Text · Comparison of two versions
Changes from plenary report to adopted text
A-10-2025-0049 → TA-10-2025-0075
- From
- A-10-2025-0049 Plenary report of 1 Apr 2025
- To
- TA-10-2025-0075 Adopted text of 6 May 2025
- Changes
- 16 changes to the text
- Paragraphs
- +7 added · −10 removed · 15 changed
More facts (3)
- Dossier
- 2024/2083(INI)
- Title (from)
- on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023
- Title (to)
- Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023
AI: What changed, in short Written by AI from the official text — check the source · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Sept 2026
Adds new paragraphs on VAT gap data and IT fragmentation, and rewrites a paragraph on NGO funding transparency.17812 The other changes are formal: decimal separators updated, paragraph numbering adjusted, and references corrected.2345
The notes class 4 changes as substance, 12 as formal, 0 as wording only.
Every difference
The full paragraph comparison, packaging included; long runs of unchanged paragraphs are folded. One part of the text per page.
Part 3 of 5: Paragraphs 121–180
60 unchanged paragraphs
63. Recognises the growing risk of AI-generated content being used to manipulate procurement processes, financial transactions and evidence in fraud investigations; calls on the Commission to prioritise research and policy measures to combat fraudulent activities enabled by artificial intelligence, including deepfake technology and AI-driven disinformation campaigns that could compromise financial and anti-fraud mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose stricter legal provisions and penalties for entities found to be using AI to commit or facilitate financial fraud, including AI-driven money laundering schemes, falsification of contracts, and digital identity theft in procurement processes;
64. Acknowledges the importance of the use of AI to make improvements in the quality and completeness of data exchanged with Member States; welcomes, in this regard, OLAF’s actions, including recommendations in the annual PIF reports, structured bilateral dialogues with Member States, the revision of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan, and interinstitutional exchanges focusing on these matters;
65. Further calls for a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms within OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol, to increase efficiency in tracking and preventing financial crimes against the EU budget; recommends the establishment of an EU-wide task force composed of representatives from OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and national anti-fraud units, with a dedicated focus on digital fraud threats, including deepfake technology, AI-generated fake documents and synthetic identity fraud; underlines that this task force should develop and share best practices with the Member States;
66. Stresses the need for increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States to combat AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; encourages the creation of a joint EU intelligence hub to track fraudulent AI activity in real time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards;
67. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement strict transparency and audit measures in AI-based fraud detection tools to prevent bias, algorithmic manipulation and misuse in financial oversight systems; urges the development of AI ethics guidelines for anti-fraud institutions to ensure accountability;
68. Calls for a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;
The internal layer of the EU’s AFA – 2023 key measures at EU level
69. Underlines the fact that the EU’s AFA is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multi-layered network of cooperation in which the first layer (OLAF, the EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, AMLA, the Commission, the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB)) is grounded on horizontal cooperation between the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; points out that the AFA has evolved over the years through a series of separate decisions that have led to an innovative network of entities; underlines that their coordinated activities in recent years have generated valuable experience that should be considered in the future revision of the relevant regulations; stresses that with the creation of the EPPO, the first European prosecutorial authority was established, enabling prompt and direct criminal law investigations and prosecutions, and that the lessons learnt in the first years of its operational activity need to be adequately integrated in the legislative framework to be able to take full advantage of the available tools and resources; stresses the importance of clear mandates between the various EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in order to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication and thereby ensure the efficiency of the functioning of the AFA;
70. Appreciates the integration in the 2023 PIF Report of the main administrative and judicial results achieved by OLAF and the EPPO, respectively, which follows the many calls from Parliament for more comprehensive reporting of the actions carried out by the components of the AFA; considers, however, that the differences in nature, scope and granularity between the two reports should be addressed and that the areas of cooperation should be indicated clearly; deems the differences in the figures provided by OLAF, the EPPO and the 2023 PIF Report to be justified in the current circumstances; highlights that reporting bodies in the Member States may report on criminal investigations only when the relevant judicial authorities grant the authorisation for them to do so, and this implies that while the EPPO and OLAF report data on active investigations, the reporting bodies are often unable to enter these details in the IMS database because of the need to protect confidentiality and ensure the proper conduct of investigations; understands that these cases result in a divergence in the data (‘delta’) that can only be eliminated when the investigations are completed and the relevant data are included in the reporting to the Commission so they can be included in a future PIF Report;
71. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission, in May 2023, of a package of anti-corruption measures which encompasses a proposal for a directive on combating corruption; believes that prevention and prosecution of corruption need to be stepped up and calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of the enforcement of measures in the Member States;
72. Welcomes the establishment of a network against corruption, which met for the first time on 20 September 2023, believes that the mapping of areas at a high-risk of corruption could contribute effectively to the further development of the EU anti-corruption strategy;
73. Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect rule of law principles; reiterates its deep concern regarding the situation concerning the rule of law in certain Member States, which is deeply worrying in its own right and can lead to serious losses for the Union budget; calls on the Commission to ensure the strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach rule of law principles and when this affects, or risks affecting, EU financial interests; further insists on the need for coherence across various instruments when assessing the rule of law situation in Member States;
74. Notes that the fourth Commission Report 2023 on the rule of law, adopted in February 2024, provides a follow-up to the recommendations issued in the previous year’s Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that, in the fight against corruption, various Member States have updated or launched a revision of their national strategies and/or action plans, while others have reformed criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption; observes that for many Member States the main obstacle to the fight against corruption is the limited resources of prosecution services; calls on the Commission to continue encouraging and supporting the efforts of Member States to reform and improve the efficacy of criminal proceedings and addressing the other challenges identified in the report; reminds the Commission of the effective tools at its disposal to safeguard the rule of law, such as infringement procedures, funding conditionality and the Article 7 TEU procedures, and expects it to make full use of them all; highlights, in this regard, that the new Financial Regulation introduces conditionality linked to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and calls on the Commission to start applying it, particularly in cases where infringement procedures have already been launched against a Member State for violations of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as this constitutes a clear recognition of an ongoing breach that could also impact the sound financial management of the Union budget;
75. Takes note of the Commission’s decision not to lift the measure under Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary; expects the Commission and the Council to lift the adopted measures only where evidence is collected that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have proven effective in practice and, in particular, that no regression has been detected on already adopted measures; condemns the threats, such as espionage, to which EU institution staff are exposed, such as OLAF staff during their investigative missions in Hungary; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of the EU institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard EU institution staff on missions; calls on the Hungarian authorities to take immediate and concrete steps to safeguard judicial independence, uphold media freedom and fully implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report to restore democratic checks and balances; urges the Council to continue the Article 7 TEU procedure against the Hungarian Government;
76. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, is a key determinant of the single market environment that fosters investment, growth, jobs and innovation, and protects small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and economic operators operating across borders; stresses that the Commission is accountable for rigorous verification, as a condition for disbursing funding, of the fulfilment of the rule of law-related milestones integrated in the various Member State RRPs; recalls that the Commissioner for democracy, justice and rule of law, working in close coordination with the recently appointed Commissioner on budget, anti-fraud and public administration, holds primary responsibility for the full application of the general regime of conditionality; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to prioritise horizontally infringements affecting the EU’s financial interests, in particular regarding the PIF Directive and the EPPO Regulation; welcomes the statement in the Commission Political Guidelines on the importance of the rule of law for EU funds and the commitment by the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration to introduce strong safeguards on the rule of law in the next MFF;
77. Considers that the protection of the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU currently included in the Common Provisions Regulation needs to be further strengthened; calls on the Commission to explore how a mechanism equivalent to the horizontal enabling conditions could be developed as a general feature in all areas of the EU budget, with a view to linking a wider range of policies to all the values set out in Article 2 TEU; calls on the Commission to explore means of linking funding to rule of law conditions and the completion of necessary reforms in order to ensure a comprehensive approach, applied horizontally to all EU funds; calls on the Commission to pursue a comprehensive approach and to put forward proposals for further strengthening the Union’s rule of law toolbox as a priority, including strengthened rule of law conditionality for funds deployed in the current programming period;
78. Maintains that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering, and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of illegal activities by organised criminals, as it allows them to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; recognises that the heterogeneous national legal systems and fragmented application of the Union’s anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and counter money laundering; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the ambitious legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which will unify national rules and thus enhance the collective fight against money laundering across the Union; welcomes the establishment of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA); considers that the new agency will play a central role in the new anti-money laundering framework through its coordinating and supervisory responsibilities; recalls that money laundering and terrorist financing are intrinsically linked and calls for the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA to have a stronger role in countering these phenomena;
