Changes from plenary report to adopted text

12. Calls on the Commission to develop and implement solutions allowing a follow-up to OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, their analysis and the measurability of the actual impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget in terms of recovery of both mismanaged funds and of uncollected resources, with a view to providing additional justification for results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to notify Parliament of the outcomes of EPPO prosecutions;

13. States that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and the sound management of public funds;

14. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries;

15. Underlines the importance of the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture with regard to fraud and states that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the private sector, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; encourages the Commission to provide support to these relevant actors in the form of training programmes, funding and any other measures required to ensure their independence from external influence and from unlawful state surveillance, intimidation and attempts to undermine their legitimacy, in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law; invites the Commission to launch an EU-wide public awareness campaign on the risks of fake news, misinformation and deepfake content in fraud cases affecting EU-funded projects;

16. Is concerned about the EPPO’s and Europol’s clear warning on the increasing presence of groups of organised criminals behind the most relevant cases of cross-border fraud; notes that the EPPO’s annual report indicates 209 investigated offences concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up to the end of 2023; understands that organised crime affects Union resources substantially and that the scale of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular on the revenue side of the budget, can only be explained by the heavy involvement of serious organised criminal groups; is aware that the current analysis and reporting tools do not allow its quantification in a way that is satisfactory for evaluating the effectiveness or the shortcomings of the measures and policies in place; calls on the Commission to swiftly launch all necessary actions to address the analysis and reporting issue;

17. Maintains that the fact that the relevant EU legislation has not been transposed efficiently into the national legislation of many Member States and the fact that the Member States’ national laws are not harmonised give organised criminal groups opportunities to conduct a number of illegal cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime and for the introduction of a new common definition of organised crime, taking into account, in particular, the use of corruption, violence, threat or intimidation to obtain control of economic activities or procurement;

18. Points out the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer survey on ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’, showing that corruption is a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses in the EU; maintains that high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, not only affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, but also undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, both in the EU and in the Member States; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly using corruption to infiltrate public administrations and gain economic advantages;

20. Acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States; calls for an evaluation and a periodical revision of these strategies; emphasises the importance of taking into account and fully addressing country-specific recommendations relating to the fight against corruption;

21. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to prevent and address cases of conflict of interest in the management of the Union’s financial resources; observes that, in the 2019-2023 period, 419 cases were reported via the IMS related to conflict of interest (there were 375 in 2018-2022), involving in total about EUR 112 million; stresses that the ECA has indicated in its audit work that the main source of information on conflict of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of the data recorded in the IMS varies between Member States; underlines that where Member States consider a conflict of interest to be a minor component in a wider fraud case, they do not report such cases as relating to conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to adopt initiatives necessary to ensure consistent and adequately detailed reporting in the IMS of the above situations; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interest to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow practical application by the competent authorities;

Revenue

22. Observes that, in 2023, the overall number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities related to traditional own resources (TOR) (5 118 compared to 4 661 in 2022) was 10 % higher than the five-year average (2019-2023), but that the amount involved decreased by 12 % to EUR 478 million (compared to EUR 783 million bat the end of2022); regrets that while the data show improved recovery for non-fraudulent cases (82 %), the recovery rate for fraudulent cases remains unchanged at 25 %, which is still low and is distributed unevenly across the Member States;

23. Points out that, in 2023, the Commission considered that in only five of the new write-off reports submitted to it by the Member States had it been satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to the Member States in question and that the latter were not financially responsible for the loss; notes, by contrast, that in 81 cases, amounting to almost EUR 69 million, the Commission considered that the Member States had not satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to them and that they were therefore financially responsible for the loss; concludes, therefore, that there is actionable room for improvement in the collection of TOR by the Member States;

39. Considers that when assessing delivery models for EU expenditure, the susceptibility of the various options to fraud and other misuse should be taken into account; calls on the Commission to ensure that the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of the RRF, including the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA and Parliament, are taken into account in future EU funding instruments, notably the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF); underlines that the shortcomings identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud, double funding, and lack of transparency, must serve as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; opposes any replication of the RRF model in its current form and stresses that any future performance-based funding must be accompanied by significantly stronger safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms to ensure the sound management of EU funds;

NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

40. Appreciates the efforts made by the Commission in the revision of the 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) to adjust to the energy market disruptions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; notes that the integration into the RRPs of REPowerEU is expected to contribute to reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increasing European self-sufficiency;

41. Recalls, nevertheless, that delays can be observed in the implementation of the RRF and calls on the Commission to remain vigilant, in particular towards the end of the RRF life cycle, in order to ensure that Member States adequately protect the financial interests of the EU and that EU taxpayers’ money is spent appropriately;

42. Underlines the importance of robust management and control systems in preventing fraud as they have the effect of deterring criminals from attempting to defraud public authorities; expresses concerns about the ECA’s repeated observations pointing to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member State control systems, as this poses risks to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the EU’s financial interests; regrets that in several Member States, the control systems were not fully functional when the national RRPs started to be implemented, and underlines that such issues pose risks to the regularity of RRF payments and to the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States remedy the inadequacies identified in their control frameworks without delay, including by implementing the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA;

47. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded and monitored; notes with concern the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations;

48. Asks OLAF to continue its risk analysis, which, in 2023, was made available to Member States along with an updated version of the ‘RRF risk framework’, and with the training and seminars for Member State authorities; endorses the use of the IMS for reporting RRF irregularities; reiterates its call on the Commission, on the specialised EU agencies and bodies, as well as on Member States, to actively cooperate and interact to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests when implementing the NGEU;

49. Observes that, as part of the Guidance on RRPs, the Commission has adopted Annex IV on the framework for reduction and recoveries under the RRF; understands that the reduction of a payment is feasible when there are still payments to be effected; recalls that the RRF ends in 2026; points out that recovery is only to be launched whenever no further instalments remain; is concerned by the fact that this recovery procedure, borrowed from the model for implementing cohesion funds, has proved to be extremely ineffective and was abandoned in the current MFF; strongly regrets the fact that by the end of 2023 there were no recovery orders in ABAC concerning the RRF, and that there is still no obligation for Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via the IMS;

50. Reiterates that transparency plays a vital role in exposing fraudulent schemes and discouraging fraudsters; reiterates its dissatisfaction with the interpretation endorsed by the Commission of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF; rejects the Commission’s incomplete and misleading interpretation; remarks that, even according to the Commission guidelines, the ‘final recipient’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, and that any initial or intermediary recipient of funding, such as ministries or agencies operating merely as distributors of the funds, should not be considered to be the ‘last entity’; asks the Commission again to request that the Member States provide information on the ‘final recipient’ or ‘last entity’ and not to accept from Member States any information on ‘second-level recipients’ that is not in line with the agreement between the co-legislators; calls on the Commission to review its guidance by providing cases and examples that can clarify the provision and be a solid term of reference for the national authorities, in such a way as to endorse an adequate transparency level and a homogeneous interpretation across all the Member States; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance;

51. Is concerned by the ECA’s opinion on the increasing risk of EU funds being spent twice on the same measure and handed out twice for the same action; understands that corresponding measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, are financed from both the EU budget and the RRF, because the EU’s pandemic recovery fund finances actions similar to those covered by standard EU programmes; acknowledges that complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments is allowed, but observes that this could result in delivering milestones that are fully financed by funds other than the RRF, because the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs effectively incurred, but rather rewards the fulfilment of milestones and targets; emphasises that the several layers of governance, the fragmented IT landscape and the limited exchanges of data or use of data-mining tools such as ARACHNE, prevent the detection of double funding, and therefore the control mechanisms in place may be insufficient to properly mitigate this increased risk; maintains that the absence of direct access to the full list of RRF final recipients limits the Commission’s capacity to detect potential cases of double funding; believes that the precaution adopted by some Member States of avoiding combining the RRF with other EU instruments contributes to mitigating the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to increase its controls in this regard;

