Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Added– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2023,

Added– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

Removed– having regard to the functioning of the Common European Asylum System, the respect and proper implementation and enforcement of the rules and the sustainable and appropriate financial support of the EUAA are essential to ensure the system of shared responsibility and solidarity among the Member States of the European Union;

Added– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Fisheries, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

Changed– having regard to the OLAF Final Report (OC-2022-0717) on the European Union Agency for Asylum finalised in October 2024, and made available in March 2025 to Membersreport of the Committee on Budgetary Control,Control (A10-0065/2025),

Change 7

Removed– having regard to the letters sent by the Chair of EUAA in March 2025 and the Executive Director of European Union Agency for Asylum in July 2025,

AddedA. whereas EU agencies are distinct legal entities set up to carry out specific technical, scientific or managerial tasks that help Union institutions to design and implement policies; whereas they are located in different Member States and have significant influence in areas of vital importance to European citizens’ daily lives, such as health, safety, security, freedom and justice;

Removed– having regard to the exchange of views with representatives from OLAF, the European Union Agency for Asylum and DG Home on 15 July 2025,

AddedB. whereas this resolution contains, for each body within the meaning of Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council , and for the Euratom Supply Agency, cross-cutting observations accompanying the discharge decisions, in accordance with Article 268 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and Article 3 of Annex V to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure;

Removed– having regard to the second report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0169/2025),

AddedC. whereas Union decentralised agencies and the Euratom Supply Agency should focus on missions with clear European added value and the organisation of such missions should be optimised to avoid overlaps in the best interests of the Union taxpayer;

RemovedA. whereas all Union decentralised agencies must be transparent and fully accountable to the citizens of the Union for the funds entrusted to them as Union bodies;

AddedD. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority aims to emphasise the significant importance of enhancing the democratic legitimacy of Union institutions; whereas this involves enhancing transparency and accountability, as well as implementing performance-based budgeting and ensuring good governance of human resources;

RemovedB. whereas the European Union Agency for Asylum, as a Union body entrusted with significant responsibilities and resources, has a corresponding duty to act with the highest standards of transparency, accountability and exemplary conduct, thereby ensuring the trust of Union citizens and institutions;

AddedE. whereas the Union’s action in the field of budgetary control is based on two principles: on the one hand, ensuring that the Union’s budget is properly and transparently spent, on the other, protecting the Union’s financial interests, and combating fraud;

RemovedC. whereas Parliament's role in respect of the budget discharge is specified in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in the Financial Regulation and in the Framework Financial Regulation;

AddedF. whereas, in 2012, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission adopted a ‘Joint Statement’ and a comprehensive set of guiding principles – a ‘Common Approach’ – to make the agencies more coherent, effective and accountable; whereas the Commission committed to follow-up on this agreement, where relevant in cooperation with the agencies;

RemovedD. whereas OLAF, as the Union’s anti-fraud body, has a duty to provide the European Parliament with timely and adequate access to its findings in order to enable effective discharge scrutiny;

AddedG. whereas acknowledging the legally non-binding character of the Joint Statement and of the Common Approach in its annex, and without prejudice to their attributions in the legislative and annual budgetary procedures, the institutions will take this Common Approach into account in the context of all their future decisions concerning Union decentralised agencies, following a case by case analysis;

Removed1. Recalls the role of Parliament within the discharge procedure, as governed by the TFEU, the Financial Regulation and its rules of procedure;

AddedGeneral

Removed2. Recalls that on 7 May 2025 Parliament decided to postpone the decision on the 2023 discharge of the European Union Agency for Asylum (‘the Agency’);

Added1. Notes that there are three types of EU agencies, decentralised agencies, executive agencies and other bodies;

Removed3. Underlines the paramount importance of acting responsibly and transparently in the implementation of the Union budget; insists that any failure to uphold these principles seriously undermines public trust;