79. Shares the view that the protection of the EU’s financial interests has been strengthened by the recast Financial Regulation; points out that the scope of EDES has been extended to encompass shared and direct management and provide new grounds for exclusion; welcomes the introduction of a legal basis for a risk-scoring and data-mining tool to be used by all Member States and in all management modes; regrets that both these measures will enter into force only in 2028 and only from the next MFF, resulting in several more years without comprehensive transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funds and missing a crucial opportunity to use these data to strengthen safeguards against corruption and fraud;
80. Appreciates the adoption of an updated action plan for the 2019 Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy; notes that it includes 44 actions distributed over seven themes covering, in particular, digitalisation, cooperation, the RRF, customs fraud, and awareness-raising in ethical and anti-fraud culture matters;
81. Points out that the EU’s anti-fraud programme (UAFP) is the only spending programme specifically dedicated to fighting fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and that it provides relevant support to all Member States’ authorities as components of the external layer of the AFA, in order to strengthen the fight against fraud; observes that the UAFP has the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing anti-fraud landscape and is aligned with the seven-year period (2021-2027) of the current MFF; notes that, so far, 55 % of the total implementation of the UAFP has contributed to the digital transition;
82. Calls on the Commission to build on the success of the UAFP and encourages the Commissioner on budget and anti-fraud to consider the UAFP as a model to be extended in the next MFF, in line with the task, indicated in the mission letter, of securing support for Member States’ efforts to protect the Union’s financial interests;
83. Welcomes the first UAFP association request received in 2023 from a non-EU country, namely Ukraine, with which an association agreement covering its participation in the programme has been negotiated and was adopted in March 2024;
84. Expresses concern that the Commission’s latest interim evaluation of Hercule III found aspects that may have hampered the programme’s effectiveness, notably that certain Member States’ administrations lacked the resources to enable them to cope with the programme’s administrative requirements;
85. Takes note of the reiterated calls from the EPPO to bolster the detection capacity of the relevant components of the AFA, and recalls that, in line with the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy, emphasis is to be given to data analysis as a tool for detecting fraud; highlights, in this regard, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to obtain comparable data across the EU; encourages the Commission to strengthen the use of the IMS as a tool to support auditors’ risk analysis when preparing audit activities; invites OLAF to increase its training offer to Commission staff, including auditors and relevant actors in the financial flow circuit;
86. Is aware that the decentralised structure of the EPPO entails an interplay between national law and EU law and between national authorities and the EPPO; understands that the EPPO operates based on the directly applicable EU regulations but that it also requires adequate implementing measures to be adopted via national legislation transposing the PIF Directive and other relevant Union acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that national legislation is fully in line with the EPPO Regulation and the PIF Directive, launch infringement proceedings and propose the revision of these legal acts in order to make the EPPO more effective in the exercise of its mandate;
87. Notes the results of the Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to the EPPO Regulation, which was presented in September 2023; regrets that many situations are still suboptimal and need to be addressed because they weaken the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal investigations; refers, in particular, to the attribution of competence between national prosecution services and the EPPO; stresses also that the EPPO Regulation stipulates the reporting of possible EPPO cases directly and without undue delay; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor Member States’ full compliance with the EPPO Regulation and their prompt reporting of suspicions of fraud in areas within the EPPO’s competence directly to it;
88. Is concerned that in many Member States the designated national authority deciding on disagreements between the EPPO and national authorities on the competence for prosecuting a case is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor whether Member States are fully complying with Article 25(6) and Article 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, which requires the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against a decision by a national authority on the attribution of competence;
89. Stresses that the current control by national authorities over the ‘necessary’ resources and equipment of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) and the need to refer to the national authorities’ provisions for ‘adequate arrangements’ on social security, pensions and insurance coverage could constrain the autonomy and independence of the EPPO’s actions; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation;
90. Points out that the transposition of the PIF Directive differs between Member States, which, in some cases, affects the cross-border exercise of EPPO competences; calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the PIF Directive and to propose its revision, based on the experience gathered;
