Changes from plenary report to adopted text

Removed22. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory;

Added25. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process despite wartime conditions and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

Removed23. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

Added26. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; welcomes the growth plan for the Republic of Moldova and the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, worth EUR 1,9 billion, which serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; expresses concern about the negative consequences of the suspension of USAID to Moldova; considers that this gap should be offset to the extent possible by EU sources, the European Endowment for Democracy and others; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

Removed24. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; stresses that the newly proposed growth plan for the Republic of Moldova serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; calls on all co-legislators to advance the relevant legislative acts as soon as possible; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

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27. Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;

28. Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;

29. Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

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Changed28.30. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; recalls that Israel has the obligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of disease epidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses in the strongest terms its concern about the disproportionate military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;

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Removed29. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; reiterates in this context the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; supports President Biden’s three-phase peace plan and regrets the lack of will on both sides to ensure its implementation; regrets, further, that the latest rounds of peace talks did not bring any tangible results; is aware of the fact that international stakeholders, including the US, the UN, the EU and Arab states, need to complement each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

Added31. Deeply regrets the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, which has caused a large number of civilian casualties in recent air strikes; deplores, in this context, the refusal of Hamas to hand over the remaining hostages; calls for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement and stresses the need for progress towards its second phase; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving the ceasefire-hostage release agreement in the first place; stands ready to engage in discussions on future concrete contributions to support a ceasefire; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access and sustained distribution of humanitarian and medical assistance in the Gaza Strip; welcomes, to that end, the redeployment of EUBAM Rafah on 31 January 2025 to support the Palestinian Authority in facilitating crossings for medical evacuations; expresses its unease about the recent closing of the Rafah Crossing Point until further notice as a result of military operations in Gaza initiated on 18 March 2025; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

Added32. Believes that the Association Council with Israel, held in Brussels on 24 February 2025, was a first step towards re-engaging in frank and open discussion with the Israeli Foreign Minister, which will require following up; acknowledges the value of engaging with Israel to strengthen the EU’s role in the Middle East, while stressing that the partnership must be based on full respect for rights and values; recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; welcomes the anticipated High-Level Dialogue with the Palestinian Prime Minister in April 2025;

Added33. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; welcomes the prospect of a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; reiterates the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace stability and prosperity in the Middle East; welcomes the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan presented at the Cairo Summit on 4 March 2025, which represents a serious basis for discussions on the future of the Gaza Strip; encourages the VP/HR and the Commissioner for the Mediterranean to engage constructively with Arab partners to provide credible solutions for the reconstruction, governance and security of Gaza; rejects, on the other hand, the ‘Trump-Gaza’ proposal, which ignores the volatile security conditions across the Middle East; holds the opinion that the extent of destruction and human suffering in Gaza requires comprehensive international engagement, with the United States, together with the EU, the UN, Arab states, and other international partners, complementing each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

34. Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;

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Removed31. Welcomes the recent ceasefire in Gaza and the progress made towards the phased release of hostages; emphasises that this represents a significant step towards relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access for humanitarian and medical assistance into the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

35. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;

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Changed33.36. Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon; welcomes the Council Decision of 21 January 2025 to adopt a third assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 60 million to the benefit of the Lebanese Armed Forces;

37. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

38. Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;

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Removed36. Highlights the need for the EU to follow up on its election observation and assist in finding solutions to electoral crises such as the one in Lebanon;

Added39. Echoes the call of ICC President Judge Tomoko Akane for the EU to take immediate action to protect the ICC and the rule of law in the international community, including by swiftly amending the EU blocking statute to bring the ICC within its scope;

Added40. Welcomes the formation of a new government; wishes President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam success in delivering on the aspirations of the Lebanese people; is committed to supporting the country in rebuilding state institutions capable of fulfilling their mission at the service of all citizens, in taking forward a reform-oriented and forward-looking agenda, particularly regarding civil liberties and the rule of law; supports reconstruction efforts while embarking on a path of political stabilisation and socio-economic recovery; calls on the VP/HR to relaunch the EU-Lebanon Partnership, including by holding an Association Council soon;

41. Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;

42. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;

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Changed39.43. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial as well as military vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

44. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;

45. Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;