Added2. Recalls that this resolution covers 31 out of the 33 decentralised agencies and two of the other four bodies (European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), and Euratom Supply Agency (ESA)); highlights that the budgetary and discharge procedures for two fully self-financed decentralised agencies, namely the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), are administered by the CPVO Administrative Council and the EUIPO Budget Committee, respectively, and are not part of this resolution; notes that, similarly, the Single Resolution Board’s (SRB) annual budgetary and discharge procedure is solely under the responsibility of its Board; underlines the need to ensure an efficient use of European resources; in line with the Court of Auditors (‘the Court’), calls for a thorough evaluation of the decentralised agencies, with a view to assessing possible reforms, to eliminate redundancy, enhance efficiency and achieve cost savings; recalls the importance of strengthening governance structures while ensuring agencies remain effective and responsive to evolving needs;

RemovedThe outcome of the investigation of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

Added3. Highlights the importance of the discharge procedure as it is not only a treaty-based obligation, but also promotes and aims to ensure transparency, accountability and open dialogue on the finances of the Union; notes that it also grants the agencies a possibility to showcase their work and demonstrate their added value to the Union and its citizens; stresses, furthermore, that agencies provide answers to the questionnaires sent by Parliament and are invited to public hearings by the discharge authority and that this gives citizens, companies, NGOs and other stakeholders the possibility to follow the meetings and be assured that the revenue and expenditure are in line with the principles of sound financial management;

Removed4. Notes that OLAF made an anonymised version of its final report on the investigation available to the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control in March 2025 and to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in July 2025; deplores the delayed access to the investigation, which was granted only in March despite the request made by the rapporteur in December 2024, with OLAF’s reply citing objections from the Management Board of European Union Agency for Asylum; insists that access to the report should have been given to CONT members earlier to guarantee the exercise of their mandate adequately;

Added4. Considers that the concept of granting discharge by an internal discharge authority as in the case of the EUIPO, CPVO and SRB could potentially lead to a conflict of interest; believes that discharge granted by Parliament avoids the potential for conflicts of interest and contributes to the transparency and public image of the agencies;

Removed5. Is aware that OLAF’s investigations shall be conducted continuously over a period which must be proportionate to the circumstances and complexity of the case; is concerned about the length of OLAF’s investigations as it undermines the ability of the discharge authority to consider their findings efficiently; insists on the crucial role of timely investigations in maintaining effective Parliament oversight; calls on OLAF to review and speed up the procedure of completing and sharing investigations with the Discharge Authority; stresses that such delays undermine the ability of CONT members to effectively exercise their oversight mandate and calls for measures to ensure prompt access to investigation reports in the future;

Added5. Is of the opinion that, notwithstanding the legal framework, the same principles of accountability and transparency should be applied to all EU-related bodies;

Removed6. Stresses that protecting the Union budget must remain a core value of sound financial management, which all Union institutions are duty-bound to uphold, including agencies and decentralised bodies that must set a clear example of responsibility and transparency in the use of European public funds; reiterates the need for strengthened coordination and cooperation within the anti-fraud institutional framework, particularly to address the need for faster and more efficient OLAF investigations, thereby aligning these efforts with the broader goal of safeguarding Union finances;

Added6. Recalls point 58 of the Common Approach on fully self-financed agencies to ensure public scrutiny by the Parliament that states: ‘The possibilities for securing democratic accountability for fully self-financed agencies (i.e. financed by their clients) should be explored, as they are Union bodies in charge of implementing EU policies but not subject to a discharge within the meaning of the TFUE. A possibility could be that the agencies in question, submit to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission an annual report on the execution of their budget and consider requests or recommendations issued by the Parliament and Council.’;

Removed7. Calls on the Agency and OLAF to make an anonymised summary of the OLAF report publicly available, to the extent legally possible, in the interest of transparency and public trust;

Added7. Points out that while the establishment or expansion of EU agencies is intended to enhance the Union’s capabilities, it is critical to ensure that this process is guided by thorough evaluations, impact assessments and a clear demonstration of added value; so that lessons can be learned and consideration can be given to terminating their mandate if necessary; highlights that this approach would not only ensure better regulation but also enhance the effectiveness, accountability, transparency and coherence of the Union’s institutional landscape;

Removed8. Takes note that OLAF issued disciplinary and administrative recommendations following the investigation;

