Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Removed17. Deplores the issues of poor administration, especially in the area of human resources, with serious irregularities, particularly in appointment and selection procedures in breach of Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants; is aware that during the period from 2019 to 2022, the Agency faced challenging circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, or the entry into force of the EUAA Regulation with a new mandate, competences, and responsibilities; rejects however any attempt to use such circumstances as justification for non-compliance with binding legislation ; calls the Agency to fully align its recruitment processes with the applicable rules, and insists on the adoption of strict, transparent, and merit-based procedures, accompanied by enforceable guidelines and subject to close oversight by the discharge authority;

AddedBudgetary and Financial Management

Removed18. Welcomes that the practice of appointing managers ad interim has been discontinued as from January 2023;

Added19. Notes that the total final revenue for 2023 (after amending budgets) and the comparative figures for 2022 for the 33 EU agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown :

Removed19. Recalls that one of the core duties of the Management Board is to give general orientation for the Agency’s activities and to ensure that the Agency fullfil its mandate effectively; considers that in order to give general orientation the Management Board needs to be aware and duly informed of applicable legislation to the Agency as well as critical developments in the management of the Agency; deplores the repeated shortcomings in this regard and calls on the Agency to establish efficient, systematic and transparent communication procedures with the Management Board;

Added20. Highlights that the increase in the revenue from 2022 to 2023 has been significant in some agencies, representing 54,59 % for ESA, 20,86 % for Eurojust, 19,65 % for Frontex and 19,15 % for ACER; welcomes the increased financing for the law enforcing agencies;

Removed20. Calls on the European Commission, who has two seats on the Management Board, to actively support and assist other board members in their understanding of the rules applicable to the Agency, and to identify and disseminate the lessons learnt from this particular case as part of broader prevention efforts; calls on the Agency to report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken to improve communication with the Management Board;

Added21. Notes that in ESA the increase is mainly due to the continued development of the Nuclear Observatory and ESA Management of Information (NOEMI) IT system and the provision of accounting services to the agency; in Eurojust the increase is mainly due to the additional resources necessary to perform tasks added by three Commission proposals for regulations and the particularly severe impact of inflation ; in Frontex the budget increase aims to continue building the Standing Corps of border guards, including equipment ; in the case of ACER, the increase is mainly due to the additional tasks delegated in planned revised regulations on energy infrastructure and methane emissions reduction , the related annual remuneration indexation, higher legal expenses and a higher budget allocation derived from fees for specific projects;

Removed21. Welcomes the suggestion made by the Commission during the exchange of views on the possibility to share Joint Services in certain horizontal areas across the decentralised Agencies, as this would help to better manage processes and make a more efficient use of resources; encourages the Commission to explore this possibility and propose concrete actions in this regard;

Added22. Acknowledges the response to the written question indicating that Frontex’s carryovers (45 % in 2023) are linked to its operational cycle, which does not align with the calendar year and cannot be easily adjusted as it involves all Member States; is aware that the Commission’s political priorities and the expectations of Union citizens for security are the explanations applied to increase the Frontex budget; insists that it is essential to ensure adequate resources for the effective functioning of Frontex, while continuously assessing whether its budget is fit for purpose and delivers results; recalls the need to monitor progress on the agency’s absorption capacity, in particular through the recruitment of border and coast guard staff, emphasising the importance of sound planning to ensure its effectiveness; calls, in addition, on the EUAN to collaborate with the agencies and the Court to develop a standardised presentation of carryovers that better aligns with the annuality principle of the Financial Regulation;

Removed22. Calls on the Agency to establish an independent internal ethics function and emphasizes the importance of having robust whistle-blower protection rules in line with Directive (EU) 2019/1937; stresses that internal reporting channels must be confidential, credible and trusted by staff at all levels;

Added23. Recalls that the majority of EU agencies receive their funding entirely from contributions from the Union budget; notes, however, that some agencies are fully or partially financed through alternative sources of revenue, including certificates, authorisations, registration of substances, contributions, data collection, market surveillance, supervision and other services such as translation and terminology as provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT);

Removed23. Highlights that although some of the events date back to the years 2021, 2022 and earlier, the OLAF investigation was only concluded in 2024; emphasises that it cannot be yet concluded that these issues have been fully resolved; stresses that the Discharge Authority retains the full right to exercise its oversight responsibilities until the situation is entirely remedied and clarified; calls on the Executive Director and the Management Board to recognise and address any structural weaknesses in both the Agency’s human resources management and the Management Board’s oversight functions, and to take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of similar issues and reserves the right to withhold or condition future discharge decisions, should the Agency fail to deliver full structural reform;