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Changed42.46. Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks to the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the nominationfresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of aan newEU Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the ninth Brussels Conference that took place on 17 March 2025 with the participation of interim Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani; considers that the EUestablishment Delegationof todiplomatic Syria,relations with the new Syrian authorities should not be a pretext for leniency for Member State nationals who madefought earlyas contactpart withof Islamist groups in Syria; declares that these fighters still represent a threat to the transitioncountries authorities;of which they are nationals and to all Member States of the EU; reiterates its unwavering support for the peopleterritorial inintegrity of Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16.716,7 million people in need; welcomes, to this end, the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions and the gradual, yet conditional, suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors so as to provide the Syrian economy with a much-needed lifeline; pledges to closely monitor the political transition process and to call on the Member States to reverse the lifting of sanctions should the Syrian authorities not live up to their stated commitments; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime and encourages the caretaker authorities to urgently organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament, especially following the inacceptable retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led political transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; calls onwelcomes the Commissioncaretaker andPresident theal-Sharaa’s VP/HRacknowledgement toof swiftlySyria’s organisediversity, thewhile ninthtaking Brusselsnote Conferencethat onthe Syriacomposition withoutof delaythe andcurrent comeinterim upgovernment withis alacking comprehensivein planthis forregard; EUstrongly supportbelieves forthat the reconstructionsuccess of Syria, taking into account the lessons learned from Iraq and Libya,Syrian amongpolitical others;transition, urgesnotably the VP/HRsafeguarding toof urgentlycivil presentpeace toand the Council anbuilding actionof plantrust towardsin thestate swiftinstitutions, yethinges reversibleon easingtransitional ofjustice sanctionsand thatreconciliation areas nota linkedpath to the previous regime,fighting withthe aimpunity reviewof processall conditionalparties onresponsible thefor progressviolations of theinternational politicalhumanitarian transition;law; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

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Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

47. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;

48. Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;

49. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

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Changed46.50. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; underlines that the seriousness of China’s engagement will depend on its willingness to make concessions to address the management and the restructuring of the debt of the countries of the Global South; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;

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Added51. Calls on the Commission and the Council to re-evaluate and reassess the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+;

Added52. Calls strongly for a review of EU financial assistance to third countries to ensure that it does not support governments that challenge European values, spread anti-Western propaganda, support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and undermine the current international order that upholds democracy, human rights and the fight against corruption;

53. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;

54. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;

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Changed49.55. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK;UK welcomesgiven not only the existence of an unprecedentedly comprehensive Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the foundation of shared values such as democracy, support for multilateralism and human rights, but also the scope of the issues of common interest in fields such as defence, climate and energy, border management, the fight against terrorism, organised crime and the promotion of peace and stability; welcomes, especially, the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections;reflections before and after the anticipated UK-EU Summit;

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Changed50.56. Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; recallsexpresses thatconcern theover transatlanticthe relationshipfast remainspace oneat ofwhich the mostnew importantUS administration has been reversing established partnerships and strategicdiplomatic relationshiptradition; forexpresses dismay concerning the EUcurrent policy of appeasing Russia and itstargeting Membertraditional States,allies; whichregrets hasrecent beencomments emphasisedmade by theUS unityVice andPresident strengthVance, ofwhich question shared values underpinning the partnershiptransatlantic demonstratedpartnership; followingwarns Russia’sthat invasionthrough ofsuch Ukraine;erratic underlinespolicy, thatthe Trump administration is gambling with a strongscarce good, namely trust in the US; believes, nonetheless, that the transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic;Atlantic callsand onis thetherefore Commissionworth toinvesting fosterin; closerdeems tiesit withmore keycrucial partnersthan inever bothto thecontinue engaging with US counterparts at federal and Canadastate inlevel; orderencourages Member States to counterpursue globalbilateral challengesdiplomatic thatchannels affectwith ourcounterparts sharedin values,the interests,US securityas the format of cooperation preferred by the US administration, showing unity and prosperity;commitment into thisa contextcommon EU position; reiterates itsthe callimportance forof EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy; calls for stronger transatlantic cooperation on trade, on foreign and security policy and on combatting challenges caused by rapid technological changes and growing cyber threats; welcomes in that regard the work of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council;

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Removed51. Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed;