Added8. Recalls that point 60 of the Common Approach states that every EU agency should be evaluated every 5 years; urges the Commission to explore further synergies and consolidation in the activities, and possible merging of agencies with complementary activities, in order to ensure cost-effectiveness and streamline agency functions, including potential mandate reviews where inefficiencies or redundancies exist; encourages the application of the sunset/review clause where necessary to maintain efficiency and ensure the optimal use of resources; believes that budgetary efficiency is key to the functioning of the agencies; echoes the recommendation of the Court in the Special Report 22/2020 which advises the Commission to increase the use of cross-cutting evaluations of agencies in the context of the Commission’s fitness checks of the different policy areas;

Removed9. Observes that, concerning the disciplinary recommendations, the Management Board decided, as a follow-up, not to open disciplinary proceedings and instead issued written recommendations with a warning and requested to the Executive Director concrete proposals by way of corrective actions, and a timetable for their implementation as soon as possible; acknowledges that in line with this request, the Executive Director has submitted to the Management Board the following documents, which include:

Added9. Reaffirms the importance of transparency, accountability, and performance-based budgeting in all EU agencies, ensuring effective financial management; emphasises that agencies must adhere strictly to their mandates; acknowledges that some agencies may require a strengthened mandate; calls for the enhancement of governance mechanisms to avoid duplication of competencies and to improve operational efficiency;

Removed– the Recommendations made by the Management Board;

Added10. Stresses the need for sufficient resources to ensure that the agencies are able to fulfil new tasks required of them by new legislation;

Removed– the current state of affairs in the Agency with regard to each Recommendation; and

Added11. Highlights the importance for the agencies to enhance their presence in the media, on the internet, and across social media to increase public awareness of their work;

Removed– the additional corrective actions to be implemented with the inclusion of a provisional timeline for their implementation; calls on the Management Board to follow up on the recommendations and report back to the discharge authority on their full and timely implementation;

Added12. Points to the mounting confusion stemming from the multitude of cases where the agencies’ names and acronyms are either identical or almost identical; calls on the respective bodies to explore ways of improving the situation;

Removed10. Regrets that the Management Board has decided after intense deliberations not to implement OLAF’s disciplinary recommendations, including the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the EUAA Executive Director or any other staff in the Agency, despite OLAF’s significant findings, which appear to be systematic and which undermine trust in the Agency’s leadership; emphasises that this decision raises questions about the Board’s commitment to accountability and responsibility, in line with institutional expectations, and acknowledges the Board’s deliberate choice not to implement the recommendations after reviewing the issues raised; stresses that Parliament will remain particularly attentive to the corrective actions undertaken; expects the Agency to demonstrate exemplary follow-up, high standards, clear responsibility for implementation of corrective measures and full accountability; calls on the Agency to ensure transparent reporting to Parliament by, inter alia, sharing the minutes of Management Board deliberations with Parliament, to strengthen parliamentary oversight;

AddedGovernance

Removed11. Notes that the Executive Director prepared a “Vision Statement on leadership implementing the changes in EUAA” with corrective actions implemented and corrective actions to be implemented; requests the Agency to inform the discharge authority of the corrective actions implemented and to be implemented, along with deadlines for their completion;

Added13. Recalls that the Common Approach , gives an overview of the governance structure of the decentralised agencies; acknowledges the progress made by EU agencies in improving financial management and governance structures while recognising the need for further improvements in efficiency and accountability; recalls that the management boards of all decentralised agencies play a crucial role in ensuring good governance and accountability; reminds that the Common Approach suggests that the management board should consist of one representative from each Member State, two representatives from the Commission, one member designated by the Parliament (where appropriate), and a ‘fairly limited’ number of stakeholder representatives (where appropriate), ensuring that they reflect a diverse range of interests and their selection process was transparent;

Removed12. Expresses concern that the administrative recommendations addressed the practice of staff evaluations being conducted by heads of sector rather than heads of unit, as well as shortcomings in the management of conflicts of interest within the Agency;

Added14. Observes that the governance structure of the decentralised agencies is overall quite similar for all the agencies; notes that all of them have a Management/Administrative Board and a Director; notes that nine agencies have an Executive Board (Cedefop, EUDA, ENISA, ERA, EU-OSHA, Eurofound, Eurojust, FRA, EIT) while only the agencies related to the European Union space programme have a Security Accreditation Board; notes, furthermore, that a Board of Regulators or Supervisors has been established by the three European Supervisory Authorities (European Banking Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)) and two agencies in the single market cluster (European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and Agency for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office));