91. Underlines that Article 25(3) of the EPPO Regulation, which elaborates on the exercise of the EPPO’s competence in the event of non-PIF offences inextricably linked to PIF offences, raises legal and practical questions and requires further streamlining in order to make effective use of the EPPO’s legal framework; calls on the Commission to propose suitable solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to reinforce the EPPO’s ability to investigate cross-border organised crime;
92. Reiterates that the EPPO has an important role in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in the rule of law reports; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO; notes with approval Ireland’s recent announcement of its intention to participate; calls on the Government of Hungary, the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls that broad public support for Hungary’s accession has been demonstrated by the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;
93. Reiterates its call for the launch of an exchange of views on the possible clarification of the competence of the EPPO within its mandate, as defined in the Treaty, as regards protecting the financial interests of the Union;
94. Notes that in 2023, cooperation between the relevant actors increased, with the EPPO and Eurojust cooperating on 26 ongoing cases at the end of 2023; observes that also in 2023 the EPPO and Europol cooperated efficiently on various operational matters, and understands that this cooperation almost doubled in 2023, with Europol providing support on 47 cases upon the EPPO’s request; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO and Eurojust specify the efficiency criteria on the basis of which they conduct their activities;
95. Welcomes the efforts by OLAF and the EPPO to strengthen their cooperation; understands that information is being exchanged between the two offices in order to avoid parallel investigations into the same matters, and that, in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO; is aware that the synergies resulting from the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) are suboptimal; calls on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing its regulations;
96. Is concerned about the lack of analysis and accurate information on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union’s budget that should follow both OLAF and EPPO investigations; is aware that the impact of the AFA on the security of citizens and on the enforcement of the rule of law in the Union goes beyond the quantification of financial recoveries alone; stresses, however, that the results of the efforts made to create the AFA should tend towards measurability and be tangible at least as regards the budgetary aspects; emphasises that the impact of the activities implemented for the protection of the Union’s financial interests should be assessed and taken into consideration in the allocation of resources and definition of mandates;
97. Understands that the Commission has yet to provide data on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union budget following the EPPO activities reported to the Commission, as provided by Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, and that this matter is included in the mission letter of the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration; observes that the freezing of assets is essential to combat crime affecting the EU budget and that a certain amount of time is needed for freezing to be converted into actual confiscations and recoveries; highlights that the amount confiscated is not expected to return by default to the Union’s budget; notes that, in line with Article 38 of the EPPO Regulation, the potential revenue resulting from seizure and confiscation measures taken by EDPs in Member States should flow back into the EU budget and could be accounted for in the EU budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow these sums to enter the EU budget;
98. Points out that data on effective recoveries following OLAF financial recommendations are not published in the OLAF Annual Report or in any other official report from the Commission; regrets that only aggregated data are made available and they refer to 2 299 financial recommendations issued by OLAF between 2012 and 2023 for an overall amount of about EUR 9 billion; remarks that the analysis of the available figures suggests considerable room for improvement; observes that a large gap exists between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered; is concerned by the low recovery rates for undue expenditure (for activities implemented under shared and indirect management modes the rate is 34 % and 11 %, respectively, and for recovery under direct management only 22 %); calls on the Commission to provide data with adequate granularity on recovery and to assess the reasons behind the recovery gap; stresses the need for OLAF and the Commission to agree upon, and apply consistently, common evaluation criteria that ensure greater convergence and clarity, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial recovery assessment; emphasises that recovery following an OLAF recommendation and the EPPO’s investigations is an important measurement of the efficiency of the AFA and calls for more transparency in this regard;
The external layer of the EU’s AFA – key measures at national level in 2023
99. Understands that the overall level of implementation by the Member States of the Commission’s recommendations issued in the 2022 PIF Report is considered satisfactory; highlights, however, that significant differences between Member States persist; is concerned, in particular, by the cases of inadequate reporting of irregularities by some Member States via the IMS; recalls that reporting is mandatory under the current regulations and encourages OLAF to strengthen its oversight and monitoring actions with a view to achieving uniform reporting across the Union;
100. Calls on the Commission to monitor the comprehensiveness of the reporting in IMS by countries benefiting from pre-accession assistance and welcomes the initiatives of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations to enforce candidate countries’ obligations to report irregularities in the IMS on a regular basis;
101. Encourages the Member States to report in the IMS the irregularities related to the RRF, in line with the ECA recommendations; calls on the Commission to facilitate such use of the IMS by the Member States by providing support in the form of training, seminars and exchange of best practices;