Added24. Acknowledges, specifically, that:

Removed24. Notes with particular concern the extremely high staff turnover rates as mentioned in the OLAF report, without the management being able to provide a satisfactory explanation; calls on the Executive Director and the Management Board, and in particular the Commission representatives within it, to put in place systematic exit interviews with all resigning staff, to document the findings comprehensively, and to report to the discharge authority on the results and progress achieved in this regard in the framework of the 2024 discharge procedure;

Added– partially self-financed agencies include the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), European Medicines Agency (EMA);

Removed25. Commends the Agency's staff for their dedication and commitment in executing their tasks despite challenging circumstances; considers essential to foster a positive work environment by promoting good practices at the human resources level and rewarding merit-based performances; urges the Management Board and the Executive Director to ensure that the Agency is a safe and supportive workplace that encourages open communication and empowers individuals to speak up without fear of retaliation; calls on the Agency to ensure that all reports of professional misconduct are taken seriously and thoroughly investigated, with appropriate follow-up actions taken to maintain integrity and trust within the organisation;

Added– fully self-financed agencies include CdT; and

Removed°

Added– agencies partially co-financed by national public authorities include the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA);

Removed° °

Added25. Notes that for 2023 the source of finance for self-financed agencies that are part of this resolution had the following breakdown:

Removed26. Refers, for other observations, to its resolution of 7 May 2025 with observations forming an integral part of decisions on discharge in respect of the budget of the European Union agencies.

Added26. Takes note of the Court’s observation that the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) are legally required to identify and account separately for the costs of activities funded from own revenue; notes that these agencies have systems in place to comply with this requirement and notes that certain agencies such as EMA, EASA and ERA go beyond those requirements;

Added27. Observes that the founding regulations for the three European supervisory authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – with the exception of activities financed by supervisory fees) set out that, initially, the contributions they receive from national competent authorities should account for 60 % of their budgets, with the remaining 40 % coming from the Union budget; notes that this arrangement reflects the mix of regulatory tasks, which are suitable for EU funding and supervisory convergence tasks, which are appropriate for contributions from national competent authorities, in the mandates of the three authorities; highlights that, due to the absence of a clear delineation between the activities funded by the two sources in the founding regulations, these authorities do not differentiate between the costs covered by the Union budget subsidy and those covered by national contributions;

Added28. Calls on EBA, EIOPA and ESMA to develop this capacity to identify and separately account for the costs of activities generating each of their own revenue streams in order to improve their decision-making and the quality of information they provide to stakeholders as regards the deficits or surpluses that such activities produce;

Added29. Notes that CdT has a system in place to monitor the cost of each activity and product generating its own revenue, allowing it to calculate profits or losses; highlights that in 2023, 10 of the CdT’s 17 main products reported losses totalling EUR 3,4 million;

Added30. Underlines that over the last decade CdT experienced 7 years of budgetary deficits and 6 years of accounting losses due to declining volumes of business; takes note that, to address the fall in business volumes, CdT has been drawing on a special reserve that was established in 2011 to ensure budget and price stability; notes that this reserve peaked at EUR 15,6 million in 2014, subsequently dropped to EUR 10,3 million in 2022 and EUR 8,9 million in 2023; is aware that once the reserve is fully depleted, any further deficits would have to be covered by Union budget subsidies, as provided for by the CdT’s founding regulation; calls on CdT to report back to the discharge authority on its plans to mitigate the risks of business continuity;

Added31. Notes the need for agencies to improve financial reporting and internal control mechanisms; calls on agencies to provide on an annual basis a detailed breakdown of expenditures, including disaggregated data on external contracts, consultancy services and subcontractors; insists on the need for real-time digital reporting tools that improve financial oversight and accountability to the European Parliament and the public; encourages further progress in audit recommendations;

AddedMain risks identified by the Court

Added32. Notes the conclusion of the Court in its annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), that the Court’s audit had similar results as in the previous year (2022), with weaknesses in public procurement procedures having remained the main source of irregular payments;

Added33. Notes from the Court’s report that the overall risk to the reliability of agencies’ accounts, as established by applying the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer and based on international accounting standards, is generally low, as was the case in 2022;

Added34. Underlines that the Court considers the overall risk to the legality and regularity of revenue underlying the agencies’ accounts to be low for most agencies and to be medium for the partly self-financed agencies where specific regulations are applicable to collection of fees and other revenue contributions, as was the case in 2022;