52. Observes that Member States may include measures in their RRPs with no estimated costs or estimated costs of zero; points out also that these ‘cost-free’ milestones are the main term of reference for assessing the correct use of RRF resources for their intended purposes; understands that the payments for these ‘cost-free’ or ‘zero-cost’ milestones are released following the milestones’ achievement, irrespective of the cost sustained, in line with the ‘financing not linked to cost’ approach under the RRF; observes, however, that such milestones make it impossible to verify the sound management of paid RRF resources, because such resources are disbursed in connection with a milestone for which they have not been deployed; calls on the Commission to reconsider its assumption that a ‘zero-cost’ measure cannot induce double funding, irrespective of whether other EU funds are used to implement it; strongly calls on the Commission to strengthen controls on ‘zero-cost’ measures and to give guidance to the Member States on how to address the financial design of the measures concerned in order to prevent such risk;

53. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

54. Follows up on the Ombudsman’s strategic initiative, launched in February 2022 and closed in September 2023, conducted on the transparency and accountability of the RRF, whose results it fully endorses; welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Ombudsman to address the suboptimal situations detected, in particular concerning the scoreboard and the proactive publication of documents related to the RRF;

Digitalisation and transparency to enhance the fight against fraud

55. Welcomes the political agreement reached on the proposed recast text of the Financial Regulation; believes that extending the scope of EDES to include shared management, and the adoption of a legal basis to use ARACHNE as a model for an EU-wide data-mining and risk-scoring tool, will strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls the calls made in previous reports to ensure that all Member States make use of data-mining tools, especially ARACHNE, to ensure timely and diligent reporting standards;

56. Shares the view that the IMS, the system through which Member States report to the Commission on irregularities and fraud affecting the EU budget, has potential for greater interoperability with other corporate tools of the Commission, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in Member States; asks to be informed, following the recast of the Financial Regulation, on the progress of the EDES-IMS interface and about the possible use of IMS data within the data-mining and risk-scoring tool (ARACHNE);

57. Reiterates its call for increased interoperability between data systems and for the harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the Union; is aware of the crosscutting nature of interoperability and appreciates the adoption of the Interoperable Europe Act;

59. Recognises that taking advantage of a real-time and data-driven economy has significant benefits for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while reducing the administrative burden on public authorities and businesses operating and trading across borders within the EU; calls for the EU and the Member States to improve the effectiveness of data sharing by creating a digital ecosystem allowing for the seamless, real-time and secure movement of standardised, structured and machine-readable data between businesses and public authorities, in particular national tax administrations, with a view to limiting possibilities for committing fraud and tax evasion;

60. Shares the view that digitalisation should be at the core of every anti-fraud strategy, and in particular that it should be integrated into national anti-fraud strategies to allow coordination between its constituent parts and for the threats posed by new technologies to be factored in;

61. Believes that digitalisation offers opportunities for tangible improvements to the governance of the anti-fraud network and that by facilitating communication and accessibility it helps to improve reporting, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the obstacles that persist and a more timely and comprehensive response by decision-makers and co-legislators; welcomes the fact that over half of the Member States have taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation, in particular a lack of information and access to data on digitalisation; encourages the Member States and actors in the AFA to continue addressing skills gaps through measures involving, inter alia, knowledge sharing, training and the broadening of know-how and skills in the field of digitalisation;

62. Welcomes the efforts of many components of the AFA in assessing and further developing the options offered by AI and machine learning in identifying and detecting irregularities and pursuing efficiency gains in both analysis and classic administrative tasks; reiterates that human assessment must remain the pivotal characteristic of every process; adds that AI has the potential to be a game changer in the fight against fraud, allowing the rapid analysis of large data sets, as well as enhancing fraud detection and identification of fraud patterns; recalls that the successful use of AI relies on effective collaboration between all stakeholders and on the availability of high quality data, underpinned by the effective use of ARACHNE; urges the Commission to work towards developing AI in Europe so as to uphold data sovereignty and ensure robust data protection, aligning with the principles outlined in the AI Act and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); calls on all anti-fraud actors to strengthen their cooperation to leverage the use of AI effectively and responsibly in the fight against fraud;