102. Welcomes the participation of Sweden and Poland in the EPPO, decided on in 2024, as well as the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; insists that Member States that are not yet participating must do so without delay and calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;
103. Reiterates that Member States’ ineffective, untimely or lack of cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitute grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to take into due consideration all information from the EPPO and OLAF on situations where Member States fail to comply with their obligations;
104. Maintains that National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) are the most effective tool for coordination between the various national, regional and sectoral authorities and the many local entities entrusted with the tasks into which the anti-fraud cycle is organised; notes that, in 2023, 21 out of 27 Member States reported having an anti-fraud strategy; observes that out of 21, only 10 Member States had a full national anti-fraud strategy while 11 Member States had only sectoral rather than national anti-fraud strategies in place; recognises that the approach taken by Member States in their anti-fraud strategies today varies widely; regrets that six Member States do not have any anti-fraud strategy at all; strongly regrets this highly unsatisfactory situation, which compromises the integrity of EU spending and undermines citizens’ trust in EU institutions;
105. Maintains that Member States would benefit from a periodic evaluation of their anti-fraud frameworks; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to run independent or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks to enhance consistency and pursue high standards;
106. Encourages the Commission to propose enforceable initiatives to clarify the relationship and consider establishing a link between the adoption of NAFS by the Member States and the level of financial support they receive;
107. Asks the Commission to launch, in preparation for the revision of the OLAF Regulation, a monitoring exercise on the state of play of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) established in the Member States; encourages the Commission to plan for the update and redesign of their structure, role, responsibilities and mandate; regrets the suboptimal staffing level across the majority of the AFCOS in the Member States; underlines the need to ensure sufficient levels of expertise among staff in national anti-fraud coordinating structures; calls on the Commission to encourage and support Member States in addressing these issues as a matter of priority, including in the context of the European Semester cycle;
108. Underlines the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; recalls that the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, adopted on 5 July 2017, is crucial for the protection of the Union budget, for the implementation of all the EU policies for which EU money is used, including in the context of RRF deployment, and for establishing the scope of investigations and prosecutions by the EPPO, whose competence is established by reference to the PIF Directive, as implemented by national law; expects national authorities, including governments, in all Member States unequivocally to condemn fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and any other misuse of public funds, taking a proactive approach in protecting the financial interests of the Union through effective measures in areas including risk assessment, communication and information sharing, and training of staff; calls on the Commission to intervene in a timely manner through infringement procedures to ensure the consistent transposition of the PIF Directive and the effective liability of – and sanctions for – legal and natural persons;
109. Reiterates that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection, investigation and prosecution; understands that, by the end of 2023, 24 Member States had adopted national legislation to transpose the Whistleblower Directive and declared their transposition complete; regrets, however, that in March 2023, after analysis of the national measures adopted, the Commission was obliged to refer six Member States to the CJEU for their failure to transpose the Directive and failure to notify transposition measures, asking the Court to impose financial sanctions; is concerned by the further infringement proceedings ongoing against six other Member States; calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of national transposition measures and report to Parliament accordingly; stresses that Parliament itself must also urgently ensure the proper transposition of the Directive, as confirmed by the CJEU ruling of 11 September 2024, which found that Parliament’s current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation; calls for Parliament to immediately adopt robust rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers;
110. Notes that the Investigative Division of the European Investment Bank (EIB IG/IN) had made 10 referrals to the EPPO and 17 to OLAF by the end of 2023; is aware that entities which have been found by EIB IG/IN to engage in prohibited practices may be excluded, in other words declared ineligible, for a stated period, from being awarded any contracts or entering into any relationship with the EIB; observes that, in 2023, these exclusion proceedings resulted in the exclusion of five economic operators for a minimum duration of three years, while five other companies reached settlement agreements applying conditionality to their eligibility;
External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests
