessions from participation in Russian pipeline projects or acquiring control over Union energy assets.

Removed(4) Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine since February 2022 and subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the clear potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas market, the Union’s economy and its essential security interests, as well as direct harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens’ health or life. Evidence shows that the State-controlled company Gazprom intentionally manipulated the Union’s energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at an unprecedentedly low level, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs and fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, affecting short-term markets and aggravating the already tight supply situation after Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, Russia systematically halted or reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant disturbances on the Union gas market. This affected notably the supplies to the Union via the Yamal pipeline, the supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut supplies via the pipeline entirely.

Removed(5) Russia’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching unprecedented levels, up to eight times above the average of previous years, in 2022. The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the Union’s gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented price hikes in 2022.

Removed(6) The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the high energy prices and volatility, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, particularly in energy, leading to risks for social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health. The supply interruptions also led to very seriously problems for the security of energy supply in the Union and forced eleven Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, Russia’s manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from remaining energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports accounting still for EUR 15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks against the Union, undermining economic security. They could also be used to finance the war of aggression against the Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to political and economic stability in Europe.

Removed(7) The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are crucial to preserve market stability, to protect human life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, not the least because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries. Maintaining energy supplies from Russia would expose the Union to continued economic and security risks; it would therefore not increase but decrease its supply security. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused by Russia, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if just temporarily, and disrupt energy markets, especially in those regions which are still significantly reliant on imports from Russia. Taking into account the long standing and consistent pattern of market manipulations and supply disruptions, and the fact that the Russian government has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy instead of trade goals, it is therefore appropriate to take legally binding measures to eliminate all remaining vulnerabilities of the Union resulting from natural gas imports both via pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) with the Russian Federation.

Removed(7a) In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably oil supplies. Russia has a history of using oil as a means of exerting coercion and manipulation. For example, in July 2006, Russia’s oil pipeline monopoly, Transneft, permanently halted deliveries, citing alleged technical reasons, to Lithuania’s Mazeikiai refinery, the largest economic entity in the country, and the only refinery in the Baltic states. This move appeared to be a response to the Polish company PKN Orlen acquiring a majority stake in the refinery, instead of Russian firms Lukoil or Rosneft. In addition, in April 2019, amidst deteriorating relations between Russia and Belarus, mounting Russian economic pressure on Ukraine, and growing tensions with several Central European countries, the chloride contamination of 5 million tonnes of Russian oil transported through the “Druzhba” pipeline caused severe disruption. The incident caused significant damage to the Mozyr refinery in Belarus, led to the suspension of deliveries to Poland and Ukraine, and forced the shutdown of refineries in Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which lasted many weeks. It is also imperative to close loopholes that allow the indirect import of Russian oil in the form of refined products, such as gasoline, via third countries. For example, certain countries have emerged as major exporters of refined oil products to the European Union, largely due to a significant increase in their imports of discounted Russian crude for processing in their refineries.

Removed(7b) In order to prevent Russia from continuing to use the Union’s oil imports as a tool for coercion and to cease further disruption to the internal market arising from such coercion, it is essential to complement existing measures with a permanent prohibition of oil imports from the Russian Federation from 1 January 2026. These measures should also include a ban on the import of refined oil products derived from crude oil of Russian origin. While the impact on the internal market is expected to be stabilising, the impact on prices is expected to be minimal. As crude oil is traded globally, the additional seaborne supply needed to replace Druzhba pipeline volumes (about 11.4 mt/year) represents only 0.5% of global seaborne trade, an amount that is unlikely to affect prices significantly. Czechia’s shift from Russian to seaborne crude in April 2025 (approx. 4.3 mt/year) had no noticeable effect on international prices. While oil imports have decreased significantly, a further phase out of Russian oil is fully feasible for countries who are still supplying Russian oil, but may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with neighbouring countries. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to adopt decisions on those plans.

Removed(8) The restrictions on international transactions provided for in ▌of this Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent years and particularly since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed, by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, not to accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore, the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import of goods of the territory of the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such measures, taken in time of the existing emergency in international relations between the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the Union’s essential security interests.

Removed(8a) In order to safeguard the Union’s security of gas supply and prevent circumvention of the prohibition on the import of Russian natural gas, the scope of that prohibition should also extend to the temporary storage of Russian origin gas in the EU storage facilities located on the territory of the Union. The Union’s gas storage facilities are critical security assets, covering some 30% of winter consumption across the Union. Well-filled storage facilities, along with voluntary demand reduction, have proven essential in periods of tight supply and market stress. Past instances of gas storage hoarding have further led to substantial market distortions, increased prices, and threats to critical security measures. Allowing third-country entities to book capacity to temporarily store Russian origin gas in the Union for later withdrawal or re-export undermines the Union’s objective to phase out dependency on Russian fossil fuels and uses up capacity needed for ensuring the Union’s energy security. For the purposes of achieving the goals of this Regulation, temporary storage of Russian gas should therefore be prohibited.