Changes from plenary report to adopted text

RemovedEXPLANATORY STATEMENT

RemovedIn the Versailles Declaration, Member States agreed that the new situation requires a thorough reassessment of how the EU should ensure the security of energy supply. The update should reflect the technological changes that have taken place in recent years and the progress made in the cross-sectoral integration of the energy system. It should also reflect changes in the geopolitical situation. This is not limited to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the profound changes in supply routes and the EU’s increased dependence on Liquefied Natural Gas imports, but should also take into account broader geopolitical developments in the world. We need to analyse the new US administration’s decision to take a step back on climate policy, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and see what the consequences are for our economy, for the existing competitiveness gap between the US and the EU, and whether this requires a reassessment of our policies, including in the field of energy and climate.

RemovedThe reassessment would be incomplete without taking into account the lessons learned and acknowledging the shortcomings of existing policies. This applies to the EU’s unstable and ambivalent policy towards natural gas, which has undermined the trading position of EU companies, leaving them unable to conclude long-term contracts, partly due to the legal limitation of gas contracts to 2049, leaving Europe exposed to global spot market prices and creating a dangerous gap between what the bloc has contractually secured and what will be imported over time. The above also applies to the existing approach to nuclear energy, which has been treated as an elephant in the room of EU policy for years. This has gradually changed in recent years, with the result that Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has been given the task in his mission letter of facilitating the deployment of small and modular reactors in the EU. The role of nuclear power should be further reassessed as it has an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables, providing flexible load following and frequency control, allowing very rapid changes in output and underpinning security of supply in Member States. EU energy policy should be firmly based on the principle of technological neutrality, which is crucial for security of supply as it allows for a diverse mix of energy sources and innovations - from renewables to nuclear and low-carbon fuels - to increase resilience, reduce dependence on specific suppliers and ensure a stable and adaptable energy system in the face of geopolitical and market uncertainties.

RemovedThe Rapporteur expresses her concern that the short-sightedness and self-interest of some EU Member States in securing cheap energy imports for their economies, against the warnings of other countries, has taught the whole continent, at enormous cost, the dangers of dependence on an unreliable energy supplier such as Russia. The report stresses that the lessons of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine must be at the heart of future EU action. EU energy sanctions against Russia should be fully implemented and further strengthened. This is required not only by our obligations to Ukraine, which is the first line of defence of the European continent against an aggressive, revisionist and imperialist Russia. It is also required by the resilience of our energy systems, which must not fall back into the trap of energy dependence on Russia and its inevitable future blackmail. For this reason, the Rapporteur calls for the adoption of a phase-out plan that should pave the way for the definitive end of all energy imports from Russia, including in nuclear and related technologies. The text also emphasises the need to ensure transparency and traceability of Russian energy imports into the EU, as a clear picture of what and how much is actually being imported should be a prerequisite and a basis for future measures guiding the EU’s phasing out of Russian imports. The Rapporteur believes that the forthcoming revision of the security of supply architecture should be used as an opportunity to include in its framework an obligation for each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of national companies. This should be used in the future to prevent other dependencies, as we cannot have a situation where we move from dependence on one country to total dependence on another.

RemovedThe Rapporteur condemns calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of a peace settlement in Ukraine. This would undermine the commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and undermine all aspects of the Union’s security. Given that gas imports are not (yet) sanctioned by the EU, the Rapporteur calls on the Commission and Member States to put in place much needed safeguards against the import of gas volumes that threaten the security of the Union. These safeguards could take the form of a required countersignature by the Commission on any potential contract with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase.

RemovedThe Rapporteur emphasises that the geopolitical situation underscores the need to revise the understanding of energy security. This requires reconceptualising that the “peace dividend” is over and that resilience of energy systems, broadly understood, is now a strategic imperative. Member States urgently need to cooperate and invest in protecting their critical infrastructure against man-made threats, both cyber and military. We need to learn the lessons from a war in Ukraine and Russia’s deliberate attacks on its energy infrastructure assets and increase the preparedness of our energy systems.

RemovedClimate change poses significant risks to energy infrastructure, as rising temperatures, extreme weather events and changing rainfall patterns threaten the reliability and resilience of energy systems. Heat waves can reduce the efficiency of power plants and transmission lines, while droughts can limit hydropower generation and the availability of cooling water for thermal and nuclear power plants. More frequent storms, floods and wildfires can damage critical infrastructure, leading to power outages and costly repairs. These challenges require urgent adaptation measures, such as strengthening networks, decentralising energy production and integrating climate resilience into infrastructure planning. Strengthening the energy system against climate impacts is an essential element of a policy to ensure a stable, secure and sustainable energy supply in a rapidly changing environment. We must therefore ensure that all new energy infrastructure is “resilient by design” and provides a high level of protection against climate and man-made threats.

RemovedThe Rapporteur would like to draw attention to the fact that the increasing complexity of the energy system, driven by the integration of variable renewable energy, decentralised production, digitalisation and the electrification of key sectors, requires greater policy coordination between Member States in order to ensure stability, efficiency and security of supply. As energy flows become increasingly interconnected across borders, unilateral action can often lead to inefficiencies, market distortions and supply risks. This should not be limited to network infrastructure and emergency response mechanisms, which are essential to prevent congestion, increase flexibility and optimise the use of resources across regions. As has been shown, national decisions to remove generation capacity from the system, such as the closure of nuclear power plants, can have a major impact on the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries, to the extent that some of them are considering insulating their markets from EU energy system influence. Energy security is increasingly a shared responsibility of Member States and these decisions require closer coordination.

RemovedSecuring a stable and diversified energy supply is essential for economic resilience, industrial competitiveness and social stability. Domestic energy production, improving energy efficiency and strengthening the infrastructure for alternative sources, such as hydrogen and biomethane, are essential to reduce dependence and increase resilience. Strong trade partnerships, especially with like-minded countries, are essential for energy security as they diversify sources of supply, reduce dependence on individual suppliers, increase market stability and facilitate access to critical energy resources and technologies needed for a resilient and sustainable energy system. A secure energy system not only protects economies from geopolitical shocks, but also supports long-term climate goals, enhancing both sustainability and strategic autonomy.