Removed13. Welcomes that starting in 2025, heads of unit will conduct staff evaluations as foreseen in the applicable rules;

Added15. Recalls that Eurofound, Cedefop and EU-OSHA’s management boards have a tripartite structure; notes that each Member State is represented in each board by a government, an employer and a trade union member (81 representatives in total); notes that the Commission has three representatives, and that there is an independent expert (without voting rights) appointed by the Parliament; recalls the smaller size of the ETF’s governing board, including 27 representatives from Member States (without social partners), three Commission representatives (who share one vote in the Board), three experts appointed by the Parliament (compared to one per tripartite agency), and three partner country representatives appointed by the Commission ;

Removed14. Strongly deplores the weaknesses in the management of conflicts of interest within the Agency, particularly the flawed handling of complaints by the Management Board against decisions made by the Executive Director; insists that such practices undermine the Agency’s integrity and credibility; calls on the Agency to promptly inform the discharge authority of the corrective actions and organisational changes put in place; stresses that only a robust and exemplary framework for conflict of interest management will be considered acceptable;

Added16. Takes note of the conclusions of the evaluation of Eurofound, Cedefop, ETF and EU-OSHA concerning the tripartite governance structure (Eurofound, Cedefop and EU-OSHA); observes that the tripartite structure provides benefits such as representation, strategic direction and knowledge-sharing but the size and diversity of the management boards pose challenges in navigating compromises on core business and administrative decisions; points out that the evaluation considered alternative governance models to involve social partners more efficiently; highlights the increased potential for savings and synergies in the activities of these agencies; stresses the need for rigorous financial oversight of EU agencies to ensure cost-effectiveness and prevent the misuse of public funds; underlines the need for a responsible, needs-based approach to agency funding, preventing bureaucratic expansion while ensuring agencies have adequate resources to fulfil their mandates;

Removed15. Notes the recognition by both the Management Board and the Executive Director of the seriousness of the allegations and the issues raised; acknowledges, however, that the Executive Director expressed scepticism, citing extraordinary workload during crises, which cannot be used as justification for dismissing the findings; considers that the recognition must be accompanied by decisive corrective measures, timely implementation, and full accountability to the discharge authority;

Added17. Takes note of the conclusions of the report on the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) and its findings deeming that regulation fit for purpose, including a review of the Standing Corps published in February 2024; notes that while the regulation provides a framework for effective border management, challenges remain in governance, accountability, and efficiency; recognises that the governance structure requires adjustments to ensure that Frontex can fully implement its mandate, including addressing the balance of representation in the management board, streamlining internal decision-making processes and avoiding overlapping responsibilities; welcomes the new organisational structure adopted by the management board in November 2023 as a step toward improving governance, strategic coordination and resource allocation; acknowledges the administrative inefficiencies highlighted in the evaluation report, particularly regarding reimbursement procedures and bureaucratic hurdles faced by Member States when deploying personnel to Frontex; calls on the Commission to explore ways to simplify these processes to reduce unnecessary burdens on national authorities; notes the importance of implementing recommendations from the Fundamental Rights Officer’s (FRO) annual report; while recognising the progress that has been made, calls on Frontex to continue to enhance transparency, fully cooperate with investigations and implement measures ensuring fundamental rights protections in all of its activities;

Removed16. Notes with concern the repeated failures in governance, including the inability of the Management Board to exercise timely and effective oversight; regrets that several of the irregularities could have been prevented with better internal controls and proactive engagement from the Management Board; insists that this institutional failure must be addressed structurally, not just procedurally;

Added18. Stresses that a balanced approach, combining effective border control with robust fundamental rights safeguards, is key to maintaining a secure Schengen area and a credible migration management framework for the Union; reiterates, therefore, the importance of structural and continuous fundamental rights training for Standing Corps officers (Frontex), ensuring their awareness of and compliance with relevant fundamental rights obligations and standards and with international human rights and humanitarian law ; stresses, moreover, the importance of reporting fundamental rights violations, when witnessing such violations, via the issuance of Serious Incident Reports;