111. Welcomes the Commission’s reaction to its call to increase the monitoring of, and control over, the funds under the Global Europe, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for assistance to non-EU countries, as well as via the joint communication with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; appreciates the Commission’s continuous efforts to ensure that anti-corruption measures are mainstreamed into EU external action instruments; reiterates its recommendation to suspend budgetary support and de-commit funds to non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, without compromising support for the civil population; emphasises that respect for and commitment to promoting EU values is an essential precondition for all partners aspiring to join the Union; reiterates that accession to the EU is a merit-based process whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria; considers that when applying the revised enlargement methodology there should be a particular focus on fundamental reforms, and that fair and rigorous conditionality should be applied as well as reversibility where setbacks occur; considers that appropriate tools must be used to ensure that candidate countries show concrete and sustainable compliance with the rule of law, democratic principles and fundamental rights, both before and after joining the Union;
112. Observes that in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine will continue to require substantial support in the current and next MFF and, in the perspective of a fair and sustainable peace agreement, Ukraine will need support for post-war reconstruction, including for central government services and reforms;
113. Considers that the three pillars of the Ukraine Facility could be reshaped accordingly and that reconstruction should align with pre-accession requirements; emphasises the importance of close coordination and cooperation with the Ukraine coordination mechanism established by the G7; calls for the EU and all Member States to increase their support for Ukraine, while putting appropriate measures in place to protect the financial interests of the EU through the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities in the use of Union funds, including by performing more thorough checks, in order to ensure that EU funds sent to Ukraine and to its neighbouring countries are adequately monitored and controlled and end up benefiting those most in need;
114. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, and deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, imply the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefiting infrastructure and people in need;
115. Appreciates the work carried out by OLAF and the EPPO in protecting the financial interests of the Union by providing training to increase administrative capacity and autonomy, carrying out investigations in Ukraine and agreeing on the working arrangement with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of corruption; invites the competent EU offices to continue their cooperation with and support for the Ukrainian authorities;
116. Acknowledges, in this regard, the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms related to judicial independence, accountability, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering, despite the difficult conditions caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; encourages Ukraine to continue on the path of reform, including with regard to the influence of oligarchs in politics;
117. Welcomes the enhanced sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia so far, encompassing the banning of Russian nationals and entities from participating in public procurement contracts in the EU and restrictions on EU funding for Russian publicly owned or controlled entities; recognises, however, that despite the current measures, individuals and entities subject to the sanctions against Russia can still find ways to circumvent the sanctions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to maintain, reinforce and extend the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus;
118. Recognises that the Member States and their relevant competent authorities are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, as well as for identifying breaches and imposing appropriate penalties; underlines the role played by customs authorities and the importance of their close cooperation in strengthening the uniform enforcement of sanctions; welcomes, in this regard, the Baltic Customs Initiative;
119. Underlines that the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to Palestinian refugees; stresses that the Union budget must continue to provide support to build peace and stability in the Middle East region, combat terrorism, hate, fundamentalism and disinformation, as well as promote human rights, fight impunity and strengthen adherence to the rule of law; emphasises, accordingly, that EU budgets must not support, under any circumstances, activities that go against these objectives; notes that, following the heinous terror attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and allegations of misuse of EU funds for terrorism, a funding review has been conducted by the Commission, which, although concluding that no evidence has been found, to date, that money had been diverted for unintended purposes (including for support for incarcerated terrorists) and reporting that the safeguards in place worked well, still called for certain additional measures that were deemed necessary; recalls that all hostages taken by Hamas have to be released; emphasises the importance of ensuring that EU funds are effectively allocated and managed in order to achieve their intended goals, even via scrutiny by the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA where appropriate; recalls the ongoing issue of the destruction of EU-funded projects in Gaza and the West Bank and calls for greater accountability and safeguards in this context;
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European Parliament (2025). “Changes between A-10-2025-0049 and TA-10-2025-0075”. Text, 6 May 2025. from A-10-2025-0049, to TA-10-2025-0075, reference 2024/2083(INI). EU Parl Watch Research. https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0049/compare/TA-10-2025-0075?all=1&part=3 (retrieved 28 September 2026). Data: European Parliament Open Data, https://data.europarl.europa.eu/ (CC BY 4.0).
BibTeX
@misc{epw-text-2025-05-06,
author = {{European Parliament}},
title = {{Changes between A-10-2025-0049 and TA-10-2025-0075}},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-05-06},
howpublished = {\url{https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0049/compare/TA-10-2025-0075?all=1&part=3}},
url = {https://news.eu-parl.st-solutions.dev/texts/A-10-2025-0049/compare/TA-10-2025-0075?all=1&part=3},
urldate = {2026-09-28},
publisher = {EU Parl Watch Research},
note = {Text. from A-10-2025-0049, to TA-10-2025-0075, reference 2024/2083(INI). Data: European Parliament Open Data (CC BY 4.0)}
}