Added35. Remarks that the Court considers the risk to the legality and regularity of payments underlying the agencies’ accounts overall to be medium, varying from low to high for specific budget titles; notes that the Court considers the risk for Title I (Staff Expenditure) to be generally low, for Title II (Administrative Expenditure) to be medium and for Title III (Operational Expenditure) to be low to high, depending on the agency in question and the nature of its operational expenditure; points out that the Court considers the risk as regards Title III similar to the risk of Title II, but since there are far higher amounts at stake under Title III, the impact is considered to be higher;

Added36. Is concerned that the Court, for the sixth year in a row, considers the risk to sound financial management to be medium and primarily associated with public procurement procedures that did not ensure that the best possible value for money was achieved;

Added37. Notes that the Court considers the risk to budget management to be low, with the Court’s audit showing high carryovers of committed appropriations;

Added38. Notes that, according to the Court’s report, the prevalent issues across the agencies were: i) Public procurement weaknesses, which remained the largest source of irregular payments; ii) Budgetary management challenges, such as excessive carryovers and late payments; iii) Internal control weaknesses, particularly in ensuring compliance with financial regulations and procedural guidelines;

AddedOverview of the audit results

Added39. Notes that the Court issued an unqualified audit opinion on the reliability of the accounts of all agencies; notes that the Court issued an unqualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the revenue underlying the accounts for all agencies; observes, however, that while an unqualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the payments underlying the accounts was issued for most agencies, exceptions were noted for four agencies: the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), the European Labour Authority (ELA), the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems (eu-LISA);

Added40. Observes that, for the EIT, the qualification concerns irregular grant payments, where EIT conducted ex post verification on a sample of 174 cost items; notes that EIT rejected costs related to 27 cost items and that the Court identified three additional cost items for which EIT could not provide evidence that beneficiaries met essential grant agreement conditions, resulting in an estimated total of EUR 12,2 million in irregular grant payments, corresponding to an estimated error rate of 3,4 %; notes that the EIT disputes one of the errors reported by the Court, affecting three cost items, which, in its opinion are eligible; notes furthermore that according to EIT, without this case, the estimated error rate reported by the Court would be below the 2 % materiality threshold, leading to a clean audit opinion on the legality and regularity of EIT’s payments;

Added41. Regrets that, concerning ELA, the qualification relates to payments amounting to EUR 1,6 million in 2023, representing 3,8 % of the total payment appropriations available; notes that this amount includes EUR 1,3 million related to a contract deemed irregular in the 2022 audit report due to the awarded value exceeding the established maximum contract limit and EUR 0,3 million associated with deficiencies in ex ante checks on contract implementation; takes note of ELA reply’s explaining that the irregular contract ended on February 2024 and was replaced by a new framework agreement established in November 2023; is aware of ELA’s decision to continue with the irregular contract temporarily to mitigate risks, protect its reputation and ensure uninterrupted service delivery, allowing it to maintain consistent operations and fulfil planned activities until the new agreement took effect;

Added42. Notes that, for ENISA, the qualification relates to irregular payments of EUR 1,8 million made in 2023, representing 4,1 % of the total payment appropriations available in 2023; recalls that in August 2022, ENISA received an additional EUR 15 million in its budget to provide enhanced cybersecurity support to Member States following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; further notes that in September 2022, ENISA initiated a procurement procedure with 28 lots and subsequently signed 28 separate framework contracts worth EUR 14,4 million; is aware that in early 2023, the management board made an exception to temporarily deviate from its financial regulations to meet revised cybersecurity support requests from Member States; takes note that according to ENISA’s reply, the management board’s decision constituted an exception (limited in time and scope) to respond to a particular exceptional situation in an extremely difficult international context; notes that this exception was duly registered as per application of ENISA’s Internal Control Framework and accordingly reported in the 2023 Consolidated Annual Activity Report;

Added43. Observes that, for eu-LISA, the qualification concerns irregular payments totalling EUR 12,6 million made in 2023, representing 3,2 % of total payment appropriations available including EUR 2,7 million for contracts audited in 2023 and EUR 9,9 million for contracts assessed as irregular in the 2022 audit report;

Added44. Notes with concern the recurrence of a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of eu-LISA’s payments, reflecting persistent issues raised by the Court in previous reports since 2020; takes note of the Court’s observation that most of the contracts affected by error have either expired or been terminated by eu-LISA in 2023;

Added45. Observes that the basis for a qualified opinion (eu-LISA) in 2023 included the following irregularities:

Added– framework Contract Irregularity: notes that eu-LISA made significant changes in some pricing elements of the financial offers of two tenderers, going beyond the corrections allowed under Article 151 of the Financial Regulation, directly affecting the tender’s outcome, with related payments totalling EUR 2,7 million in 2023;

Added– unjustified Negotiated Procedure: further notes the irregular payment of EUR 7,7 million connected to a framework contract awarded via a negotiated procedure without proper justification, contravening procurement standards;