Added57. Deplores the decision by the US to bring a sudden halt to most of its humanitarian aid and development assistance, including but not limited to the aid provided until now by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with devastating effects on countless people’s lives, but which also risks severe consequences for human rights and global security; recognises that the EU cannot replace USAID, but needs to strategically and smartly reallocate resources through a Team Europe approach so as to mitigate impacts, in both the interests of the countries affected and our own interests; welcomes the announcement by the Commission and the EEAS that efforts are underway to inject liquidity in severely affected areas through redeploying and increasing pre-financing; commends the decision to initiate mapping at EU level, which should also take into account secondary effects, and asks for the results to be shared with the Member States and with Parliament; asks the Commission to issue a statement taking stock of the holistic response of the EU to this crisis;

Added58. Calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; believes that the bilateral security and defence dialogue as well as the upcoming security and defence partnership provide the basis for enhanced security and defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production;

Added59. Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed; considers that the EU must act urgently to reduce its dependencies on non-EU countries for its defence capabilities, in particular for strategic enablers, ensuring its own autonomous security; recalls that the EDTIB is a strategic asset for both the Union’s security and defence and for its foreign policy; calls for its significant strengthening and for the deepening of defence industrial partnerships and integration of the industrial basis of like-minded reliable partners into the EDTIB, first and foremost Ukraine;

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60. Encourages close relations with western European non-EU countries, in particular cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; welcomes in this context the conclusion of negotiations on a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; calls on the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway, particularly in the scope of the security and defence partnership as well as the cooperative management of shared stocks and the continuation of long-standing fishing activities; calls for the swift signing of the association agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

61. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses full support for the newly launched work on the EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, establishing more ambitious joint priorities for cooperation across all dimensions;

62. Expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to agree to have such a civilian mission on their side of the border as well;

63. Is of the view that the centre of gravity in the global order is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific and that the EU must strengthen its active role and presence in this region to safeguard its interests, promote stability and uphold a rules-based international order; reiterates that a peaceful, free, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region is of vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition in the region is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; calls, in this context for enhanced foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan;

64. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of their respective diplomatic missions in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; welcomes, to this end, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the latter of which provides for, among other things, consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including exchange of information on defence industry-related matters, as well as the exploration of possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives;

65. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; identifies climate change and green growth, digitalisation and new technologies, research and development, connectivity, trade and investment, foreign, security and defence policy as the key areas of cooperation; calls, in this respect, for stronger buy-in from Member States; calls, equally, on the Member States to expand and broaden the India-EU cooperation on maritime security in response to China’s evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific; highlights the need to engage with India on its heavy military dependency on Russia as well as its supply of restricted critical technologies to Russia; urges India to condemn Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and to join the EU sanctions policy towards Russia;

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Changed58.66. Considers India an important democratic partner and encourages the EU to strictly engage with the Indian Government on the respect of human rights and rule of law, both internally and worldwide; calls for the full implementation of the EU Strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in close coordination with Member States’ own actions; stresses in particular the need to promote greater synergies in foreign and security policy through existing dialogue mechanisms and other forums set up under the EU-India Roadmap to 2025; believes that the momentous visit of the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners to India on 27 and 28 February 2025 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of EU-India relations and reaffirmed the strategic link and its untapped potential; welcomes the announcement of a forthcoming strategic EU-India agenda;

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67. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; encourages the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on an investment agreement with Taiwan; emphasises that any attempt from authoritarian regimes to restrict the benign development of EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;

68. Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by its continuous distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758; calls, accordingly, for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;

69. Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, technological and military power to redefine the global order; underscores that the military-civil fusion strategy is a testament to such means; stresses, in this context, that the EU needs to be more assertive and unified in its approach to China and therefore calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to review the strategy towards China that takes full account of the increasingly oppressive domestic policies, the assertive foreign policy as well as the use of economic coercion as a means by which China aims to reach its objectives; considers that the challenges stemming from the rise of China as a global actor require a balanced multi-dimensional response along the principle of ‘cooperate where possible, compete where needed and confront where necessary’, through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on a number of key issues;

70. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

71. Holds the view that China, through the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, (indirectly) enables the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;

72. Reiterates its condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law as well as the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in the light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

73. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy;

74. Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and efforts towards a comprehensive strategic partnership, building on economic ties and sustainable growth, and in particular on political cooperation with regard to human rights and democracy; calls for increased support for Myanmar’s national unity government and for greater pressure to be applied to ASEAN countries to align on international sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta;

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Changed67.75. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with partners in Africa, among others South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal and Mauretania, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; is of the belief that the EU needs to maintain a continued focus on Africa, which is already a strategic continent and will become an increasingly important player in the future;