Added– unauthorised Contract Amendment: observes that payments amounting to EUR 1,8 million were classified as irregular following an unauthorized amendment that increased the value of a fixed-price contract by EUR 3,6 million;

Added– non-compliance with Framework Contract Terms: notes with concern that payments of the framework contract for maintaining shared infrastructure totalling EUR 0,4 million were irregular, as the specific contract deviated from the framework contract;

Added46. Expresses deep concern over the recurrence of procurement issues that result in a qualified opinion for the fourth year in a row and urges eu-LISA to take immediate corrective action to address and prevent these problems in future financial management and procurement practices, ensuring full compliance with the Financial Regulation; calls for informing the European Parliament on the progress in question before 30 June 2025;

Added47. Welcomes that the Court, during the hearing , acknowledged that despite the opinion issued for 2023 (eu-LISA), the identified faults are being addressed and improvements have been noted;

Added48. Insists that although the Financial Regulation does not set ceilings for carryovers, recurrent and excessive levels of carryovers undermine the budgetary principle of annuality and are indicative of structural issues in the budget process and implementation cycle; notes that in 14 Agencies (ENISA, Eurofound, EIGE, eu-LISA, EMA, EUSPA, ELA, FRA, EFCA, ECDC, EU-OSHA, ACER, Frontex and ESA) the level of carryovers affecting all budget titles combined is higher than 15 %; notes that in the case of Frontex and ESA, carryovers reach more than 40 % and 50 % respectively;

Added49. Recalls that the regulatory framework mandates that agencies make payments within specific deadlines; notes that any failure to meet these deadlines may result in creditors being entitled to late-payment interest; observes that, for the year 2023, the Court reports that while the total amount of late-payment interest incurred was considered immaterial, it is noteworthy that nine agencies (ACER, ECDC, EEA, EUDA, ENISA, ERA, EU-OSHA, Eurojust and Frontex) frequently failed to meet their payment deadlines; asks the agencies in question to ensure adherence to legal time limits for payments; highlights that although the amount of late-payment interest incurred was minor, the high frequency of delayed payments may negatively impact the agencies’ reputations;

Added50. Highlights that the Court issued ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraphs to underline a matter presented or disclosed in the accounts which is of such importance that it is fundamental to the understanding of the accounts or the underlying revenue or payments; further notes that, for the 2023 financial year, the Court used ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraphs for the following agencies that are part of this resolution: CdT, EBA, EIT, EMA, ERA, ESMA, Eurojust, eu-LISA and Frontex;

Added51. Recalls that CdT provides disclosures in its financial statements on the decline in operating revenue, which has negatively affected its economic outcome;

Added52. Draws attention to disclosures in the annual accounts of ERA and Eurojust regarding the implementation of SUMMA ; notes that, throughout 2023, technical issues continued to contribute to a rise in late payments (50 % in 2023) and instances of non-compliance in Eurojust; notes that ERA experienced technical issues during the first trimester, though substantial improvements were made in comparison with 2022;

Added53. Notes that the accounts of ESMA and the EBA include a disclosure of uncertainty regarding the outcome of a lawsuit ; takes note that ESMA was formally notified of a legal case related to a joint procurement procedure where apart from ESMA, three other EU agencies participated (EBA, EIOPA and ERA); is aware that the procedure resulted in a framework contract worth EUR 40,2 million and by the end of 2023, ESMA and EBA had signed specific contracts totalling in ESMA EUR 2 185 226 and EUR 6 306 786 in the case of EBA;

Added54. Is concerned that the applicant is seeking annulment of a tender decision and monetary compensation ranging from EUR 400 000 to EUR 3,5 million; notes that due to the early stage of the proceedings, the management of both ESMA and EBA are unable to provide a reliable estimate of potential costs resulting from the case ;

Added55. Draws attention to the disclosure in ESMA’s accounts of an impairment of EUR 368 300, corresponding to outstanding fees from third-country supervised entities; notes that the impairment is linked to the fact that the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) does not provide ESMA with an effective mechanism for enforcing the collection of outstanding fees from outside the Union; welcomes that the recent co-legislators’ agreement to amend the regulation (EMIR 3) introduced the possibility for ESMA to withdraw recognition from third-country supervised entities that do not pay their fees;

Added56. Notes that the EBA’s accounts include disclosures on the significant impacts of the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) and the Markets in Crypto-assets Regulation (MiCAR) as regards the unfunded resources needed to set up the related tasks and implement an appropriate oversight and supervisory policy that took place in 2023 before fee collection could start; takes note that EBA had to reallocate resources to these preparatory activities;